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ABSTRACT
This thesis is about change in foreign policy. It aims to 
develop the case study of Britain’s entry to the European 
Community and theoretical perspectives of foreign policy 
change in a mutually helpful way. It contends that foreign 
policy change cannot be understood without both a theory of 
the international system and a theory of how governments 
make decisions and interact. A case will be made for 
adopting a cognitive theory of decision-making within a 
critical perspective of international structures. Where 
other approaches often force accounts of change into an 
analytical mould of movement towards a well-defined and 
predictable equilibrium, the critical/cognitive combination 
allows hypotheses to be formed about the uncertainties, 
imperfections and inchoateness of change. The case of 
British entry to the European Community, 1970-4, will 
illustrate the value of such hypotheses.
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INTRODUCTION
Britain’s entry to the European Community gives the
appearance of choice, yet has been analysed in terms of
necessity. Although exhaustively debated and the subject of
a closely fought domestic contest, it has been claimed that
choice was illusory. Thus F.S. Northedge writes: " By 1970,
there was nowhere else for Britain to go but into the Europe
of the Six. . . had the Six realised it, they could have made
1
the fee for British entry even higher than they did".
This is no paradox to a neorealist for whom the preferences,
perceptions and processes within a state may be neither here
nor there. As S. Haggard and B.A. Simmons sum up this view,
" national policies cannot be inferred from intentions,
efforts or goals because structure tends to mould outcomes
2
however the former vary".
However, it will be claimed here that there is no 
contradiction in representing foreign- policy changes, such 
as those involved in British entry to the EC, as both pre­
structured and open-ended. The combination of a critical 
theory of structure and a cognitive theory of choice will 
make this possible. To see why, it is first useful to say 
some more about the logical characteristics of more
1. F.S. Northedge, Descent from Power : British Foreign 
Policy 1945-73, Allen and Unwin, London, 1974, P 328.
2. S. Haggard and B.A. Simmons," Theories of International 
Regimes",International Organisation,Vol 41,No 3,Summer 1987.
mechanistic, or "Durkheimian", accounts of the international 
system, such as Kenneth Waltz's neorealist ideas, most
1
famously developed in his Theory of International Politics.
To Waltz, states are like chess pieces: their behaviour is
not defined by their internal composition, but by the logic 
of the external relationships in which they stand to each 
other. Not only do the latter dominate foreign- policy 
change, but they constitute a system that is neither of the 
construction nor the choosing of governments. Once states 
are established to provide security in a field of 
insecurity, they are constrained to follow a balance of 
power logic, to imitate the most successful means of 
cultivating state power and to limit their co-operation to 
policies that do not compromise their ultimate ability fo 
provide for themselves. The system is static in that all 
durable foreign policy change will occur within its logic; 
it is homeostatic in that such change will always tend 
towards a neatly defined equilibrium: in a process analogous 
to the company in economic theory, the state that is only
'Vmarginally less efficient than others in respoding to
external imperatives, will suffer negative feedback until
its policies are corrected. A monistic system based on the
distribution of state power operates behind the backs of
governments to direct their foreign policy changes towards
1. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Addison 
Wesley, Cambridge, Mass, 1979. See also Kenneth Waltz," 
Reflections on Theory of International Politics", in Robert
0. Keohane (ed). Neorealism and its Critics, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1986, P 331.
equilibria that are enforced by feedback, where they are not 
intended or desired by decision-makers themselves.
As neorealists import Durkheimian theories of system from
general social philosophy, it is logical for critics to go
back to the same source for alternative theories about the
structuring of social life. Two accounts of the alternative
offered by critical theory will be employed
1
here: Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Knowledge and Anthony 
Giddens's Central Problems in Social Theory and Constitution 
of Society. According to critical theorists, the structuring 
factors in social life should include all those properties 
needed to reproduce entities or practices of social value 
across time and space. Various implications follow which 
show how the Durkheimians fail to distinguish what makes a 
system one of human actors, rather than natural objects.
By contrast, to the monism of Durkheimian systems, the
structuring of social life is irreducibly pluralistic. Any
social actor, such as a government, will often want to
reproduce several entities and practices across time and
space: the power and security of the state in the field of
international politics, the competitiveness of the economy
in a given international division of labour and the
Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge^ Tavistock 
Press, London, 1972.
2. Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, 
Macmillan, London, 1979, The Constitution of Society, 
Polity, Cambridge, 1984.
government’s own domestic survival will all require 
alignment with quite different imperatives ; the 
reproduction of each social practice involves governments in 
varying, and even conflicting, "logics of external 
interaction" with other entities. For example, governments 
face a logic of self-help in ensuring both the international 
economic success of their societies and the physical 
security of their states, but the two may cut in opposite 
directions. For fear that others may steal a competitive 
advantage, governments may feel compelled to allow their 
economies to go beyond a point of integration to the 
international division of labour, and to appropriate fewer 
resources to an independent defence, than would be prudent 
for states primarily concerned for their separateness and 
security in an inter-state system.
Even to reproduce one of the social practices with which a
government is concerned requires attention to several
structural realities. Taking up an advantageous postion in a
distribution of resources will never be enough, as even
command relationships require a minimum of viable inter-
subjective structuring: the sharing of meanings, routines
1
and norms with other actors.
Social structuring is, therefore, said to require 
configurations of both rules and resources. But in politics 
and other social activity, neither rules nor resources have
1. Giddens, op cit, 1984, PP 18, 37, 88-9.
a static significance; they are "performatives": they
acquire their effectiveness in how they are used and how 
they impress. Moreover, human objects of social systems can 
communicate discontents and co-ordinate to transcend 
constraints. Thus where Durkheimians posit structures that 
are static and set apart from social activity, critical 
theorists claim that they are recursively" implicated 
in that activity . Little happens that is not pre­
structured, yet capable of redefining how " things will go
1
on": "action and structure presuppose each other"
Bringing together the plurality and recursiveness of social
structuring, Foucault calls for analysis to switch from
explaining political developments as the outcomes of " great
silent, sedimentary substrata" to admitting that social
reality consists of " several different series that overlap
and intersect without being reducible to a single model of
causality or linear progression". A Durkheimian approach,
the whole methodology of which is to " detemporise and
detotalise", cannot capture the possibility that change is
not neatly defined within a single hegemonic system, but
occurs at the points of " rupture, tension and
discontinuity" between the several, recursive systems that
2
structure an entity’s social setting. These alternative
1. Giddens, op cit, 1979, P 53.
2. Foucault, op cit, P 8. Also, Richard K. Ashley," Living 
on Border Lines", in James Der Darian and Michael J. Shapiro 
(eds). International/ Intertextual Relations, Lexington 
Books, Mass, 1989, PP 259-313.
perspectives clearly have very different implications for
the ways in which an entity, such as a foreign-policy making
government, should go about the tasks of creating and
1
adapting to its environment.
If structures are recursive, it follows that they are more
permissive than is suggested by the constraining account in
Durkheimian theory. This is a point conceded by Waltz
himself. "Structural and unit level causes interact ..the
bothersome limitations of systemic analysis arise from the
2
problem of weighing unit level and structural causes". In a
famous analogy, Arnold Wolfers argues that situations are
rarely so compelling that human action can be predicted from
context alone; where a house is on fire, everyone will make
for the exits, but where it is just over-heating, there are
many plausible responses: the environment is structured, but
3
choices still have to be made.
This is especially so where the decision-maker finds himself 
having to decide how to distribute his resources between 
responding to several systemic relationships. Herbert Simon 
adds that units are only compelled to converge on a single 
standard of systemic behaviour where they are in fierce 
competition for a shortage of secure niches. Over time,
1. See the traditionalist/transformationalist distinction on 
page 16.
2. Waltz, op cit, 1986, PP 343-4.
3. A. Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, John Hopkins 
University Press, London, 1962, PP 14-6.
10
they usually develop differentiated characteristics,
protected positions in their environment and margins of
safety beyond bare needs. Moreover, where all behave
imperfectly, there is more room for each to choose its
1
behaviour. For all these reasons, systemic analyses rarely 
avoid the need for supplementation by theories of human 
choice: a point that is willingly conceded by critical
theorists, grudgingly, if at all, by Durkheimians. Michael 
Brecher argues that there is both an operational and a 
psychological environment of decision-making. Foreign policy 
takes place in a structured context, but that context has to 
be refracted through the interpretative frames of
decision-makers before choices are made.
A "rationalistic" theory of choice provides the best fit
with a neorealist view of system. It presents actors as
making synojb^ic calculations of all options available and
of all the likely costs and benefits that may ensue times
the probability of their occurence. In calculating costs and
benefits they are able to hold all their values in mind,
blending them into a single commensurable measure of utility
and comprehending how much of one value will have to be
traded off to attain another. This exercise enables them to
ÏT Herbert Simon, Reason In Human Affairs, Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1983, PP 14-6.
2. Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel: 
Setting, Images, Process, Yale University, Press, New Haven, 
1972, P 4.
11
1
optimise returns. It all implies formidable knowledgeability
of self and environment. However, John Steinbruner, suggests
that this is too demanding and that actors should be
described as rationalistic if they only strain towards the
ideal by continuously seeking 1) to up-grade pictures of
context: " analytic learning" 2) to improve the accuracy of
estimated trade-offs between values in the environment: "
2
value integration" . Such a view of choice fits the Waltzian 
perspective that governments will attempt to maximise the 
power and interests of the state and that they will not 
resist unwelcome lessons over long periods.
By contrast, a cognitive theory of choice goes well with a 
critical view of structure. They come from the same 
epistemological stable, such that it would be perverse to 
use one but not the other. Both challenge the tradition that 
the reality of assumptions is immaterial, so long as they 
yield good predictions. Just as critical theory claims to be 
based on observation of how social phenomena are, in fact, 
structured, cognitive theory is based on empirical 
experimentation with how actors perceive and decide. 
Critical theorists also stress that all structures need an 
inter-subjective dimension: shared understandings of how
things work, norms that govern the legitimation of actions,
1. Barry Hindess, Choice, Rationality and Social Theory, 
Unwin Hyman, London, 1988. PP 9-29.
2. J. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, 
Princeton University Press, New Jersey, PP 42-3.
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routines and socialised expectations that allow individuals
to make decisions without being crippled by the
uncertainties presented by the number and complexity of
interaction patterns that could follow from each action.
Giddens thus calls for social explanation to include a
double hermeneutic: interpretation based on how actors
1
themselves interpret their environment. The power of 
cognitive theory to rise to this challenge will now be 
developed at some length as the distinctive theoretical aim 
of this thesis is to demonstrate the cogency of a cognitive 
account of action within a critical view of structure, as a 
means to explain foreign policy change.
The cognitive paradigm proceeds from the rejection of the
idea that external context presents itself unambiguously to
human actors, who are more or less efficient processors of
system and interests. These are always open to many
interpretations. Under such uncertainty, it is the nature of
actors belief systems that are the key to predicting how
they will behave. As A.J. Ayer puts it, " The account of
the world is founded on the primitive elements of our
experience, but it is also the product of theory"..." it
1
cannot be prised away from our manner of conceiving it". 
Karl Popper explains that it is impossible to utter even the 
simplest conclusion about our environment without going 
XT Giddens, op cit~ 1984, xxxiii.
2. A.J. Ayer, The Central Questions of Philosophy, Penguin, 
London, 1976, P 137.
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beyond the facts. Theory is needed to posit criteria for
selecting, classifying and correlating the facts, not to
mention hypothesising causal relations. Because hypotheses
are needed to establish relations between facts they are not
reducible to facts and can never be other than " creative 
1
intuition.."
Even if facts could speak for themselves, there would always
be too many ramifications in relation to the bounded
rationality of man for decision-makers to calculate the
effects of each decision. These always depend on the
variable reactions of others, they cannot be calculated with
reference to one time period only, they feed back in terms
of a myriad of values and involve many trade-offs between
values. As Steinbruner sums up cognitive theory, it presents
the actor as coping with this irreducible uncertainty
2
categorically and not by calculation. He makes peremptory
use of a few pre-existing beliefs and regular cognitive or
mental operations to create a manageably simple and certain
view of the environment; cognitive experiments reveal that,
without these, actors are paralysed by uncertainty and can
3
neither describe nor prescribe.
1. Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 
Hutchinson, London, 1959, P 95.
2. J. Steinbruner, op cit, P 123.
3. R. Nisbett and L. Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and 
Shortcomings of Social Judgment, Prentice Hall,NJ,1980, P 7.
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The classic works that introduced cognitive theory to
International Relations were Joseph De Rivera, " The
1
Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy” (1968), Robert
Jervis, " Perception and Misperception in International 
2
Politics" (1976) and Steinbruner's " Cybernetic Theory of 
3
Decision" (1974). A summary of further research can be found
in Christer Jonson, Cognitive Dynamics and International 
4
Politics (1982) and Richard Little and Steve Smith " Belief
5
Systems in International Relations" (1988). The general
conclusions of cognitive science upon which these studies
draw are well collated in Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross,
Human Inference, Strategies and Shortcomings of Social
Judgement (1980) and Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos
7
Tversky. Judgement Under Uncertainty (1982). The principal 
perspectives of International Relations decision-making that 
have been drawn can be summarised as follows:
1. Given the openness of political environments to so many
1. Joseph De Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign 
Policy, Merrill, Columbus, Ohia, 1968.
2. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in 
International Politics, Princeton University Press, NJ, 
1976.
3. Steinbruner, op cit.
4. Christer Jonson, ed,Cognitive Dynamics and International 
Politics, Francis, Pinter, London, 1982,
5. R. Little and S. Smith , eds , Belief Systems and 
International Relations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1988.
6. Nisbett and Ross, op cit.
7. D. Kahnemann, P. Slovik and A. Tversky, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty, Cambridge University Press, London, 1982.
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interpretations, pre-existing beliefs and cognitive
operations are a key level of causation in the flow between
1
environmental stimuli, actor decisions and outcomes. They 
determine which pieces of information are even noticed, how 
they are interpreted and which prescriptions are considered.
Broadly speaking, politicians are likely to apply three 
types of cognitive operation. They may base their decision­
making on a prepositional theory or a paradigm; thus foreign 
policy behaviour would differ between decision - makers who 
take a monetarist or Keynesian view of the world economy, or 
hold to one of the many theories of European integration 
etc. Of particular interest here, is a distinction 
introduced by Steve and Michael Smith between foreign policy 
actors who take traditionalist and transformationalist views 
of international relations; the traditionalist believes that 
governments should continue to concentrate on the power, 
security and sovereign separateness of the states they 
represent: in a manner evocative of critical theory, the
transformationalist holds that the latter can only be one 
systemic consideration in a field of pressures and that the 
state itself may even need to be transformed or diminished
in favour of new political forms better suited to meeting
2
the external needs of the society that it represents.
Ï1 Steve Smith, Introduction to R. Little and S. Smith, op 
cit.
2. Steve and Mike Smith, Introduction to Michael Smith, 
Steve Smith and Brian White (eds), British Foreign Policy: 
Tradition, Change and Transformation, Unwin Hyman, London, 
1988. PP 4-6.
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The key level of causation provided by the fact that 
decision-makers may themselves be guided by theory has 
often been excluded by those afraid of reifying 
intellectual constructs; but reification only occurs with 
the false or inaccurate attribution of ideas to actors.
Alternatively, decisions may just employ a bagatelle of what
cognitivists call schema or scripts - expectations that a
fact of a certain kind will be followed by a predictable
sequence - as in the use of historical analogies,
stereotypes, standard operating procedures and proverbial
1
wisdom such as " Trojan Horse" or " Thin end of the wedge".
Finally, politicians may just " decompose their environment"
into a few relationships, only ever thinking about them one
at a time, as they become urgent. This is Steinbruner’ s
cybernetic variant of the cognitive paradigm; it shows how
the decision-maker may try to adjust to his environment by
choosing to monitor certain kinds of feedback and without
2
striving to understand how things work or inter-relate. 
Whichever strategy is employed, some conceptual model is 
always implicit. Even cybernetics requires some guess as to 
the "critical variables" that should be monitored for 
T1 Nisbett and Ross, op cit, PP 29-35.
2. Steinbruner, op cit, PP 47-66.
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negative or positive feedback.
2. As Foucault argues, conceptual models used in human
choice are not deductively sound constructs. This is often
even true of elaborate prepositional theories. They impose
their own connections between phenomena, their own criteria
for classifying things as important and missing others
altogether, for memorising some lessons of the past and not
others etc . They are " dispersions.. full of gaps,
1
discontinuities and incompatibilities". An important 
strength of cognitive theory is that, in contrast to 
accounts that have had to rely on rationalistic accounts of 
human action, it shows how choice may be full of
imperfections, yet patterned.
A few regular characteristics of political behaviour can be 
summarised. It will under- estimate complexity and ambiguity 
in the environment as the whole purpose of cognitive
mechanisms is to simplify. Actors do not employ criteria of 
logical or statistical/inductive reasoning, but function as 
" naive social scientists". In their striving for coherence 
and simplicity, they over-ascribe causation, ignore 
coincidence, randomness and accident, perceive correlations 
and intentions where none exist, infer invariable 
relationships from weak covariations, snatch at 
explanations, often accepting the first that comes to mind 
and pay insufficient regard to whether A causes B, or B
1. Foucault, op cit, PP 56-9, 71-2.
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causes A or both are caused by a third factor. They are
biased against the ambiguities of multi- causation and in
J.S. Mill’s words hold a " prejudice that a phenomenon can
have only one cause”. They expect effects to resemble causes
and thus slip into loose, associative thinking. Their
interpretations are skewed towards the vivid, the concrete
and ease of recall. Thus decisions are more likely to be
based on anecdote and personal experience than statistical
research. They are inattentive to variation in problem
structure and context; thus so long as there is some
superficial reason for applying a theory or a historical
lesson , it will often be adopted with little regard for
differences in circumstances. As Nisbett and Ross put it,
1
actors are fecund but facile in their causal explanation.
3. In parallel with an environment fractured between many
structures, decision-makers may well operate with more than
one conceptual model, a problem which will be compounded in
a bureaucracy where different agencies will often look at
problems in conflicting ways. Foucault has argued that there
is no hidden," calm unity of coherence" beneath all the
discursive practices by which actors organise perceptions of
2
their environment. The theory of cognitive consistency, 
hypothesises that actors will, however, strive to screen out 
all the conflicts that derive from their different ways of
1. Nisbett and Ross, op cit  ^ PP 115-28.
2. Foucault, op cit, P 155.
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thinking about social life and to claim that each idea 
points to the same conclusion after all.
This has important implications. Foreign policy will often 
be characterised by inter-paradigmatic tensions as decision­
makers strive not to articulate conflicts inherent in
different ways of thinking about problems: for example, the
potential strains between basing policy on the sovereignty 
and separateness of the state on the one hand and on the 
common management of interdependence or the further
integration of markets to secure economic reproduction on 
the other. Decisions will under-estimate the difficulties of 
chosen courses and the extent to which one value has to be 
traded off to attain another: they are said to lack value
integration. They will also tend to be over-justified and 
may even be presented as panaceas. Single solutions are
offered for many goals: too few solutions end up chasing too
many equations. Decisions are misconceived as equilibrium 
points which tie everything up in one go, when they are
usually flows with an initial move requiring several
1
supplementary actions.
Pay-offs, costs and interests do not enter decision-making
as objective quantities. Perceptions of these are skewed by
the basic predisposition of actors to make or decline the
decision. An affective, emotional or ideological commitment
Ï1 William Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process in Britain, 
Allen and Unwin/RIIA, London, 1976, P 5.
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to the success of a goal will influence assessments of its
feasibility and profitability. An expectation that something
is inevitable will incline an actor to believe that it would
be to his liking or in his interests. Commitment to a group
or relationship and a cult of consensus will prompt actors
to see the common line as in their interests and
reconcilable with all the other groups and relationships 
1
they value. Of course, there will have be " lead" and "lag" 
factors with the latter being redefined to point to the same 
conclusion as the former. But what leads and what lags in 
decision-making cannot be fitted into a set hierarchy of 
importance. For instance,it is not clear that beliefs about 
international structures will lead in foreign policy-making. 
On the contrary, the exigencies of electoral, parliamentary 
and party politics, the ideological and domestic problems 
of adjusting to a new international alignment etc may be the 
more vivid and immediate preoccupations and thus shape 
beliefs as to what international structures demand.
In the vein of Steinbruner's cybernetic paradigm, decision­
makers may vacillate between basing their lead beliefs on 
a whole host of considerations, depending upon which has 
most recently been the subject of negative feedback. Far 
from comprehending the whole political picture, politicians
are, at any one time, dominated by an evoked set, a narrowly
2
defined range of seemingly urgent concerns. In their 
T1 Jervis, op cit^ PP 356-65.
2. Jervis, op cit, PP 203-17.
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determination to find a solution to these, they screen out 
or re-interpret the costs to other values, until these too 
force themselves back on to the agenda.
4. A further key implication of cognitive consistency is what
1
Steinbruner calls the 2 principle of economy": the decision­
maker responds to a changing environment with minimum 
adjustment to his belief structure. Any portfolio of beliefs 
and cognitive operations will be a stable predictor of 
political behaviour as the actor will bend all efforts not 
to change his world view. Learning occurs by reinforcement. 
Further experience does not lead to critical reappraisal of 
preconceptions; instead the accumulation of knowledge 
takes the form of an ever greater number of hypotheses 
expressed in terms of the initial preconceptions. The sunk 
investment in the structure makes revision epistemologically 
increasingly costly with time.
Actors strain to integrate all new information to old
beliefs. They seek to eliminate all "dissonances". There is
even evidence that actors' may preserve their beliefs beyond
the disproof of the initial arguments that gave rise to
2
them. Beliefs are constructed with " confirmation biases", 
inclining the actor only to notice confirming evidence. In 
their extreme form, they become " outcome irrelevant
1. Steinbruner, op cit, 1974, P 102.
2. Nisbett and Ross, op cit, PP 184-9.
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1
learning structures".
Jervis shows how political change will thus tend to follow
distinctive paths. There will be long lags between changes
in the environment and in political behaviour. The first
reaction to discrepancies that do not fit existing beliefs
is to screen them out as flukes, misperceptions, temporary
deviations etc. The second is to admit the new information
but to evade the need for change; decision-makers often
believe that change can be postponed, or that the old policy
can accommodate a few exceptions even if this makes it
increasingly rococo, or that there is anyhow no alternative
to the existing policy . The third reaction to policy
failure is to attempt preservative change. Changes are made
in the belief that they are really continuities, shoring up
old ways. Finally, actors will try to jettison their
peripheral beliefs only. If even this fails, and core
beliefs have to be sacrificed, change is likely to be
traumatic and may take the form of an undiscriminating
2
substitution of old ideas by their opposites.
5. A key belief that actors will seek to preserve from
unwelcome change is their " concept of self". Theories that
reduce political units to efficient processors of structures
T~. Hi Einhorn, " Learning from Experience and Sub-optimal 
rules" in Decision-making in Kahnemann et al, op cit, P 275.
2. Jervis, op cit, PP 289-95.
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and interests fail to capture the importance of identities
in politics: the struggle to sustain a flattering and stable
self-image , or role, defined by Holsti as expectations and
1
norms that attach to specific entities in a system. As
Wallace and Tugendhat rightly put it, " Foreign Policy is
unavoidably bound up with a nation’s view of itself". Any
gap that opens up between its own elite’s concept of role
and the roles others ascribe to it, is likely to lead to
indignation, or a feeling of confusion and insecurity with
the loss of a key cognitive device needed to bring
certainty, simplicity and stability to the understanding of
2
a self/environment relationship.
6. Belief systems are formed by a combination of experiences
and socialisation into consensual knowledge structures.
Decision-makers will tend to appraise new situations in the
light of lessons drawn from previous experiences. This
introduces a heavy element of epistemic distortion to
political behaviour as each historical happening is "
context bound" and memories of it are usually a " tapestry
3
of fact and fiction". "Cascading error" often follows with
1. K.J. Holsti," National Role Conceptions in the Study of 
Foreign Policy", International Studies Quarterly, Vol 14, 
No 3, September 1970, P 258.
2. William Wallace and Christopher Tugendhat, Options for 
British Foreign Policy in the 1990’s, RKP/RIIA, London, 
1988, P 9.
3. Y. Vertzeberger, " Foreign Policy Decision-Makers as 
Practical Intuitive Historians: Applied History and its
Shortcomings", International Studies Quarterly, Vol 30, No 
2 June 1986.
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each new round of decision-making neglecting new 
difficulties for a preoccupation with avoiding the problems 
of the last. Moreover, the lessons from experience do not 
receive equal attention. Decision-making will be most 
affected by vivid, dramatic and personal experiences. 
Formative happenings, constitutive of political awareness, 
will disproportionately condition behaviour.
The socialised dimension of individual belief systems echoes 
the stress of critical theory on the importance to any 
successful interaction of intersubjective structures of 
shared meanings, cause:effect analyses, stabilised 
expectations, and norms to legitimise actions. The trouble 
is that actors will be socialised into various 
intersubjective structures; norms and shared meanings that 
ease the problems of international co-operation, often known 
as regimes, may clash with the inter-subjective structures 
into which elites are socialised as members of a national 
political culture or bureaucracy or sub-national interest 
group, political party, ideological tendency etc. The 
problem is that the latter may enjoy a robustness and 
complexity that cannot be matched by the novelty and 
contestedness of international regimes.
7. Snyder and Diesing’s comment that "inter and intra
1
government decision-making differ and need integration"
1. Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, 
Princeton University Press, NJ, 1977, P 28.
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points to the neglect of the study of interaction as opposed
to theories of systems and the foreign policies of
individual governments. Cognitive theory can help to fill 
the gap without the pitfalls of the stylised approach of 
game theory. Interactions can be hypothesised to be a
function of the relationship between inter-subjective 
structures of international dealing and belief systems to 
which elites are socialised at the national level.
Patterns of interaction and co-operation across states may 
be more problematic than those within them, but where they 
do occur,Governments will prefer partners whose own belief 
systems, political culture, sense of identity etc are most 
compatible with their own. They will also aim to minimise 
strain between belief systems at the various levels. As only 
some will succeed, and the result will be of enduring 
significance, even co-operation between states may be 
preceded by an initial tussle to mould the regimes - norms 
and expectations- of interaction.
Without robust inter-subjective structures, interactions
will be more exposed to the ways in which governments
process information about each other through their detached
belief systems . They will have preconceptions by which they
interpret all moves of other states. This can lead to
1
cognitive mirroring, or whole spirals of misperception. 
Behaviours based on certain assumptions about other states 
T1 Jonson, op cit^ P 12.
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often either provoke self-confirming reactions, or are
interpreted in line with the initial assumptions.
Governments thus often dig themselves ever deeper into set
beliefs about each other. Various cognitive features may
help to initiate a cycle of misperception. Where actors tend
to see their own thwarted or misunderstood behaviour as
well-intentioned, important to everyone's well-being,
necessary in the situation, or, at worst, accidental, they
regard the unwelcome actions of others as avoidable,
directed towards themselves and the calculated product of an
efficient and unitary process of decision-making. In short,
a mixture of lack of empathy and egocentric bias can
1
introduce a frustration to international dealings.
It is now necessary to adumbrate a research programme. The
first task is to define a dependent variable: what
constitutes foreign policy change? Using one definition, it
can be taken to be change in " actions directed at affecting
or responding to individuals, groups, states and conditions
2
outside the sovereign community". But whose actions are 
relevant ? On the one hand, to talk of state actions is to 
reify and miss the ferment of group and individual actions 
within governments. On the other hand, William Wallace is 
T1 Jervis, op citl PP 353-64.
2. W. Carlsnaes, Ideology and Foreign Policy, Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1986, P 69.
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correct to remark that foreign policy cannot be reduced to
individual decisions; it takes place within a culture of
shared assumptions, especially in Britain’s case where the
policy-making elite is quick to prescribe "sound lines" on
1
most issues. With this in mind, changing elite perceptions 
and actions will be taken as the main unit of analysis in 
British entry to the EC. However, even in Britain, elite 
assumptions will not be entirely homogeneous, and some 
attention will still have to be paid to individual 
idiosyncracies, especially where these intersect with a 
heavy concentration of power over final foreign policy 
decisions in the hands of the Prime Minister, Foreign 
Secretary and senior officials.
The next step is to define what is to count as good
explanation. To Popper the quality of a theory is like the
fineness of a mesh: it is a matter of how much of reality
can be caught in its explanatory hypotheses. But before
testing theories against each other, it is necessary to
specify their logical dissimilarities: to make a series of
predictions of what patterns can be expected in the data if
2
one theory applies rather than another. A rationalistic 
theory of choice within a neorealist account of structure 
implies an equilibrium view of change, while a cognitive 
theory of decision-making within a critical account of 
structure implies that change is "path-dependent"; actors
1. Wallace, op cit, P 6.
2. Popper, op cit. PP 32-4.
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can be pictured as moving along a path and facing a variety 
of teleologies at each point; outcomes are probabilistic, 
rather than deterministic, in that the actor's situation is 
pre-structured only to the extent that different 
probabilities of costs and benefits attach to each possible 
move; he still has to guess the probabilities and make a 
choice of value; moreover, in making his decision, he may 
contribute to the continuous redefinition of cost/benefit 
structures for the future.
It might be objected that the cognitive/criticial approach
is the less parsimonious account. However, what Popper
actually says about parsimony is not that it is a matter of
the paucity or elegance of assumptions per se, but of how
1
far they open themselves to disproof : of how many
possibilities they preclude by assumption in order to become 
powerful, non-tautologous theories. It is hard to think of 
any aspect of the analytical/neorealist view of change that 
does not have a counterpart assumption, equally open to 
disproof, in the cogntive/critical theory. Moreover, the key 
factor is the gearing of a theory: the amount it can explain 
in relation to the parsimony of its assumptions. Here it 
will be contended that the critical/cognitive account is far 
richer in that it can explain not just the fact of change, 
but its character - why it takes one form and not another. 
Moreover, even where contexts are structured in a
1. Popper, op cit, PP 136-46.
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Durkheimian fashion, actors often find themselves adjusting 
from one equilibrium to another by routes so lengthy and 
tortuous that a theory which can explain patterns of 
disequilibrium, of how and why adjustment is so imperfect, 
tells us more about the political conditions that prevail 
for most of the time.
Popper also argues that theories should be tested by
devising hard test cases. British entry to the EC is a hard
case for the cognitive/critical approach in that it can be
presented elegantly and simply in neorealist/analytical
1
terms. Applying Waltz’s analogy with the firm in economics, 
some markets include many firms of roughly equal size. None 
can dominate and all are equal in having to "take" 
structures as they are. Some markets are, however, dominated 
by a few oligopolies, which can, to a degree, "make" their 
own environment, pre-empting perhaps cumulatively, a 
disproportionate share of prosperity and security to 
themselves. It follows that the worst situation is to be a 
small unit in a world of oligopolies. So long as Britain was 
on its own in a world of larger groupings it would continue 
to cultivate its power and prosperity less effectively than 
its competitors. It would eventually adapt to membership of 
a larger unit, regardless of internal preferences. But this 
co-operation would be ephiphenomenal to the real wish to 
preserve the power of the state. It will, indeed, be seen 
that adaptation to membership occurred despite a high degree
1. See above, PP 6-7.
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of reluctance: that goals were rarely articulated in terms
of European integration, although they often referred to 
national power and prosperity.
Rather than giving a detailed breakdown of chapter contents 
at this point, each of the three parts of the thesis will be 
preceded by a brief introduction of its own. Part 1 will 
look at the evolution and coherence of elite views on 
Britain and the EC. Part 2 will discuss the dynamics of the 
negotiations and the domestic politics of ratification: the
role of process in foreign policy change and the enduring 
effects that these stages may have had on Britain's new 
relationship with the EC. Part 3 will look at Britain's 
first steps in membership, providing an opportunity to test 
hypotheses developed in earlier chapters.
In the absence of access to official papers, a diverse set
of sources has been employed. The "Seventies" series of
interviews with senior politicians and officials, carried
out by Philip Whitehead and associates, has proved 
1
invaluable. These have been supplemented by some interviews 
of my own, notably with Edward Heath, whose frank and full 
statements have filled some important gaps in research to 
date. Chatham House has meticulously collated contemporary 
press cuttings and speeches. These proved invaluable in two 
respects. First, the press was given detailed briefings of 
the entry negotiations, in preference to allowing reports to
1." The Seventies", interviews housed in LSE Archive.
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be based on speculation. Second, leading politicians gave
many interviews at the time; these stand as a record
1
untainted by retrospection or imperfect recollection. For
the wider assumptions of policy-making and debate, two White 
2
Papers, a great many columns of Hansard and the Bulletin of 
the EC were useful. Some very worthwhile secondary research- 
summarised in the bibliography at the end of this thesis 
has been carried out on a myriad of specific issues that 
intersect with the story of British entry and it has been a 
rewarding experience to attempt to bring all this together. 
However, the only general work in English is Uwe 
Kitzinger's, Diplomacy and Persuasion, 1973, written by an 
academic who was also a participant with access to senior 
decision-makers. In French, there is also the work of 
Françoise De La Serre, who wrote an important summary of the 
negotiations for Documentât ion Française in 1972 and a 
general work, ^  Grande Bretagne et La Communauté Europeene, 
in 1987.
1. References to this collection will be footnoted as "RIIA 
Press Lib". The relevant series are Britain and the EC: 
Economic and Political Co-operation. Both cover 1970-4.
2. Britain and the European Communities: An Economic 
Assessment, Cmnd 4289 of 1970. The United Kingdom and the 
European Communities, Cmnd 4715 of 1971.
3. Uwe Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain 
joined the Common Market, Thames and Hudson, London, 1973.
4. Françoise De La Serre, L'Adhesion De La Grande Bretagne a 
la Communauté Europeene, Documentation Française, NED 3882- 
3, 1972.
5. F. De La Serre, ^  Grande Bretagne et La Communauté 
Europeene, Presses Universaires de France, Paris, 1987.
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PART 1: THE CONTEXTS AND ASSUMPTIONS OF BRITISH ENTRY TO THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.
Edward Heath recalls that his Government of 1970-4 avoided
fresh debate on whether Britain should enter the European
Community as the decision had been taken in 1961 by the
1
Macmillan Government. This remark is revealing in that the 
first application made to the EC between 1961 and 1963 was
to leave its own geological strata of policy assumptions.
However, it is misleading to the extent that the contexts of 
Britain's European policy changed fundamentally between 1963 
and 1970, producing supplementary rationales for EC entry.
Indeed, chapter 1 will focus on the evolving operational and 
psychological environments of Britain's EC policy between 
1960 and 1972 . Chapter 2 then goes on to examine the
internal consistency of the assumptions about EC membership 
that were established by 1970-2 and the extent to which they 
can be said to have been well or poorly adjusted to the 
operational contexts.
In some ways, the evolution of Britain's European policy
from 1960 to 1972 would seem to fit a
rationalistic/neorealist account of foreign policy-change.
Northedge's remark that Britain entered the EC because there
2
was nowhere else for it to go presents the image of a state 
T1 Interview with Edward Heath^ December 1988.
2. Northedge, op cit, 1974, P 328.
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adapting to well-defined compulsions in the international
system, even if many of its elite would have chosen a
different foreign policy in a less constraining world.
Whitehall allegedly studied EC entry in greater detail than
any previous policy option. Harold Wilson, Prime Minister
from 1964 to 1970, boasted that if anyone wanted to know
the effects of membership on pigeon-fancying, a paper
1
would be available. Chapter 1 will show how an initially
simple set of assumptions that had spurred the application
by Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister from 1957 to 1963,
became an intellectually complex set of rationales by the
time negotiations re-opened in 1970. It might seem that
British policy-makers were at least rationalistic actors in
2
Steinbruner's sense of analytic learning.
However, the case will be made in the next two chapters that 
the critical view of the multiple, discontinuous and 
recursive structuring of political activity is far more 
illuminating of the contexts within which British foreign 
policy changed between 1960 and 1972. Meanwhile, regardless 
of their growing sophistication, the assumptions of 
Britain's EC policy revealed many of the imperfections and 
dynamics predicted of the cognitive actor in the 
introduction.
1. Harold Wilson, The Labour Government: 1964-70, Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson/ Michael Joseph, London, 1971, P 387.
2. See above page 12.
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CHAPTER 1: ENTRY TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: AN EVOLUTIONARY
FOREIGN POLICY.
1. Initial motives : EC entry as the pursuit of a traditional 
foreign policy by other means.
In spite of their pragmatic claims, Britain’s foreign
policy-makers had used a doctrine to structure their
perceptions of the postwar world. Preconceptions of
Britain’s role and identity were grounded in a
"self/environment" concept of the UK as the only country
that stood at the intersection of the " three circles of the 
1
free world". This would ensure privileged access to the US, 
leadership status in both Commonwealth and European politics 
and a place at the " top table" of US/USSR discussions, 
conferring a unique status intermediate between the 
superpowers and other states. Where other non-superpowers 
would find it hard to sustain independent, national foreign 
policies, Britain would be compelled to enjoy this privilege 
by a structure of international relationships that pointed 
to its unique ability to act as intermediary within the 
West and, to a degree, between East and West. But all would 
be lost if Britain became absorbed in any one circle.
In 1957, the British Government had not expected the EC to
2
succeed, or even survive. However, when it did both,it
1. Joseph Frankel, British Foreign Policy: 1945-1973, OUP, 
RllA, London, 1975, PP 157-8.
2. Alistair Horne, Macmillan:1957-1986, Macmillan, London 
1989, PP 30-5.
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presented some unpleasant shocks. Its formation occasioned a
boom in production, trade and investment amongst the six.
Productivity rose by more than 25% in the five years to 1960
1
compared with 11% in Britain. It was under the pressure of
international comparison that the mood in Britain changed
from contentment at the end of the 1950's with a new age of
affluence to restless flirtation with elixirs for higher
economic growth, beginning with the formation of the
2
National Economic Development Council in 1961. In 1960, De
Gaulle proposed that the Six should operate as a bloc in
foreign policy-making ; the dangers of exclusion from this
seemed all the more acute as the Six had not only put the
EEC together against British expectations but were, by 1960,
3
considering how to accelerate its development. In contrast
to the axiom of British European policy that France and
Germany were insufficiently agreed on anything to organise
4
Europe without Britain, they began from 1958 to develop a
strong bilateral axis that would stand in a mutually
5
reinforcing relationship to the wider Community of the Six.
Traditional categories of British foreign policy thinking
1. C.J.F Brown and T.D. Sheriff in Frank Blackaby, Ed, De- 
Industrialisation, Heinemann/NIESR, 1979, P 249.
2. Horne, op cit, PP 468-9
3. Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community: 1955-
63, Princeton, New Jersey, 1964, P 255.
4. Horne, ibid, P 257
5. Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: Le Souverain, Seuil, Paris,
1986, PP 293-309.
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structured both fears of Britain’s exclusion from the EC and
the initial goals sought by joining. "Three circles" was a
robust and pervasive frame of reference - or what
cognitivists would call a core belief around which others
are structured- precisely because it fused the key
assumptions of traditional British foreign policy. First,
that economic and alliance relationships spanning the whole
Atlantic area were the "minimum mass" that could guarantee
1
security and prosperity. Second, although Britain was small
in relation to this Atlantic mass and the US superpower, it
was essential to its status as a fully sovereign state that
it should strive for as much independent, national influence
over its international context as any other power. Third,
with small physical capabilities, this could only be
achieved through the deft structuring of international
relationships: privileged access to the decision-making of
others would be guaranteed by the value of Britain’s
consultancy and its diplomatic ability to help the three
circles realise their complementarities. By using its
special relationship with the US to communicate the concerns
of others, Britain would ensure leadership of Europe and the
Commonwealth. By being useful to the US in organising
coherent responses from the two more diffuse circles,
Britain would guarantee access to Washington as an equal and
2
not a supplicant. Influence could be had without power.
Ï1 Lord Carrington, Reflect on Things Past, Collins, London 
1988, P 230.
2. K. Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The
British and American Experience, Little:Brown, Mass, 1967.
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The success of the EC challenged this world view. It was
feared that the EC would unravel Britain's deftly
constructed relationships. Sir Con O ’Neill, the senior
official on Britain's negotiating team 1970-1, argued that
the principal force behind entry was a "feeling that we were
becoming increasingly side-tracked and insignificant":
Britain would be excluded from decisions and opportunities
in the European circle where its interests were most 
1
concentrated. EC powers would erode and even arrogate
Britain’s non-European contacts. A secret foreign policy
review, revealed by the 1959 cabinet papers, illustrates the
fear that the EC would eventually challenge Britain’s
international position and that the US, with its commitment
2
to European integration, would acquiesce in this. A further
Whitehall view was that the US would always look for a
principal European negotiating partner and the EC would
3
become progressively more suited to this role than Britain.
Michael Stewart, Foreign Secretary 1965-6 and 1968-70,
argued that the Commonwealth could also " be undermined"
4
with the UK outside the EC. Trade and aid were among the 
only remaining adhesives of a ramshackle Commonwealth. 
However, Commonwealth countries faced increasing opportunity 
costs in not transferring the
Ï1 Interview with Sir Con O ’Neill, " The Seventies".
2. The Guardian, 1 January 1990.
3. Camps, op cit, 1964, P 280.
4. Michael Stewart, Life and Labour, Sidgwick and Jackson, 
London, 1980, P 162.
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emphasis of their commercial relations to the EC. While 
Britain's share of world trade fell below 10% and its market 
grew only half as fastj the EC , the Six emerged as the 
world's largest trade bloc.
There were, in fact, two different fears of how the success
of the six might isolate Britain. According to the first,
potential power patterns in the Atlantic area would be
shaped by manoeuvrings within a quadrilateral of US, UK,
1
France and Germany. The EC would remain a loose multilateral
grouping, but it would add sufficient lustre to Franco-
German collaboration for the latter to trump Britain as the
obvious point of US access to European politics. However,
even many pro Europeans remained uncomfortable about both
French and German diplomacy. In 1971, Roy Jenkins, a leading
Labour marketeer, argued that, as Europe developed political
influence commensurate with its economic strength, France,
Germany or both would " move into a position of greater
2
power - none is appealling".
Alternatively Europe might integrate and/or negotiate en 
bloc with the US. Jenkins argued, that in this event, 
Britain would have to forego expectations that it could 
take part in "making" its international environment and 
accustom itself to " taking" whatever structures were
1. Donald Watt, " Anglo/German Relations Today and Tomorrow" 
in Britain and West Germany, Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan, 
eds, RIIA/OUP, 1971, PP 210-1.
2. The Times, 10 May 1971.
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decided by others. He recalled that, as Chancellor of the
Exchequer 1968-70, at a meeting of the " Group of Ten"
finance ministers, he had had to wait for EC and US
ministers to confer amongst themselves, knowing that Britain
1
would have to accept whatever they decided.
Under three circles premises, Britain's elite felt all the
more exposed in dealings with the US from outside the EC
for the lack of independent multilateral supports. Macmillan
argued that the European Free Trade Association, EFTA, which
had been Britain's initial response to the EC, might have to
become a peripheral political bloc if Britain was to have
2
satisfactory influence over its environment. Wilson felt
that Britain needed to find some new independence from the
3
US "especially in the political field". In 1971, Heath told
Pompidou that dealings with the US had always depended on
Britain having other relationships, without which it was
4
left with nothing but the stark fact of US/UK inequality.
Indeed, the very fact that Britain's elite operated with the 
intellectual construct provided by the three circles 
doctrine, probably magnified fears of exclusion from the 
EC. By stressing the degree to which Britain's external 
Frankel, op citj P 256
2. Frankel, ibid, P 241.
3. Harold Wilson, op cit, 1971, P 337.
4. Interview with Edward Heath, December 1988
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relationships all hung together, it encouraged the albeit
belated inference that all could fall apart with continued
exclusion from the European circle. According to interviews
with dipolmats, EC entry only became a top priority in the
1
Foreign Office with Dean Acheson's speech in 1962. In what
was to become a formative incident in itself in British
thinking, the former US Secretary of State warned that " The
attempt to play a separate power role- that is a role apart
from Europe..based on a special relationship with the US..on
2
being head of the Commonwealth., this role is played out". 
Some of the arguments above suggest that, with a touch of " 
egocentric bias", British decision- makers saw the EC as 
becoming an ersatz Britain: as evolving to pre-empt the slot 
in the pattern of international influence that the UK was 
supposed to occupy; if concepts of the latter had not i) 
been so grandiose or ii) implied that some middling powers 
were of little significance, while others were privileged 
with access to superpowers, leadership status etc, exclusion 
from the EC might have seemed less fearful.
Where Britain had sought to reconcile effective
international influence with the continued sovereignty of
the state, several Europeans supported integration. Britain
could lose control over this problem if it remained aloof
while the political forms of European collaboration were
Ï1 cl Moorhouse, The Diplomats, Jonathan Cape, London, 
1977, P 371.
2. C. Hill," The Historical Background: Past and Present in 
British Foreign Policy" in Smith, Smith,White, op cit, P 49.
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decided, only to find itself under pressure later to join
whatever institutions had been forged by the Six. Macmillan
wrote in his diary " we shall not be able to play our part
in deciding the future structure of Europe" and it was a
tragedy that Britain and France were not working together in
1
the EC to entrench an " anti- Federalist" perspective.
Successive British Governments feared that the Atlantic area 
as a whole would be badly managed if pulled between the US
CO
and J European diplomacy without Britain. Macmillan feared a
world caught between a " boastful, powerful Empire of
Charlemagne - now under French but later bound to come under
German control" and a US that would become "less and less 
2
friendly". By contrast to US enthusiasm for European
integration, many in Britain were preoccupied by the image
of it dividing the Atlantic area. In 1960, Selwyn Lloyd,
then Foreign Secretary, urged that the EC should not
endanger relationships in NATO by encroaching on its agenda.
Home’s statement in 1971 that " Europe was in need of
rationalisation" reflected a basic assumption that tensions
could always spill over between several multilateral fora
3
that were discontinuous across issues and participants.
Recalling the distinction between traditionalist and 
transformationalist foreign policy concepts on page 16, the 
T1 Horne, op cit~ PP 260 & 319
2. Horne, ibid, P 236.
3. Home, speech to the WEU, 11 February 1971, RIIA Press Lib
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1961-3 rationales for EC entry were clearly established
within the former categories. The concern was with how to
sustain the influence of the British state in an
international diplomacy that would remain conventional in
content and method. Many arguments implied that diplomacy
would continue to be concerned with security, the
manipulation of multilateral and bilateral contacts to
achieve maximal influence and manoeuvre for one's own state,
the hierarchical questions of national roles, prestige and
rights of participation in international dealing. Entry was
1
seen as a means to revive a specifically national diplomacy; 
a leadership role could be reasserted in Europe, Britain 
could become a two-way channel between the EC and its 
Commonwealth contacts across the globe, and it would once 
again be able to approach the US as a principal initiator of 
European policy. Although the UK Government cared greatly 
about access to EC markets, it was assumed that this would 
be a matter of creating opportunities for private interests 
and that it would have minimal implications for 
transnational political forms or the separation of domestic 
from foreign policy-making.
1. Christopher Hill," Britain: a convenient schizophrenia", 
in C. Hill (ed). National Foreign Policies and European 
Political Co-operation, Allen and Unwin, London, 1983, P 24.
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2. The gathering challenge to British Foreign Policy 1963-70
In distinguishing the operational and cognitive environments
of foreign policy-making, Brecher argues that any lag
between the two will lengthen where change in the former is
slow and gentle, allowing old assumptions to be sustained by
inertia and the ambiguity of new developments. But lags will
1
shorten if change is vivid, concentrated and crisis-ridden. 
If the largely traditionalist assumptions within which 
Britain’s application to the EC was developed in 1961-3 
proved inappropriate, events, such as those of 1963-70, 
could be expected to provoke changes in British foreign 
policy thinking towards Europe.
Macmillan's decision to apply for EC entry in 1961 and the
1970-1 negotiations were separated by unusually intense
challenges to the image of great power leadership and to
confidence in Britain’s ability to pursue an independent
diplomacy. Events suggested that British Governments were
becoming demandeurs, even ineffectual dependents. Home’s
summary of the position by 1970 was that " our earnings were
mortgaged; our currency was vulnerable; we were unable to
afford the costs of carrying out our full responsibilities 
2
to our allies". A survey of British elite opinion, taken 
from entrants in Who’s Who, revealed that as late as 1959, 
Ï1 Brecher, op cit  ^ P 525,
2. Home, speech 29 August 1970 in D.C. Watt and James 
Mayall, eds. Current British Foreign Policy: Documents,
Statements, Speeches,1970, Temple Smith, London, 1971, P453.
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72% considered Britain to be the third power in the world.
By 1965, this had dropped to 39% with only 8% expecting
1
Britain to occupy such a position by 2000.
Britain's crisis of self-confidence in the 1960's was
essentially economic in origin. It had hitherto been argued
that other economies would only grow faster than Britain
while they were catching up with its more advanced stage of
development. However, others now overtook Britain and
continued to grow twice as fast. It began to look as though
Britain might even face a cumulative decline relative to
others. By 1970, France, Germany and Benelux could supply
between 50% and 100% more goods per unit of labour than the 
2
UK. Indeed, the OECD predicted that the gap would widen with
Britain only growing by a further 37% during the 1970's
3
compared with the EC's 67%. This was bound to affect 
Britain's position in the international hierarchy; the image 
of Britain as the third power in a world of superpowers 
might not be the final adjustment that would have to be made 
in elite concepts of its international status.
In the postwar period, Britain was the only major Advanced
4
Industrial Country to fall further behind the US in its
1. David Lerner, Euratlantica, Changing Perspectives of European 
Elites, MITS, 1969.
2. Brown and Sherriff, og cit, PP 248-9.
3. Hansard, 28 October 1971, Col 2124.
4. Hermann Van Der Wee, Prosperity and Upheaval: The World 
Economy 1945-80, Penguin, Middlesex, 1987, P 51.
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economic development. The tenacious pursuit of EC entry
needs to be set in the context of the near obsessive
citation of adverse GNP comparisons from the 1960’s onwards.
According to Downing Street economic policy adviser, Brendan
Sewell, the Heath Cabinet was " very much depressed by the
league tables which showed other countries growing faster 
1
than Britain" - most especially by a report from Lord
Rothschild's think- tank that Italy would soon overtake
Britain. Jenkins recalls how the mood changed from an
assumption in the 1950’s that Britain should not become too
involved with the poor economies of Europe to anxiety in the
1960's that Britain would be in deep trouble if it did not
2
join in the prosperity of the EEC.
But decline also began to manifest itself on Britain's 
external account, producing currency and balance of payments 
crises. The repetitive, traumatic and faintly humiliating 
nature of these were more likely than slow growth alone to 
provoke rethinking of Britain's external policy . From 1964 
to 1969 the pound's problems were never far from the news. 
Britain had to accustom itself to its Prime Minister being 
in frequent negotiation for credits with other Governments 
and international bankers. The problem was that the pound 
had become a negotiated currency - a unit that is only 
reluctantly held by others with the result that its issuer 
is constrained in all kinds of economic and foreign policy 
Interview with Brendan Sewe111 "The Seventies".
2. Interview with Roy Jenkins, " The Seventies"
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1
to prevent it being dumped in the market. Whereas the other
international currency, the dollar, involved the US with
liabilities of 2% of its GNP in 1965, Britain’s liability
2
overhang amounted to 17% of its GNP. At one point in March
1968, the pound was being sold at a rate that would have
3
exhausted the Bank of England's reserves within four days.
In 1971, Susan Strange’s Sterling and British Policy summed 
up the important contemporary critique that a traditional 
foreign policy had slipped into a negative relationship with 
Britain’s economic base. However engrained Britain’s 
uncompetitiveness had become by the 1960’s, its economy had 
started the postwar period with some advantages over rivals. 
These had been eroded by a foreign policy that Frankel has 
described as being based on a great power paradigm. British 
Governments devoted resources disproportionate to other 
middling countries to the security roles of the state and 
resisted the logic of multilateralism for independent 
capabilities. Moreover, Britain’s position in the web of 
Atlantic and Commonwealth relations meant that it was not 
just spending a great deal on foreign policy but it was 
adding to its balance of payments problem by spending more
1. Susan Strange, Sterling and British Foreign Policy, 
Oxford University Press, London, 1971, P 17.
2. David Calleo, Britain’s Future, Hodder and Stoughton, 
London, 1968, P 33.
3. Richard Grossman, Diaries: Condensed Version, Ed Anthony 
Howard, Methuen, London, 1979, P 457.
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abroad on its foreign policy than other countries spent in 
Britain on theirs.
Far from being able to afford a great power insouciance to
deficits on the "Government Account" of the balance of
payments, the UK was frequently forced into deflation to
defend its currency. It was at this point that the burdens
of foreign policy bit hard into the productive base.
Britain was never able to attain the mature phases of the
economic cycle which brought investment and modernisation.
With lagging productivity, dated products and strained
labour relations, the deflationary cure to each balance of
payments deficit worsened the next crisis on external
account. Yet even in the 1960’s, there would have been no
deficits at all, but for the losses on the Government 
1
Account. Moreover, Britain could have devalued earlier to 
ease the balance of payments problem if it had not continued 
to see itself as one of the powers responsible for 
sustaining international arrangements by example. It was 
because priority was given to an independent diplomacy and 
sovereignty that Britain had not joined the EC at its 
inception, when its economic position might have made it a 
principal beneficiary of market integration with West Europe.
Britain's trade policy had also given priority to cementing
the Commonwealth as a coherent subsytem that would increase
T1 A.R. Prest and D. J. Coppock, The UK Economy, Weidenfeld 
and Nicholson, 5th Edition, London, 1974, PP 107 & 120.
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the influence of British diplomacy. Preferential trading 
relationships had been established with a dispersed and 
largely under-developed Commonwealth and these had, in turn, 
complicated the negotiation of access to European markets. 
Unfortunately, trade during the postwar period was to grow 
most rapidly within regional blocs and where a similar stage 
of economic development made it easy for countries to sell 
into each others markets because they enjoyed like 
consumption habits. A preference for the Commonwealth over 
Europe may have retarded the modernisation of UK products.
British Governments had always faced tensions in responding 
simultaneously to all the pressures involved in reproducing 
i) a competitive economy ii) expectations of affluence and 
welfare in domestic society which were, in turn, most 
immediate to their electoral security and iii) a 
traditionalist foreign policy that stressed the sovereignty 
of the British state a) internally, through the insulation 
of domestic policy from external dealings and b) externally, 
through resource commitments and diplomatic patterns 
sufficient to ensure that Britain was not reduced to a 
passive taker of structures fashioned by others. However, 
by 1970 tensions were beginning to relate to the basic 
causal variables and defining criteria involved in 
continuing with the three sets of activity at all. EC 
entry was no longer presented as an adjustment in the single 
plane of inter-state diplomacy, but as a means to arrest 
deteriorating trade-offs between all the structuring
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dimensions of British Government activity. The resuscitary
qualities of entry no longer focused on hopes of reviving a
traditional foreign policy alone, but now extended to a
shoring up of the British state across the range of its
functions. However, it will also be shown that this made it
increasingly hard to sum up British Foreign Policy within a
single paradigmatic focus. Not only was EC entry becoming
indicative of a more transformationalist agenda, in which
economic competitiveness and domestic social values were as
important as diplomacy and security, but it was becoming
hard even to present entry as a means to traditionalist ends
1
without positing transformationalist methods, given 
Britain's circumstances in 1970. These points will now be 
expanded over the remainder of the chapter.
1. P 16 for a definition of the traditionalist/ 
trasformationalist distinction.
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3. British entry to the EC and the challenge of preserving 
international economic competitiveness.
The pressures of international political economy that
British Governments faced in deciding whether they should
join the EC can be analysed in terms of Strange’s
claim that Advanced Industrial Countries (AIC's) have to
find those alignments with international structures of
1
production, technology and finance that are most suited to 
their circumstances and values. Moreover, such structures 
are inter-related, so failure in one area can compound 
problems in others.
Several arguments for EC entry centred on the need for 
modern, volume production to enjoy tariff-free markets that 
transcend national jurisdictions. To compete, in other
than niche markets, companies must attain the optimum size 
for production units in their industry ; otherwise they do 
not enjoy the full economies of scale and cannot defray the 
costs of innovation. Britain in the early 1970’s was still 
heavily committed to products that required high volume or 
large start-up costs. Table 1 shows that, in 1971, Britain 
was the only Advanced Industrial Country with the exception 
of the US to have a small balance of payments surplus in 
technology. Gamble points out that, in 1970, 53 out of 200
of the world’s largest non American companies were British, 
while only 25 were German and 23
1. Susan Strange, States and Markets: An Introduction to
International Political Economy, Pinter, London, P 27.
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1
French. Heath’s Industry Secretary, John Davies, argued:
" Britain had to break out of its industrial confinement..it 
had been seeking to sustain its historic scientific and 
industrial attributes on too narrow a base". 2.
The 1971 White Paper on British entry to the EC pointed to
the importance of :
" selling into a market perhaps five times as large as 
present. For advanced industrial countries, the most 
favourable environment is one where markets are large..this 
favours specialisation, the economies of scale, the 
development and marketing of new products, the most 
efficient use of resources and the checking of monopoly 
positions". 3.
TABLE 1: Balance of Payments in Technology.
Leading AIC's
Ratio of receipts to payments
US 11.31
UK 1.07
France 0.59
FRG 0.37
Japan 0.12
Source: Wilfred Beckerman, Slow Growth in Britain, Cause and 
Consequences, OUP, London, 1979, P 186.
Analysing Britain’s 1967 application, the European
Commission had pointed out that many industrial projects had
been initiated in Britain over the past 15 years only to be
abandoned as orders could not match development costs in
4
Britain’s restricted national market. The CBI feared that
1. Andrew Gamble, Britain in Decline, Macmillan, London, 
1981, P 109.
2. The Financial Times, 24 September 1971.
3. Cmnd 4715 of 1971.
4. "Opinion of the Commission on the Application for 
Membership received from the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Denmark and Norway", Bulletin September/October 1971, 
Paragraph 48.
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unless Britain entered the EC it would be out-competed by
giant European companies as well as giant US ones by the
1980’s. It also rejected the argument that Britain could
prosper through specialised consumer products in much the
same way as Switzerland or Sweden. Britain had sunk its
capital and trained its labour in volume manufacture. Any
solution which did not take this into account would be like
1
re-building a ship at sea.
Of course, there were few industries in which Britain's
economy could not support a single optimal producer.
However, the economist, Tibot Scitovsky, had shown how
countries have to consider economic integration as soon as
their home markets can support only a handful of producers
2
in key industries, otherwise they become trapped between the
need to be early into international markets with new ideas
in order to sustain competitiveness and a domestic economy
3
that is unconducive to innovation. Their
societies face monopolistic industrial structures with
dangers of economic inertia and social costs. Just 3 firms
4
controlled 50% - 90% of Britain's 20 largest industries.
Thus Davies urged EC entry to overcome the dilemma of
1. The Guardian, 24 March 1971.
2. Tibot Scitovsky, Economic Theory and West Europe 
Integration, Unwin, London, 1958, PP 110-36.
3. Paul Stoneman, The Economic Analysis of Technological 
Change, Oxford University Press, 1983 P 264.
4. Keith Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society: The 
British Experience , Andre Deutsch, London, 1970, P 433.
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" needing size, yet fearing it"
By 1970, it was also clear that skilled adjustment to
patterns of international technological development had
become critical to both economy and state. Davies argued
that the link between educational research and industrial
performance was extremely strong and that any failure would 
1
be cumulative. Heath opined that Europeans would remain "
second class industrial powers" unless they developed
2
technologies on a continental scale.
These comments reflected important pressures that made the
international distribution of opportunities to develop and
trade technology an increasingly significant component of
inter-state power and prosperity by the early 1970's. Access
to technology divides economies into those which can command
high value added for their outputs in highly competitive
global markets and those condemned to downstream production.
Technological leaders and laggards may coalesce into two
self-perpetuating groups with the former deploying their
superior profits, investment and knowledge to continue their
3
lead into each new product cycle. States are principal 
purchasers of technology and they are increasingly dependent 
upon it for efficient governance; but they are also closely
1. John Davies, " Industry in an Enlarged Community", 
speech, 16th September 1971, RIIA Press Lib.
2. Edward Heath, Old World: New Horizons, (The Godkin 
Lectures of 1967), OUP, London, 1970, P 12.
3. Strange, op cit, 1988, P 31.
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involved in the conditions of its supply. As technologies
are peculiarly interdependent, governments must ensure that
their countries have access to all new ideas, but few can
develop all of these indigenously, so the real challenge
becomes one of ensuring access to the international
diffusion of techniques on acceptable terms. Wilson thus
suggested that the EC should add a technological community
to its institutions, while Heath saw European co-operation
in research and development as the only alternative to
1
political dependence and industrial "flaccidity".
The importance of EC entry to British hopes of preserving 
their position in the international technology game can be 
appreciated from the rejection of the suggested alternative 
of a North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA). So long as the 
main target of US corporations was the dynamic EC market, 
they would respond to free trade with Britain and a 
protected Europe with the worst possible combination of 
exporting goods to Britain and capital to the EC. But if 
Britain was inside the EC, British Governments hoped that it 
would be the ideal production base for US exporters seeking 
to jump the EC tariff. When it came to nurturing their own 
technology, Britain's producers felt increasing need of 
transnational partnerships to afford research and 
development. As Heath argued:
" No single European country has sufficient resources to 
compete with the US in advanced technology and inability to
1. Heath, op cit, 1970, P 45.
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compete commercially means that finance for research and 
development cannot be afforded. For every $ 1000 spent by 
the US on research, Britain spends $ 100, France $ 75 and 
Germany $ 50. 1.
Partnerships with US producers seemed likely to be too 
unequal to work. In 1963, the research and development of 
the five largest US companies had equalled that of Britain 
and the Six put together. Where British producers felt they 
could assume a leading position in European technology 
ventures, they feared that US partners would syphon off 
their accumulated knowledge and their best scientists.
Turning to international financial pressures, the
combination of large-scale production with internationally
mobile capital, meant that governments had to be
increasingly sensitive to the ability of economic activity
located in their territory to attract a good credit-rating
for investment .The Financial Times' wry comment that
British industry might join the EC even if Britain did not,
shows how countries even had to compete for the surplus
2
funds of their own companies. So long as Britain was 
excluded from the EC it was feared that its national market 
would be too restrictive to generate profits to attract 
investors, domestic or international; indeed, investing in 
EC countries would always have the advantage over that in 
Britain of ensuring access to the common market.
1. Heath, Old World: New Horizons, OUP, London, 1970, P 43.
2. The Financial Times, 1 February 1970.
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As Joseph Frankel remarks, this was a serious problem for
British Governments, which were increasingly having to look
1
to international capital to re-equip British industry.
A further problem concerned Britain's continued
competitiveness as a provider of finance. Robert Gilpin has
argued that " financial markets tend to be highly
centralised and hierarchical in character because of
2
economies of scale and pooled information". The result is 
intense competition to be one of the few centres that can 
attain sufficient volume to function viably. City views on 
British entry to the EC noted that Europe was a highly 
sophisticated industrial area with a financial sector that 
could not remain under-developed much longer. For example 
the London equity market was capitalised at $ 91b, Paris at 
$ 6.3 b and Frankfurt at $ 2.7b, However, European financial 
services were growing faster than British competitors 
because they started at a lower level. Between 1964 and 
1969, the total credits and debits within the EC area grew 
by 78% and 91% compared with 35% and 22% in Britain.
The British Committee on Invisible Exports concluded that if 
Britain were included in the EC, European companies would 
grasp opportunities of financing themselves in London, where 
they could find sophisticated markets in banking, insurance,
1. Frankel, op cit, P 59.
2. Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International 
Relations, Princeton, NJ, 1987, P 310.
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stock-broking, shipping etc in one place. If on the other
hand, Britain was excluded, London would face the problem of
how to generate sufficient volume to compete with New York,
together with a long-range threat of being dwarfed by a
1
European financial centre. The Governor of the Bank of
England warned that the City would be highly vulnerable
2
outside the EC if the world moved towards economic blocs,
while Geoffrey Rippon, Britain's Chief Negotiator with the
EC during 1970-1, pointed out that 37% of Britain's export
earnings now came from invisibles. It was also hoped that
the development of an efficient single European capital
market would offer European producers comparable advantages
to their US competitors. Gross savings in the enlarged EC
3
would be $ 229.l.b compared with $ 259. 6b in the US. One
study showed that European banks were already planning
mergers and joint ventures to raise the capital sums needed
4
to break into international corporate lending.
The critical point is that the arguments that had evolved by 
1970-2 for EC entry in response to international production, 
technology and finance structures implied economic 
integration and not just conventional inter-state trading 
relationships with the Six. First, they suggested that
1. The Financial Times, 29 September 1971.
2. The Financial Times, 30 May 1972.
3. P. Woolley, "Integration of Capital Markets" in G. 
Denton, (ed). Economic and Monetary Union, Croom Helm, 
London, 1974, P32.
4. The Times, 8 December 1971.
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Britain’s economy needed to be permanently enmeshed with 
that of the EC as a precondition for continuing with 
certain productive, technological and financial activities 
at all. Given the long lead times, the expense and 
commitment involved in establishing production plants for a 
continental market, importing direct investment to the UK to 
jump EC tariffs and including British companies in joint 
technological ventures, both British and foreign actors 
needed to know that British economic activity would be 
enmeshed with that of the EC on a continuing and politically 
predictable basis.
International trade need only involve exchange of a few
goods at the margin. Markets may remain separate with
movements in any one country having little effect on
supply, demand and prices in others. This no longer applies
with economic integration, where producers and consumers are
progressively enmeshed in a single matrix of input/output
interdepencies, Economic integration - and not merely
increases in trade between Britain and the EC- was implied
by the argument that producers would have to attain a
similar level of specialisation and of economies of scale
1
in a single internal market to Japan and the US if they were 
to remain internationally competitive.
Heath told the Commons that the EC would have to move on 
from a customs to an economic union immediately after entry.
1. Watt and Mayall, op cit^ P 458.
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He had previously urged the creation of European Companies
1
with "internationalised production lines". Rippon argued
that unless Europe went on to create all the conditions
needed to make transactions between states as easy as those
within them, US corporations would use advantages developed
in their own continental-scale markets to reap more benefits
2
from an enlarged EC than Europeans. James Prior, Heath’s
Parliamentary Secretary before becoming Agriculture Minister
in 1970, recalls how Heath came to see the EC as essential
to Britain’s very survival as an advanced industrial 
3
country.
However, if the prescription was economic integration, there 
was surely a tension between prospering as an AIC and 
continuing as a state with a fully traditionalist approach 
to foreign policy: the latter suggests that states do not
involve themselves with others beyond the point at which 
they can readily revert to the exclusive cultivation of 
their national power and to freedom of manoeuvre between 
alternative bilateral and multilateral groupings. Moreover, 
it will be shown that there were limits to which even 
Britain’s elite would accept economic integration without 
questioning the continued political separation of management 
of domestic society from dealings with other governments.
1. Hansard, 17th February 1972, Col 744. Heath, op cit, 
1970, P 40.
2. Rippon, speech, 15 September 1971, RIIA Press Lib.
3. Interview with James Prior, " The Seventies"
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4. Entry to the EC as foreign policy in pursuit of domestic 
objectives.
It was feared that without a move like EC entry to expand
growth and the resources available to British Governments
choices might soon have to be made between commitments that
were thought to be central to the internal as well as the
1
external nature of the postwar British state. Postwar 
governments had combined ambitious foreign policy 
commitments with promises to create an affluent society and 
welfare state at home, all in the context of expectations 
that the economy could be precisely and stably managed.
By 1970, steps had already been taken to cut Britain's
external commitments only to discover that there was still a
competition for resources even between the principal
domestic objectives of the British state. Although the
1964-70 Government diverted 2% of GNP to internal use by
cutting defence, the proportion of national income taken by
Government rose from 35% to 40%. The result was that the
1. F.S. Northedge, " Britain as a Second Rate Power", 
International Affairs, Vol 46, No 1, 1970.
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rate of growth of living standards almost halved betweeen
1
1960-5 and 1965-70.
The Government had expected the economy to grow faster than
it did and for the welfare state to be financed out of a
2
fairly constant share of GNP. But the conflict for resources
having arisen, it threatened further problems. First, it
undercut the scientific precision with which governments had
allowed it to be assumed that they could manage the economy;
the central tool of economic management since 1958, the
Phillips Curve, had assumed that certain combinations of
unemployment and inflation could be attained with a mean
3
error of only 0.1%.! However, where the Government had 
combined 1% inflation and 1.5% unemployment in 1960, 6.4%
inflation went with 2.6% unemployment in 1970. Deteriorating 
trade-offs were seen as the result of a sociological 
inflation in which producer groups responded to the 
knowledge that there were only limited resources for 
standard of living improvements in any one year by " leap­
frogging" each other in price and wage increases. Second, 
the Treasury worried that once consumption and government 
expenditure slipped out of "steady-state" growth (as 
constant shares of GNP) the affluent society and the welfare 
Prest and Coppock, op cit, P 268.
2. Wilfred Beckerman, The Labour Government 1964-70: The 
Economic Record, Duckworth, London, 1972, P 50.
3. Prest and Coppock, ibid, P 40.
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State were in danger of gobbling their own seedcorn, as they
slipped into a contradictory relationship with the
productive base by pre-empting resources from exports and
investment . This echoed Andrew Shonfield’s critique that at
the very moment that the international competitive challenge
to Britain's economy, blunted by wars and recession between
1914 and 1950, was at last coming into its own, resources
were being committed to everything except modernisation and 
1
competitiviness.
However, commitments to consumption growth, welfare and
precise economic management could not be lightly
abandoned. They were embedded at three levels: in the
expectations of the electorate, in the tripartite
collaboration with industry and the unions to which all
2
postwar governments ultimately turned and in what David
Marquand has termed the " assumptions and expectations" of
3
the policy-makers themselves as to what constituted a 
rational and civilised management of society. Table 2 shows 
the extent to which the British state had become committed 
to welfare provision by 1970.
1. A. Shonfield, British Economic Policy since the War, 
Penguin, London, 1958.
2. Middlemas, op cit, PP 429 & 460.
3. David Marquand, The Unprincipled Society: New Demands and 
Old Politics, Fontana, London, 1988, P 18.
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TABLE 2: CHANGES IN PROGRAMMES OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 
AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT OUTLAYS.
Social Welfare 
Defence, law and order 
Economic Programmes
1953
32%
45
21
1973
44
27
27
Change
+12 
-18 
+ 6
Source: Dennis Kavanagh, Thatcherism and British Politics
The End of Consensus, OUP, London, 1987, P44
The political security of Governments deteriorated as they
found it harder to meet domestic expectations. Table 3
illustrates the point with respect to successive
parliaments. Governments faced electoral losses if they
failed to deliver standard of living improvements. When
TABLE 3. MEASURES OF THE POLITICAL INSECURITY OF BRITISH 
GOVERNMENTS
General Election By-elections Polls
swing +/- to average fall ave annual
Govt. in Govt suport variation in
party ratings
1951-5
1959-64
1966-70
+ 1.8
- 2.9
- 4.7
1.9
13.5
16.8
4.2 
5.5 
9.0
Source S.E. Finer, The Changing British Party System, 
American Enterprise Institute, 1980, P 66
David Butler and Donald Stokes correlated the lead of
parties in the opinion polls with their lead on perceived
ability to handle the economy, they found a covariation of +
1
0.56, compared with + 0.04 on all other issues.
1. David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in 
Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice, Penguin, London,
1971, P 497.
64
Contrary to political myth, the incoming Heath Government
was as eager in 1970 to sustain the accumulated domestic
commitments of the state as its predecessors. As Douglas
Hurd, then Heath's Private Secretary, explains, the
primary aim was to find the resources to sustain the welfare
1
state. In opposition. Heath had refused to intervene in
arguments between the interventionists and free-marketeers
in his own policy-making groups, on the grounds that i)
government had both to create the conditions for the private
sector to produce goods to the best of its efficiency and
2
find resources for welfare and infrastructure projects of
its own ii) a more rational, up-to-date approach to
government would create extra resources, obviating the need
3
for " ideological measures". EC entry was central to Heath's 
thinking on both counts. As Robert Carr, Employment 
Secretary 1970-2, put it:
" No- one will understand the Heath Government unless they 
realise the extent to which it approached government with a 
clear strategy. We believed that we had to make a very 
definite attempt to break out of the vicious circle: the
first key point was to join the EEC". 4.
James Prior has confirmed this impression: " Heath was
determined to lead Britain out of inertia and the EEC was to
Ï1 Douglas Hurd, An End to Promises : A Sketch of A
Government 1970-4, Collins, London, 1979, P 40.
2. Robert Rhodes-James, Ambitions and Realities, British 
Politics 1964-70, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1972, 
136.
3. David Butler and Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, The British 
General Election of 1970, Macmillan, London, 1971, P 70.
4. Interview with Robert Carr, "The Seventies".
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1
be the springboard"
The Heath Government saw EC entry as a foreign policy that
would support domestic plans for a " quiet revolution" of
economic reconstruction and national efficiency in three
ways. First, Keynesians had assumed that if governments set
the expansion of demand, the supply of goods would take care 
2
of itself. However, since the formation of the NEDC in 1962, 
it had been recognised that it was inability to combine 
resources efficiently to supply competitive goods that held 
Britain back. Through the impact of transnational economic 
liberalisation on the efficient allocation of resources and 
of EC industrial and technology policies, it was hoped that 
entry would be a foreign policy and supply side cure for the 
British economy rolled into one. So eager was the new 
Government to expose the economy to new international 
pressures that it considered a unilateral tariff cut even 
before the conclusion of negotiations with the EC.
Second, it was hoped that the supply side improvements would
strengthen Britain's trading position and thus shift the
balance of payments constraint on domestic growth. Davies
told a seminar of Conservative M.P's that the Six had
improved their export performance with third countries by
Ï1 James Prior, A Balance of Power, Hamish Hamilton, London, 
1986, P 85.
2. Robert Skidelsky, " The Meaning of the Keynesian 
Revolution" in R. Skidelsky (ed). The End of the Keynesian 
Era, Macmillan, London, P 35.
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more than that between themselves, implying that any group
1
gained relative to outsiders by integrating their economies.
The Bow Group pointed out that the six had increased their
trade with third countries by 122% since 1957 compared with 
2
Britain's 78% . As early as 1967, Heath suggested that the
next Government might return to the Maudling strategy of
making one determined effort to break out of stop-go so as
to enjoy the mature phases of an economic boom. It was felt
that EC entry would facilitate such a strategy. Competitive
pressures would restrain inflationary pressures. An influx
of foreign capital was expected on entry that would both
finance new investment and make it easier to ride out a
3
balance of payments deficit. Short-term funds would be more 
likely to stay in London if under-written by confidence that 
Britain had arranged a brighter future for its economy.
Finally, there was a streak of dislike of traditional
British society in Heath's policy and of belief in a
European model that was economically and culturally more 
4
advanced. He believed that joining the EC would modernise 
attitudes; the Six had cracked the secrets of running an 
advanced industrial society that had eluded Britain; entry 
would make it easier for Britain to learn by imitation. Thus 
in 1972, Heath rejected the creation of a Ministry of Europe
1. The Times, 20 May 1971
2. The Times, 8 February 1970
3. Heath, op cit, 1970. P 40.
4. Interview with Madron Seligman, "The Seventies".
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and issued a directive to all Government Departments urging
them to study how best to encourage the adoption of European
1
methods in their sphere of activity.
The Guardian argued that Heath aimed to " traumatise postwar
patterns" and that the EC was his chosen instrument; it will
uncongeal the attitudes, habits and expectations of the 
2
British". Heath felt that slow growth and insularity were
3
making British society "narky". The Bow Group argued that a
Little England Approach was creating social and
4
psychological problems . Amongst Heathites, EC entry began
to assume overtones of a mission recivilisatrice. Gamble’s
study of the contemporary Conservative Party suggests that
Heath and his supporters were more frustrated than most by
Britain’s relative decline; by character they were
technocratic and fascinated by modernity; they were also
still out of place in their own party and in Britain’s
5
broader elite strata. However, to recapitulate briefly, 
there was a perception that "foreign economic policies" were 
the only way out for a national economic policy that was 
increasingly locked into a contracting box of domestic 
decline.
1. The Finacial Times, 24 January 1972.
2. The Guardian, 2 June 1971.
3. Kitzinger, op cit, 1973, P 148.
4. The Times, 8 February 1970.
5. Andrew Gamble, The Conservative Nation, Rout ledge and 
Kegan Paul, P 190.
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5, Shoring up the Domestic Base of External Power.
The more complex perceptions of the relationship between
economics, domestic goals and foreign policy that had
developed by 1970 may still, however, be represented as
reflecting a primary concern with the external power of the
British state. Indeed, the expected benefits of EC entry
were presented as including the i) shoring up of domestic
consensus for substantial expenditures on security and an
active foreign policy ii) easing of resource constraints
that had made it necessary for Britain to make choices
between meeting its alliance commitments and funding a
military capability that could be deployed as part of an
independent foreign policy iii) strengthening of the
Atlantic Alliance and Britain’s influence in its counsels.
The 1971 White Paper on EC entry began by referring to the
1
interdependence of economic competitiveness and security.
Gamble has argued that the preferences of the British elite
for an ambitious foreign policy free of domestic
contorversy had always required that latent conflicts for
resources be disguised by meeting domestic social demands 
2
in full. By the end of the 1960's, Britain’s foreign policy 
was threatened by a new politicisation. In 1968, Labour 
backbenchers had insisted that there should be no further 
cuts in welfare expenditure without defence savings that
1. Cmnd 4715 of 1971, ParaH
2. Gamble, op cit, 1981, xxi.
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were to lead to the commitment to withdraw from from East 
1
of Suez. A fear developed amongst Britain's elite that
overseas commitments would assume an unstable basis in
2
domestic politics if Britain was cut off from the prosperity
of neighbouring countries. Some of the more colourful
figures in British politics advocated what came to be known
as the " Little England" approach; international threats to
Britain had been greatly exaggerated: Britain was not suited
to political and economic integration with others, so, like
Japan, it should seek its competitive advantage by cutting
the costs of foreign policy to the bone, perhaps free-riding
to a degree on the security efforts of others who were
richer and closer to danger. Yet the idea of Britain not
playing extensive international roles remained abhorrent to
most elite opinion; The Times summed up fears of an
internationally isolated and economically frustrated Britain:
" Britain would attempt to resolve its problems by a bad 
neighbour policy...it would reduce its participation in 
European defence collaboration and international aid..it 
would become a ruthless scavenger for world business..it 
would have to choose between intense national discipline and 
impoveri shment" 3
The Heath Government came to power determined to restore
Britain's security roles in the Gulf and South East Asia.
Hurd's claim that Heath was in earnest is supported by
T1 Barbara Castle, PiariesT 1964-70, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 
London, 1984, P 359.
2. S. Henig, "Britain and Europe: The Middle Way", Journal 
of Common Market Studies, Vol VI, December 1967, P 212.
3. The Times, 4 May 1971.
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the theme of Heath’s Godkin lectures that European powers
had to share in a global policing role if international
order was to be maintained. However, substantial resources
would still have to be found for European defence, as
Britain's influence on Alliance policy was thought to be
proportionate to its military contributions. Although
withdrawal from East of Suez had thus been presented as a
means to greater British influence over NATO Europe,
Britain, in fact, had only a few more troops in the latter
area in 1970 than in 1964 and it was importunate of the
Federal Republic for offset payments even to sustain the
1
foreign exchange costs of these. Whereas in 1952 Britain
produced more arms than all the other European allies
combined, 1970 was the first year in which both France and
2
Germany had larger absolute defence budgets than the UK.
As the Heath Government decided to keep to the limit of 5%
of GNP that Labour had imposed on defence spending , it
looked to EC entry to bring economic growth and an
industrial policy that would ease problems of procurement,
in order to satisfy ambitious defence goals. Home argued:
" Britain and Europe are forfeiting priceless advantages in 
the accumulation of wealth, which is the basis of all 
security, and in political influence by allowing EFTA and 
the EC to continue separate". 3.
While the linkage between EC entry and security reflected
1. Carrington, op citl P 229.
2. C. Coker, A Nation in Retreat, Brassey's, London, 1986,
P 2 and Frankel, op cit, P 291.
3. 1970 Election Campaign Guide, Cons Central Office, P 618
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the continued importance of traditionalist priorities, it
also showed how such priorities were becoming dependent on
transformationalist methods. The Government occassionally
conceded that the hoped-for doubling of economic growth to
produce greater defence at a constant GNP share depended on
1
further economic integration and not merely joining the EC.
Defence Minister Lord Lambton told the Commons that
collaboration in West European procurement would become a
precondition for possessing many capabilities at all.
Countries could not carry out an " effective individual
2
programme in every case" . Although the EC was not involved
in security issues, Anglo/German talks on a NATO Defence
Improvement Programme had highlighted ways in which EC
industrial policies could operate in parallel with defence
collaboration. The encouragement of transnational mergers
and joint projects could lead to greater compatibility and
lower unit costs in defence products; a way would be found
around nationalistic purchasing and France would be included
in a new web of Europe-wide procurement, further eroding the
3
de facto significance of its separation from NATO. Arguments 
for entry were beginning to suggest that certain productive, 
technological and security bases of UK state power would 
have to be meshed with those of other states, or 
inadequately cultivated.
1. See above PP 58-60.
2. Hansard, 1 March 1971, Cols 1348-9.
3. C. Bluth, " British/German Defence Relations: 1950-80" in 
Karl Kaiser and John Roper, eds, British-German defence co­
operation, Jane's/RIIA, London, 1988.
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6. British views on EC entry and the changing logic of 
Multilateral Co-operation.
Although economic integration in an enlarged EC might limit 
the ability of British Governments to revert to a strictly
independent cultivation of national resources, or to seek
prosperity in alternative groupings, there was a view that 
it could otherwise proceed with minimal implications for 
conventional inter-state behaviour in West Europe and with 
still less need for new transnational political forms. An 
economic transfusion of resources would prolong the life of 
independent European states. "Negative" integration - the
removal of restrictions to private transactions would be
enough. The automatically optimising mechanisms of the 
market would provide a better adjustment of economies to 
the pressures of international production, technology and 
finance than any new EC policy or institution; economic 
integration could and should occur without compromising the 
separate and sovereign management of domestic societies by 
nation states. Economic integration need have no 
implications for political superstructures. However, what 
is striking about British elite arguments for EC entry in 
the early 1970's is how far they did imply an ambitious 
multilateralism in transnational economic policy-making; a 
multilateralism that was certainly suggestive of departures 
from traditional inter-state behaviour and possibly 
suggestive of new political forms. The following arguments 
will be examined:
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1. With Entry occurring against the background of the
erosion of the Bretton Woods system of international
economics, many arguments focused on the need for an
enlarged EC that would make more of its economic policies in
common in order to aid the stabilisation of the
international economy. The Keynesian tradition of British
thinking had centred on the notion that economic groupings
are not automatically stabilising as it may be irrational
for individual units to take the decisions that are needed
1
by the system as a whole. There was, therefore, a need for 
some political provision of international public goods 
across the interdependent AIC area: stabilising mechanisms
that benefit everyone and not just their providers.
Since 1944, these public goods had been provided
unilaterally by the US. The US prevented competitive
deflations, devaluations or trade wars in the international
economy. It pressured others to follow simple rules of trade
and currency management. Its trade deficit created dollars
that provided other Governments with liquidity and allowed
2
them to ride out temporary difficulties ;its economic 
management pump-primed the international economy when growth 
lagged. However such a system could not survive, as it 
depended on the indefinite creation of US liabilities.
1. J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest 
and Money, Macmillan, London, 1936, PP 245-57.
2. Gilpin, op cit, P 135.
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Indeed , since the suspension of dollar convertibility in 
1968, it had been clear that the US could no longer fix its 
policies with other than its own priorities in mind and that 
the Administration was under pressure for the US itself to 
abandon the rules of the old system. Heath argued that 
international transactions would either stop growing or 
become increasingly unstable if the other economies did not 
agree to the creation and control of international liquidity 
by some other means than continuous US payments deficits.
By contrast to French thinking which stressed the predatory
potential of international economic leadership, British
Governments emphasised its role as a public good. In
conjunction with a scarcely diminished assumption that
Britain should show a lead and help to take
responsibility for international structures, stability was
seen to require that AIC's should organise themselves to
share the burdens of international economic management with
the US. The success of EC bloc diplomacy in GATT talks in
the late 1960's and the first stirrings of Franco/German
interest in an economic and monetary union in 1968-9,
suggested triangular management by the US, EC and Japan. In
his Godkin lectures. Heath chose the theme that" those who
expected to benefit from the essential framework of
stability" provided by the US " should make a contribution
1
to its continuance". Rippon argued that a more international 
form of economic leadership would require preliminary co-
1. Heath, op cit, 1970, P 14.
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ordination of European positions to simplify the overall 
1
negotiation. Heath's Chancellor of the Exchequer, Anthony
Barber, told the Commons how the US supported British entry
2
as a route to shared responsibility. Many feared either
that bloc management of the international economy might work
without Britain's inclusion or that it might fail because
the EC could no longer function properly without
enlargement. Heath argued that European collaboration was
unlikely to assume new responsibilities without Britain as
many were still disturbed when France and Germany became too 
3
close. Jenkins argued that Britain could neither tolerate..
" an embittered and divided six impeding the further 
development of West Europe, nor a six intensifying its 
development, commanding notice in every field with Britain's 
voice finding it increasingly hard to get through" 4.
In his final words moments before the key votes in the
Commons on both 27 October 1971 and 17 February 1972, Heath
significantly chose to stress international economic power:
" What is important is being in the best position to 
influence economic decisions which are determining our 
future.... over these next few years in which new patterns 
will be formed...they will affect the livelihood of everyone 
in this country and they will be taken by those with the
greatest economic power" "these questions would be
settled by the US, the EC and Japan" 5.
2. Robert Gilpin shows how international production
1. Rippon, speech, 20 October 1971, RIIA Press Lib.
2. Hansard, 27 October 1971, Col 1739.
3. Heath, op cit, 1970, P 15.
4. Jenkins, The Times, 5 May 1971.
5. Hansard, 28 October 1971, Col 2205, and 17 February 
1972, Col 751.
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is not located by perfectly competitive markets alone, but 
by a hybrid system in which transnational oligopolies and 
state policies help to fix comparative advantages. Countries 
are in competion to fashion the best institutions and 
policies to foster production. Several arguments for EC 
entry drew the implications that i) European countries would 
not be able to create the continental market needed to take 
on US and Japanese competition, unless the many policy­
making areas that had provided a rich source of non-tariff 
barriers were brought under the common authority that only a 
body like the EC could provide: ii) European Governments
needed to limit the competition between themselves to create 
incentives to producers, if they were to use resources as 
efficiently as possible to create a single European 
productive base and to avoid being played off by 
international corporations: iii) in providing advantages to
its own producers, the existence of a single political 
authority in the US was as important as pan-continental 
markets. Europe would have to imitate features of the 
former.
The conspicuous example was technology. States can set up 
their producers with initial advantages by commissioning 
research and production so that start-up costs are defrayed 
and economies of scale established before industry has to 
compete in the market. With limited national budgets in 
comparison with the US, European Governments were under 
pressure to integrate their technology policies to back
77
technological leaders on a pan European basis and to strip
out duplication in research and development. Heath pointed
out that 62% of the income of Britain's aircraft industry
was provided by public procurement and research grants. "
Yet if Britain, France and Germany got together, they could
1
ultimately produce the full range of civilian aircraft"
In other policy areas, Davies made the point that, despite
the elimination of tariffs, Europe remained an area of
2
separate national markets. Shonfield, one of the co-authors
of the Duncan review of 1969 of British foreign-policy
methods, cited non-tariff barriers as evidence for the
redundancy of the assumption that governments could limit
their diplomacy to regulating transactions between states;
this had only displaced protectionism - and the
fragmentation of the EC market- to policy areas that were
considered off limits to international discussion because
3
they initially only regulated transactions within states.
3. States and international oligopolies can also change the 
verdict of the market by externalising costs that they 
should bear themselves and internalising benefits that would 
otherwise accrue to others. With the expectation that the 
international economy would either become a free for all of
1. Heath, op cit, 1970, P 44.
2. Davies, 16th September 1971, RIIA Press Lib.
3. A. Shonfield, "The Duncan Report and its Critics", 
International Affairs, Vol 46, No 2, April 1970, P 254.
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weakening norms or be managed without Britain, the problems
anticipated for the UK outside the EC can be summarised by
James Rosenau's distinction between: i) promotative actors,
who are able to change structures in their environment ii )
preservative actors, who can do little to influence
international structures, but find the status quo congenial
and, in any case, have good lines of communication to
promotative actors iii) acquiescent actors for whom the
external environment is neither changeable nor comfortable,
but who seek to avoid any external friction and thus allow
the burden of adjustment to fall on their domestic politics
iv) intransigent actors who are in the same position as
iii), but prefer a tense resistance to external pressures to
1
the sacrifice of values in domestic society.
The expectations of Britain's elite were conditioned by a 
history of being able to " make" international structures, 
if only through diplomatic access to others. Could British 
Governments satisfactorily manage matters of international 
political economy outside a collective bargaining pact such 
as the EC ? Was Britain reasonably placed to make domestic 
adjustments to international economic decisions over which 
it had little influence, or to re-externalise the uwanted 
effects of the economic policies of other countries ? 
Several studies suggested that Britain and Germany were on a 
par in their exposure to interdependence. However, Home
James Rosenau, The Study of Political Adaptation, Frances 
Pinter, London, 1982, PP 56-86.
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was more accurate when he told a Conservative seminar on the
1
EC that no country was more vulnerable to the world economy.
First, there was a problem of defining the " British
economy". By 1971, 50% of UK companies had at least 6
foreign subsidiaries and the value of foreign production was
twice visible exports compared with 40% in the cases of
2
Germany and Japan. This was a dispersion of capital and 
corporate assets that made it hard to view the national 
economic interest as confined to UK sovereign jurisdiction. 
Second sensitivity was not a matter of the level of 
interdependence but of who would lose or gain from further 
change. Britain was in many ways the marginal AIC actor in 
the interdependence game. Its currency was often first to be 
sold, its goods last to be bought and its underlying 
performance often compounded rather than cushioned shocks. A 
study of changes in demand for goods as incomes rose between 
1963 and 1974 showed that British consumers were twice as 
likely to spend extra earnings on imports than foreigners 
were to buy British as they became more prosperous. However, 
by 1970 Britain had to ensure that international trading
j
conditions would allow it to make a vast /' 4 b surplus on 
finished goods to pay for food and raw materials; in 1955, 
the figure had only been 800m at 1970 prices.
The Times argued that the first economies to " suffer from 
TT Home, The Times 6 May 1971.
2. Gamble, op ci^, 1981, P 110.
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risk to the open international trading system just as the
optimal scale of industry is breaking through national
boundaries" would be those without guaranteed access to an
1
inner region of politically secure markets. Indeed, if
Britain, which still accounted for 8% of international
trade, were caught in the cross-fire of a trade war between
the economic groupings, it would be the obvious place to
dump surplus production. On the other hand if there were to
be more negotiations centred on the EC, US and Japan,
difficulties of reaching settlements might be overcome by
externalising problems to those without bloc protection.
British officials had concluded as early as 1960 that,
unlike the EC, EFTA’s bargaining hand would be weakened by
the expectation that it would probably not prevail in a 
2
trade dispute.
Third, British Government policies were not only sensitive
to international developments, but politically vulnerable in
their low ability to take counter- vailing measures or 
3
absorb change. They found it hard either to re-externalise 
costs or to sit out the domestic political consequences of 
adjustments in the earnings and employment of capital and 
labour. This combination had meant that Britain had only
1. The Times, 1 January 1971.
2. Miriam Camps, European Unification in the 1960's. New 
York, 1967, PP 170-1.
3. R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 
Little Brown, Boston, Mass, 1977.
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been able to end the currency crises of the 1960's through
the favours of others. Clive Ponting's research in US
archives has shown that this resulted in a foreign
penetration of British foreign policy making that extended
to a 1965 mini- budget being shown to the US Administration
1
before the British cabinet. Strange has described the powers
of inspection entailed in the 1968 Basle agreement to
2
support sterling as amounting to wardship of court.
4. Governments are unlikely to accept a politically
3
"unbrokered relationship" between international markets and 
values in their societies, least of all where the
interventions of others mean that the former are not
operating neutrally and optimally. The right to arbitrate 
the distribution of values is constitutive of the domestic 
authority of governments, is presupposed by the goals 
of welfare states and is a key factor in electoral politics.
Consideration of whether the British state, acting alone,
could broker outcomes between international markets and
domestic values had been postponed by faith in the Bretton
Woods system of " embedded liberalism". The US and the IMF
would create plentiful international liquidity that would
T1 Clive Ponting, Breach of Promis^ Hamish Hamilton, 
London, 1989, P 77.
2. Strange, op cit, 1971, P 259.
3. J.G. Ruggie, " International Regimes, transactions and
change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order"
in S.D. Krasner (ed). International Regimes, Cornell 
University Press, London, 1983, P 214.
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allow other governments to ride out balance of payments
deficits without adjusting economic and social policies
geared to their own domestic objectives. An open
international economy would thus be reconciled with the
continued ability of each country to pursue its own version
of the " good society" through its own state. Nation states
and international markets could function without getting in
1
each other's way and interdependence could develop with
minimal need for economic multilateralism.
Unfortunately, as Robert Triffin had argued as early as
1959, the Bretton Woods system eventually only sharpened the
tension between interdependence and the domestically 
2
sovereign state. International liquidity could not be 
created fast enough to match the increase in international 
transactions. On the other hand, it could not be stopped 
from leaking into the private banking sector where it was
used to issue even further internationally footloose 
credits. Eurodollars mushroomed from $ 3b in 1960 to $75b in 
1970. Governments were exposed to the risk that money would 
flow between their countries until each had adjusted its 
domestic policies to be equally desirable to the markets At 
the very least, currencies and interest rates would have to 
move to satisfy the markets with clear implications for the 
ability of Governments to choose combinations of growth,
1. Marquand, op cit, 1988, P 61.
2. Richard Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence, McGraw 
Hill, New York, 1968, P 4, 117 & 180.
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employment and inflation.
British decision-makers had recently received a graphic
lesson in how international markets could constrain
political choice. Wilson came to power in October 1964
committed to a National Economic Plan at home and to
reviving the Commonwealth as the focus of British foreign
policy: " Britain’s frontier lies along the Himalayas".
However, the decision to withdraw forces from East of Suez
and concentrate them in Europe was taken just three years
later, not as a planned change in foreign policy, but under
immediate pressures to assemble a programme of economies
1
that would stem the selling of sterling . Back home, the
National Economic plan had been based on the notion that the
announcement of inviolable growth targets for several years
ahead would be self-fulfilling as industry would be able to
invest in the confidence that the demand for its products
would be available when they came on stream. The growth
targets were set at 3.8% a year for 1964-1970. However,
these had lost all credibility with industry by July 1965.
In an effort to sustain the National Plan’s targets against
the pressures of international currency markets, the
Government had reached the limits of its IMF drawing rights 
2
by May 1965. By July it had exhausted a credit especially 
negotiated with Bonn and was forced to announce a package to
1. Crossman, op cit, PP 436-44.
2. J.H.B. Tew, " Policies Aimed at Improving the Balance of 
Payments in F. Blackaby (ed), British Economic Policy: 1960- 
74, CUP/NIESR, 1978, P 351.
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limit growth to 2.5% in the coming year. The plan's author,
1
Tony Crosland, conceded that it " made no sense any more".
Several arguments for EC entry suggested that Britain should
react by accepting some transnational management of economic
and welfare questions, rather than resign itself to a
"politically unbrokered" relationship between the domestic
and international economies. Shonfield argued that the
underlying philosophy of the compilers of the Duncan report
had been the need to adjust British foreign policy to the
making of domestic policy in common with other Governments:
" There is a growing realisation among individual European 
countries that they no longer have the capacity for the 
effective management of their domestic affairs separately 
from one another. .Britain has become convinced of the need 
to act collectively with neighbours on matters which were 
previously considered as purely domestic concerns" 2.
Barber, who had briefly been Britain's chief negotiator with
the EC, argued in his opening statement to the talks " that
none of us acting alone can gain the ends which we desire
for our own people in terms of physical security or economic
3
and social advance" . Davies told the CBI that Britain would
have to look to the EC to regulate the relationship between
international markets and domestic values:
" We must look to the EEC to assert more control over 
investment flows: over centuries we have always been eager
to ensure that the flow of investment is guided and watched
1 .Crossman, op cit, P 133
2. Shonfield, op cit, P 254.
3. Statement to the Conference of the European Communities 
with applicant states. Cmnd 4401 of 1970.
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1
and that the currency rudder is kept in our hands "
The rejection of association for full membership was an
acknowledgement that Britain's position in the international
economy might require common policy-making with EC states:
economic integration by private transaction would not be
enough. Anthony Royle, Junior Foreign Office Minister 1970-
4, argued that Association would not bring "measures of
economic collaboration", particularly in technology, nor
would Britain be a party to the formulation of bloc
2
negotiating positions in international economics. Indeed
Heath argued that negative integration could be " unstable"
3
without a degree of positive collaboration. British 
Government circles also became increasingly preoccupied with 
the " law of uneven development", according to which well 
integrated markets suck capital and prosperity to central 
areas in the absence of a political mechanism capable of 
taxing and spending in a way that makes peripheral areas 
more attractive for development.
If Britain was unable to attain sufficient political 
influence over the relationship between its own society and 
the international economy independently, the EC seemed to 
provide the most appro priate multilateral unit. In part,
1. Anthony Royle, speech, 12 February 1971, RIIA Press Lib.
2. Interview with Edward Heath, December 1988.
3. Davies, speech, 22 January 1971, RIIA Press Lib.
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this reflected Britain's changed position as a structure
taker, A major reason for choosing the EC was "because it
was there". Unless a power is a hegemon, multilateralism
involves, by definition, acceptance of forms that are
agreeable to others. Britain found that the ground in
multilateral economic co-operation to have been largely
staked out after 1957. It could not expect the Six to undo
the EC. On the other hand, the rejection of NAFTA showed how
the formation of the EC was seen to leave an unequal and
solitary partnership with the US as the only multilateral
alternative. But the EC was also becoming co-extensive with
a higher proportion of the external causation to which
outcomes in British society were exposed. The growth of
Britain's exposure to interdependence between 1955 and 1970
can be almost entirely attributed to an intermeshing of
interests with the EC and EFTA countries which were likely
to associate with the EC after British entry. A further 7%
of Britain's GNP had become traded, yet non- European
1
transactions grew not at all as a share of GNP.
In conclusion, traditionalist foreign policy ceased to 
provide the single paradigmatic focus for EC entry between 
1963 and 1970. The aim of achieving a better alignment with 
patterns of international diplomatic influence had to share 
its claims on Britain's European policy with other 
structural pressures: the need for transnational answers to
problems of reproducing economic competitiveness and
1. Prest and Coppock, op cit, PP 103 & 110.
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domestic social values. Where traditionalist motives for EC
entry remained, Britain's policy-makers seemed to find it
increasingly hard to state them without suggesting
compromises with transformationalist methods, given
Britain's circumstances by 1970. Further illustrations of
this point will emerge during the next chapter, especially
in relation to what will be termed the distinction between a
diplomacy of commitment and a diplomacy of manoeuvre and to
hopes for an effective diplomatic concertation through the
new process of European Political Co-operation and the
pressures on co-operating states to integrate policies and
processes, even where they do not integrate institutions.
However, this chapter has shown how the perceived need for
the British state to receive an economic transfusion issued
in pressures for an international integration of its
productive base , an ambitious multilateralism in economic
policy and some erosion of traditional distinctions between
domestic and foreign policy-making. In several respects, EC
entry was for Britain a half-recognition that larger nations
may develop advantages of scale that require lesser players
to accept the paradox of transnational solutions in
cultivating key aspects of their state power. The 1971
White Paper on EC entry stated that: " No single member can
afford more than a limited part of the full range of modern
technological and industrial advance..individually no
1
European country can ensure its voice is heeded".
1. Cmnd 4715 of 1971, Paras 24 & 27.
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CHAPTER BRITISH ELITE VIEWS ON EC ENTRY: TRADITIONALIST,
TRANSFORMATIONALIST OR SCHIZOPHRENIC ?
Thus far we have seen how two sets of objectives were
established: one in terms of a traditionalist perspective of
foreign policy-making, another that implied that the
strength, security, separateness etc of the state could only
be one consideration of many and that these precepts might
themselves have to be diluted by economic integration and
political multilateralism. The tendency of actors to see the
environment through several conceptual prisms at once is
familiar to critical and cognitive theories:
" modernity is a multifaceted regime of highly mobile 
knowledgeable pratices - interpretative attitudes and 
practical dispositions that are widely dispersed" 1.
Indeed, critical theory suggests that there is " no
totalising narrative": several paradigms will be needed to
make sense of the environment and to manage a fractured
2
operational context successfully. But what can be hoped for 
is that decision-makers should be prepared to move in the 
direction of value integration: to learn where choices have
to be made and to specify how, when and to what degree 
priority will be given to each of their perspectives.
However, two cognitive patterns mentioned in the 
introduction suggest that actors find it hard to achieve
1. Ashley, op cit, 1989, P 260
2. See PP 7-10 for general insights of critical theory into 
the fracturing of the operational environments of social 
entities and PP 49-50 onwards for a discussion of the 
problem in the particular case of British Foreign Policy.
89
such inter-paradigmatic clarity. The principle of economy 
predicts that actors do not strive to clarify the
differences between their old and new ways of thinking, but 
to deny that there has been any change. Cognitive
consistency suggests that actors tend to see changes as 
panaceas; as satisfying all their values and perspectives
simultaneously, rather than requiring clear specifications 
of where choices may need to be made.
A case will now be made that British elite attitudes to EC 
entry were characterised by just such a confusion in 
relation to the traditionalist and transformationalist 
approaches to foreign policy making. In discrete instances 
of concrete policy-making there was some acceptance of 
transformationalist precepts: However, it was thought that
such departures could be "pragmatic" : that they could be
limited exceptions to a general philosophy of foreign policy 
that would remain unchanged. If by 1970 there was a good 
deal of conceptual integration at the level of conflicts for 
resources in British foreign policy, this was not matched by 
reflection on the need to choose between different political 
practices and forms implied by traditionalist and 
transformationalist approaches. Any new multilateralism was 
conceived as taking its place alongside the British state 
and not challenging its traditional international roles, its 
sovereignty, separateness in decision-making etc. Attention 
was thus absorbed in presenting all that might be required 
of EC membership as a continuation of conventional inter-
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State practices to the exclusion of discussing what should 
be given priority in the event of conflict between these and
the goals Britain sought by joining in the first place.
EC entry was quite reasonably seen as a sensible response to
the deteriorating trade-offs between the different
structuring dimensions of British Foreign Policy. But there
was an unwillingness to admit that the effective use of EC
membership might itself require a hard-headed ability to
accept trade-offs; indeed, it will be seen that the more
fractured the operational environment, the more integrated
the cognitive environment of a government's foreign policy
needs to be, so that actors are able to grasp what few
opportunities remain to trade their different values and
1
perspectives on reasonable terms. It will now be shown how, 
by contrast to this, British actors bent their intellectual 
energies to denying that there would be any need to choose 
between traditional values and the transformationalist 
methods of which their rationales for EC entry were 
increasingly suggestive. This argument will be developed in 
relation to two questions inherent to EC entry: what should
the relationship be between i) member states and Community 
institutions ? ii) national and Community diplomacy ?
1. See below P 130.
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1. British elite views on the internal development of the 
EC
It is first necessary to examine British elite attitudes in
the early 1970's to the future relationship between the
British state and the EC. Some definitions will be useful.
Wallace distinguishes between formal sovereignty, which is
the legal right to make authoritative decisions, and
effective sovereignty, which is the ability to make those
policies without excessive penetration of the decision-
1
making process by outsiders , or what Paul Taylor calls the
2
integrity of decision-making. Autonomy means range of
choice and ability to attain results from actions. The
separateness of states requires integrity of decision-making
but it also implies autonomy: that governments are something
more than flotsam on a sea of causation extending beyond
their jurisdiction. Separateness has also been used to
denote the gate-keeping role of the state: its ability to
determine, if need be, the terms of interaction between
external environment and domestic society .Political
integration, occurs where states mesh their policy-making
processes. It obviously covers formal transfers of authority
to a supranational body. However, there were two other forms
under active discussion in the early 1970's that sought to
reconcile collective effectiveness with the continued
T1 William Wallace, " What Price Independence, Sovereignty 
and Independence in British Politics", International 
Affairs, Vol 62, No 3, Summer 1986, PP 386-7.
2. Paul Taylor, The Limits of European Integration, Groom 
Helm, London, 1983, P 27.
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decentralisation of formal authority between member 
states.Intergovernmentalism, which in its strictest form, 
involves no common policy-making, but Governments that are 
so interlocked in continuous communication that their 
different policies adjust one to another; this may be aided 
by rules of communication and mutual adjustment. Through the 
adoption of a " Community Method", governments do make 
policies in common, but with the initiatory, analytic and 
mediating role of an impartial secretariat, in addition to 
rules of co-operation between themselves.
British elite rationales for entry placed a heavy burden of
expectaction on EC processes. The Government admitted that
its goals depended on the construction of new policies.
Britain's underlying growth potential was expected to
1
improve from from 2.5% to 4.0%-5.0%; however, more
considered assessments acknowledged that, as Britain had
missed out on the initial formation of the customs union, a
new stimulus to growth would probably require a second
2
generation of EC policy development. Moreover, it was
acknowledged that this might have to involve the
supplementation of a traditional concentration on negative
integration with the positive development of common 
3
policies. The list of desirable common policies mentioned
1. The Times, 27 May 1971.
2. Rippon, speech, 10 September 1971, RIIA Press Lib.
3. See above PP 73-87.
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by ministers during 1971 covered technology, regions,
industrial restructuring, the environment, energy, public
procurement, harmonisation of corporate taxation and legal
arrangments that would allow European-wide companies to 
1
develop etc.
Externally, the EC was expected to become an effective
international actor: to be effective in bloc negotiations
and even to assume a role in the continuous management of
2
the international economy. Over a longer time scale, some
hoped that it would assume the leverage, status and rights
of participation in diplomatic and security questions that
would make it a partner, if not an equal, of the
superpowers. On his return from the Paris summit of May
1971, Heath told the House of Commons of how he had spoken
with Pompidou of " the sort of Europe which we want to
see..a Europe, which by its unity, will be of a size and
3
nature to be an equal of the US, Japan and the USSR".
Contemporary comments on the shortcomings of individual 
nation states that were used to justify entry suggested that 
European collaboration was expected to have the 
institutional capacity to develop some effective presence in 
several areas where some governmental role was thought
1. Davies, speech, 16 September 1971 and Rippon, speech,
1 October 1971. RIIA Press Library.
2. See above PP 74-82.
3. Hansard, 24 May 1971, Cols 32-3.
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necessary. The 1971 White Paper on EC entry warned that "
individually no European state can assure that its voice is
heeded". The Times wrote about the " blunt facts of the
1
incapacity of individual states". Rippon argued that the
functions that the European state could no longer perform
unaided included the provision of security and political
influence, economic and social development and environmental
protection. He told the Commons that " the nation states of
Europe were too small to benefit from the society they
2
themselves have produced". Uwe Kitzinger, a leading member
of the European movement, argued that the most plausible
explanation of the " frustration of national objectives" was
the " corrosion of the nation state concept".." it would be
necessary to choose in the future between decision-making
that is national but ineffective and decision-making that is
3
effective but transcends states".
In an analysis of 22 issue areas where there was typically 
considered to be a need for some public authority in West 
European societies, Lindberg and Scheingold calculated that 
1) The Community had already developed some role in 12 areas 
but 2 ) The extensity of its presence was not matched by 
intensity, as it could only be said to predominate over
1. The Times, 1 January 1970.
2. Rippon, speech, 26 February 1971, RIIA Press Lib and 
Hansard, 26 October 1971, Col 1250.
3. Uwe Kitzinger," Britain's Crisis of Identity", The 
Journal of Commmon Market Studies, Volume VI, No 3, March 1968, P 
346.
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1
States in 4 policy spheres.
However, an interesting feature of British elite thinking at
the time of entry was that it did occassionally acknowledge
the problem of intensity: that a threshold had been reached
at which European collaboration might need to handle policy
challenges of a qualitatively different order to anything
before the 1970’s. If there was a common factor to the 4
areas in which Community action had previously predominated
it was that these lent themselves to " framework policies";
in such matters as tariffs, competition policy and
agricultural supports it was possible to attain outcomes
through relatively static structures; as these needed only
periodic adjustments, the timetables of servicing policies
to prevent functional breakdown and ponderous international
coalition building were just about compatible. However, the
new agenda of foreign policy co-operation, economic and
monetary concertation, and even common industrial, energy
and environmental action, was more in the mould of " process
policies". Coherence would not depend just on initial
frameworks, but on what Taylor has referred to as the
cumulation of decisions from individual precedent to
2
precedent to form clear directions.Rippon pointed out that "
economic and monetary co-operation cannot be the product of
haphazard identities of interest. Foreign policies cannot
Ï1 Ll Lindberg and S. Scheingold, Europe’s Would- be Polity, 
Prentice-Hall, NJ, 1970, PP 69-74.
2. Taylor, op cit, P 120.
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be given greater effectiveness by repeated expedients".
However, the historical record suggested that the EC
struggled to handle even existing policies under its current
institutional arrangements. Moreover, British elite views on
the internal development of the EC were formulated against a
background of first- hand learning experiences between 1970
and 1971 that left little excuse for failure to perceive the
limitations of existing arrangements. The Six failed to
follow through an intention at the Hague to agree common
negotiating positions with Britain. Many of the issues in
the negotiations were not so much concluded as postponed for
later discussion. As the fishing policy was not covered by
the deadline to finish negotiations by summer 1971, talks
2
dragged on for a further six months, absorbing much EC time. 
Deadlines were missed to agree agricultural reforms and a 
first stage for economic and monetary union by the end of 
1970 ; when the latter was finally concluded in March 1971, 
choices of principle needed to create a viable plan were 
either postponed or cobbled together under the illusion 
that a "juxtaposition" of opposites makes a " coherent
5
strategy".
T1 Rippon, speech, 1 October 1971, RIIA Press Lib. Also 
see Shonfield in The Financial Times, 3 November 1971.
2. Below Chapters 3 and 4.
5. D. C. Kruse, Monetary Integration in Western Europe : 
EMU, EMS and Beyond, Butterworths, London (1980), PP 77-8.
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The problem was likely to be compounded after enlargement. 
Unanimous agreements would have to be brokered between nine 
(ten with Norway) instead of six members. Unlike the Six, 
new members had not had the benefit of several years 
socialisation into the norms and methods of European co­
operation and there were signs that their domestic political
cultures were characterised by lower levels of attachment to
1
the values of European integration. The " elegantly simple 
2
first bargain" by which France had obtained the Common
Agricultural Policy and Germany industrial free trade had
also facilitated such agreement on further policy
development that had occurred since 1957; at least the
principal players had some considerable and unambiguous
interests that were exposed to the failure or entropy of
Community processes. However, the new Community was being
created with a major partner, Britain, that was
disadvantaged by existing policies. Indeed, some of the most
effective EC decision-making before 1970 had been spurred
3
by the anticipation of British membership; Britain would no /v-y^ 
function as an outside "threat" to promote internal cohesion.
The Heath Government showed moments of frankness and 
sophistication in appraising the institutional challenge 
posed by its own goals for EC membership . Government 
See below P 297.
2. Taylor, op cit, PP 65 & 299.
3. Miriam Camps, European Integration in the 1960's, 
Praeger, New York, 1967, P 2.
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spokesmen hinted at the dynamic potential of the Community.
It was made clear to the House of Commons that, although
present EC processes were strictly limited, the Government
might well have to request the enlargement of Community
powers at some later date. Sir Geoffrey Howe, then Solicitor
General, told the House of Commons that " The Communities
were a dynamic organisation that would evolve and continue 
1
to evolve" . Rippon added that new Treaties might soon be 
2
needed. Heath also had the courage to suggest in the final
speech before the second reading of the European Communities
Bill, when the Government was most at risk, that these new
treaties might have to include some majority voting within
3
the next 10 years. Heath, in fact, expected some return to
4
majority voting in the second half of the seventies.
The Governnment also attempted to prepare the way for
transfers of functions to the Community level by deepening
perceptions that there was a trade off between national
policy-making and effectiveness: the influence to be gained
by " pooling sovereignty" in effective forms of European
collaboration was set against the absence of autonomy that
Britain would face if it continued to insist on its "
5
political virginity." Indeed, uniquely amongst postwar
1. Hansard, 17 February 1972, Col 650.
2. Hansard, 15 March 1972, Col 833.
3. Hansard, 17 February 1972, Col 746.
4. Interview with Edward Heath, December 1988.
5. Royle, speech, 12 February 1971, RIIA Press Lib.
99
Governments, Heath’s came close to exaggerating how little
Britain could do on its own. The 1971 White Paper warned
that Britain outside the EC would have to " maintain its
interests and develop its resources from a far narrower 
1
base". Junior Foreign Office Minister, Anthony Royle,
itemised occasions since the war when Britain had not been
able to do as it wanted . Although confusing sovereignty and
autonomy, it seemed self-evident to Heath’s technocratic
frame of mind that Britain was not "losing" its
sovereignty; on the contrary it could only be "used" inside
the EC. Rippon argued that "sovereignty meant the exercise
of choice" and that Britain’s choice was already doubly
constrained by the practicalities of reaching agreements in
existing international organisations of which it was a
member and the smallness of its economy. By contrast, EC
membership allowed states to enlarge their choices through
"carefully controlling interdependence.. greater coherence
and sharing of functions, and in a way that was respectful
2
of national identities".
But a most interesting development was that official 
thinking began to appreciate that there were wide 
differences between transnational co-operation based on a 
"Community method" and multilateralism limited by 
traditional precepts of foreign policy. It has been seen how
1. Cmnd 4715 of 197ÎT^ op cit. Paras 27 & 8.
2. Rippon, speeches, 22 April 1971 and 2 July 1971,
RIIA Press Lib.
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the Duncan report had argued that the management of
interdependence called for an end to the rigid separation of
foreign and domestic agendas and direct enmeshment of all
British Government departments with their counterparts
across the AIC area. Shonfield interpreted the report as
signifying a "Community approach" in which " consensus about
1
common circumstances would evolve and deepen". Former
British Ambassador to Washington, Lord Harlech, praised the
"solidarity" that a common analytical base and co-ordination
2
of internal policy-making had given the EC in trade talks.
In a revealing parliamentary answer. Home highlighted the
benefits of belonging to a settled group of continuously
communicating states where conventional approaches might
have stressed freedom of manoeuvre . Asked whether Britain
could not seek foreign policy co-operation in the WEU and
avoid the economic costs of EC entry, he replied that this
would leave Britain at a disadvantage to the Six who would
3
be " sitting together week in and week out". Rippon argued
that " Britain had been slower than most to appreciate
the postwar revolution in international relations by which a
community system could balance integration with continuing 
4
national consent". Chapter 7 will show how the Heath
Government sought, against Pompidou's preferences for a
Ï1 Andrew Shonfield, Europe Journey to an Unknown 
Destination, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1972, PP 15-21.
2. The Times, 20 January 1971.
3. Watt and Mayall, op cit, P 710.
4. Rippon, speech, 10 September 1971, RIIA Press Lib.
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strict intergovernmentalism, to strengthen the initiatory
and mediating roles of the European Commission. In the
Godkin lectures Heath argued that Britain had failed to take
part in European integration in the 1950's because it was
still " thinking in terms appropriate to the nation state"
and did not realise that "new forms of co-operation" such
as the OECD, " though far in advance of anything that had
1
previously existed", were not enough.
Heath’s own views are worthy of special mention. From the
Godkin lectures in 1967 to a recent article, his statements
on the relationship between the state and the EC have
repeatedly invoked two conversations. According to the first
with Jean Monnet, the Community had to be guided by the
principle that it could not afford to offend the vital
interest of any member. Thus when, at the Paris summit in
May 1971, Pompidou significantly felt it necessary to ask
Heath for reassurance that he supported national vetoes.
Heath replied that for the moment they only formalised the 
2
inevitable. However, the second conversation with Heinrich 
Von Brentano, German Foreign Minister in the 1950’s, showed 
that Heath was not prepared to foreclose options on the 
future development of the Community.
" I do not believe that it is very productive to talk about 
Federalism and non-Federal ism. The European Community was 
created sui generis. There has never been anything like it 
before in the world..and the final form of its organisation
1. Heath, op cit, 1970, P 18
2. Interview with Edward Heath, December 1988.
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will be sui generis..I talked to Von Brentano about this..he 
told me that we will develop pragmatically and progress to 
our own form of unity..only then will we send for the 
lawyers and say " tell us where we have got to" and by the 
time they tell us, we shall have got somewhere else". 1.
Heath suggested that institutions could take varying forms
across issues and time, following specific functional
requirements, experimenting, responding to feed-back from
previous successes and reflecting changing enthusiasms for
national or European identities. There would be no need to
specify end-states, or theological principles of
arrangement. He summed this all up as a " typically British
view" of 2 institutional pragmatism".
But he was also clear that the EC was already a unique
political form. By pointedly referring to " The Community"
and "our partners" he signalled that EC relations would no
longer be a matter of foreign policy , or conventional
inter-state dealing. Having reassured parliament that
Britain would not be yielding sovereignty because it would
2
retain a veto, he discouraged its use. In its place, he
advanced the norms that a) members should seek to pour more
of their dealings through the EC and reduce unilateral
national decision-making. This contrasted with a minimalist
approach that action should only be taken at the Community
level where the nation state was inadequate and seemed to
Heath to have two advantages: the pooling of information on
Ï1 Edward Heath, " European Unity over the next Ten Years": 
from Community to Union", International Affairs, Vol 64, No 
2, Spring 1988, PP 199-209
2. The Guardian, 2 December 1973.
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the best way to handle public policies and an enlarged scope
1
for the Community to progress through multi-issue deals b)
membership of the EC should be a kind of master relationship
for partners. When they operated in other multilateral
groupings they should either co-ordinate their positions or
advance national lines that took the views of EC partners 
2
into account c) having agreed that there should be a common
policy of a certain kind, members should make their best
endeavours to carry on negotiating until they found a
solution acceptable to all, d) matters already agreed should
not be re-opened e) members should welcome the good offices
of the Commission and f) being a member of a Community meant
flexible acceptance of unwelcome arrangements to secure 
3
overall progress.
However, the tension between ambitious goals for EC entry 
and the retention of an ideology of state sovereignty was 
not accompanied by any further clarification. Many of the 
goals of membership were immediate, even urgent. For 
example, bloc diplomacy to deal with a " disintegrating" 
monetary system, which in turn implied some coordination of 
economic policies within the EC, a second phase of 
industrial integration to ensure that Britain enjoyed a 
growth stimulus similar to that after 1957, regional 
Interview with Edward Heath, December 1988.
2. See below page PP 115-7.
3. See The Times 27 May 1971, Hansard 17 February 1972,
Col 744, The Guardian 2 December 1973.
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policies to head off British balance of payments 
difficulties and to give its membership a firm basis in a 
new central bargain etc. Yet Heath’s statements that Britain 
might have to adjust to majority voting within ten years and 
accept a very different approach to multilateral decision­
making in the interim were seen as faintly idiosyncratic; 
indeed, the former was thought unworthy of parliamentary or 
press comment. By contrast to Heath, other ministers tended 
to slip between promising great potential for EC processes 
and stressing their limitations, to the point of 
disparagement, when the focus shifted to state sovereignty. 
At one moment, Rippon spoke of "having laid the foundations 
for a truly integrated Europe" .." of enormous adaptations" 
being needed to make up for the "functions that the European 
nation state can no longer perform unaided" , but then he 
spoke of " things moving extremely slowly in Community
Europe" and of the Treaty of Rome as "4 pages of principles
1
and 400 pages of exceptions"
The notion of a "Community system" was widely welcomed as a
clever reconciliation of state sovereignty with a workable
EC system. But this was only true in the sense of formal
sovereignty; it thus remained unclear whether all British
actors were as reconciled as Heath seemed to be to the
implications of a Community method for effective
sovereignty: the probability that British preferences would
ÏT Rippon, speeches, 26 February ,22 April and 9
September 1971, RIIA Press Library.
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have to be diluted, that governmental processes would have
to be intermeshed and that co-operation would cease to be
fully discretionary and become rule-based. Significantly,
this point was taken up by delegates to a parliamentary
1
conference in London in February 1971. The next paragraph 
will show how a Community method logically implies some 
threshold at which it starts to predominate even over states 
with vetoes, such that it can hold the grouping to a 
consistent course despite short-term fluctuations in the 
interests, perceptions and political coloration of component 
governments. However, the British debate concentrated on the 
benefits of a Community approach without making that 
threshold explicit.
Robert Keohane points out that co-operators do not face pre­
defined pay-offs from collaboration, but can increase 
returns by the ways in which they approach co-operation. By 
working at a continuous relationship between a stable set of 
participants and pouring as many multilateral dealings as 
possible through the one grouping, governments can 
proliferate norms of co-operation and habits of 
communication; they can socialise preferences, expectations 
and cause/ effect analyses of how policies work. This 
increases the number of situations in which co-operation is 
mutually profitable and the chances that they will be 
speedily identified. Most importantly such an approach may 
be necessary if states need to be able to change gear from
1. The Guardian, 13 February 1971.
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spasmodic acts of co-operation to collaborate to produce
policies that need long-term, coherent development. Only
through investment in the thickening up of norms and
communications with partners - "regimes"- can states
overcome the problem of needing collective action, yet
finding it hard to arrange without a strong central
enforcement agency. Only if states are able to pass some
threshold at which they can trust everyone else to abide by
the regime, will they hang on inside a co-operative package
against their short-term interests because they expect to
benefit on average and seek to preserve their future ability
to deal to their own advantage under the co-operative code.
It is only in such circumstances that most opportunities for
inter-state collaboration become realistic, as it is almost
impossible to arrange matters to produce identical benefits
1
or a precise synchrony of costs. However, Donald Puchala
sums up the gulf between such a politics of commitment and
those of ad hoc, a la carte co-operation and expedient
manoeuvre between a range of multilateral groupings:
negotiations that are rule-based, not fully discretionary
and which involve a "full-information game" are not " those
of the nation state"; such Community approaches are the "
furthest thing from anarchic self-help that are not 
2
Federations". If a Community method was the minimum needed
1. Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, Princeton Ubniversity 
Press, Princeton, NJ, 1984, PP 29, 113-5.
2. Donald Puchala," Of Blind Men, Elephants and European 
Integration, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol X, No 3, 
March 1972, PP 279-84.
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to meet the functional requirements of policy-making implied 
by the goals of British entry, Britain had not avoided the 
need for integration: the absence of institutional
integration would place a heavier burden on the integration 
of policies, processes and normative orders in the EC area,
A central tension in the idea that issues of sovereignty and
autonomy would be avoided in the absence of formal
integration was presented by the fact that, in strict
constitutional usage, the sovereignty of the British state
resides in its parliament and not its executive.
Intergovernmental and community systems are particularly
1
hard to square with the autonomy of parliaments. It is hard 
to follow intergovernmental dealings through their 
subterranean processes, let alone unravel them when they 
involve an indivisible package of interstate compromises. 
The problem was foreshadowed by the experience of British 
entry. Howe told the Commons that from then on i) Parliament 
would delegate its powers within the scope of the existing 
treaties to the executive to make laws in concert with other 
governments ii) Parliament would have to content itself with 
devising its own procedures to comment on matters before
they reached the Council of Ministers iii) some new
Treaties might be added by Executive privilege i.e. 
Parliament would only have rights of consultation iv) those 
which came before Parliament would have to be accepted or 
defeated in their entirety: " When a Government negotiates
1. Hansard, 25 October 1971, Cols 1396-7.
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with other states, the whole of the Treaty must be seen as a
1
package., it is not open ..to pick and choose provisions" 
Heath recognised that the only way out was a strengthened 
European Parliament, but the question then came full circle 
to how this could be effective without challenging the 
sovereignty of national parliaments.
Above all, there was virtually no discussion of what should 
happen if the community method was inadequate. What would 
then be traded off: the goals of EC membership or the formal 
sovereignty of the British state ? British decision-makers 
can be seen as thinking in dyads. When the focus was on the 
contrast between the collective autonomy of EC states and 
loss of control to third governments, transnational market 
forces etc, there was some willingness to experiment with 
new forms European co-operation. However, when the focus 
shifted to the contrast between the sovereignty of state and 
EC processes, the earlier distinction seemed to slip from 
consideration. Such a tendency to fragment the environment 
into dyads and not to achieve a comprehensive integration of 
preferences across all values is exactly what the cognitive 
paradigm predicts.
However, there were two further slippages. The idea of 
institutional pragmatism - that it would be possible to 
experiment with new policies and collaborative forms without 
creating entangling processes and circumscribing the range
1. Hansard, 6 March 1972, Col 1155.
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of choice over larger principles of political arrangement
contrasted with recognition of the dynamic potentials of
European co-operation. Failure to clarify this point risked
a stand-off between the dynamic pressures of integration and
1
political unpreparedness for its implications: an "
interdependence trap",in which supposed partners become
frustratred, fractious, and thus even less able to operate a
decentralised co-operation, as they find themselves caught
between a clearly defined need to collaborate and an
2
inability to break with traditional inter-state behaviour.
Secondly, it was common at the time of entry to stress the
veto power that membership would bring. If British
Governments were unable to avoid compromises to their
preferences by leading in EC policy formation, they would at
least gain a blocking power over unwanted developments in
their immediate external environment that they would not
have had outside the EC. 30% of Conservative speakers in the
3
House of Commons debates on entry made this point. Kitzinger
identified what he called a " carpet-baggers" approach to
Europe: that Britain should join to gain the benefits of a
larger market but otherwise seek to keep the development of
4
the EC under control.
1. Wallace, op cit, 1986, P 373.
2. Various articles on this theme in Ghita lonescu, ed. 
Between Sovereignty and Integration, Croom Helm, London, 
1974.
3. Below, P 239.
4. The Times, 26 January 1971.
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However, reassurances that veto powers were a cast-iron
guarantee of sovereignty were a simplification of the
patterns of international interaction that were impelling
Britain towards entry in the first place: the very pressure
Britain was under to adapt to the EC as constituted was
testimony that the pace and form of integration may not be
within the blocking power of any single member state. Where
parties face potential coalition surpluses, i.e. gains from
collaboration greater than the sum of their individual
contributions, those who are able to make quick deals can
pre-empt a greater share of the coalition surplus to
themselves, forcing the others either to remain outside the
agreement or to join later with proportionately less
influence over institutional forms and the distribution of
1
costs and benefits. British Governments had reasons to seek
the agreement of others to new or changed EC policies; they
would have to play a game of coalition and log-rolling that
would necessarily limit complete discretion in the use of
veto powers; a blocking game might not be enough. As
unilateral decision-making was becoming a matter of
"strategic action" - only reaching its full significance
when mixed with the reactions of others- governments were
condemned to worry about the quality of their relationships:
to temper their sovereign right to pursue their short-term
interests in each case with the knowledge that they could
need the understanding of partners in the future.
T1 Harold Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation, 
Harvard, Mass, 1982.
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In fact, even the position on formal sovereignty was more
ambiguous than admitted. Under British constitutional law.
Parliament remained formally sovereign to the extent that it
could always claw back any powers that it had granted to the
Council of Ministers or make laws in contradiction to EC
provisions. However the European Communities Act adopted all
EC law into British law, including a European Court ruling
in Van Grand en Loos , summed up as follows by one reviewer:
"that the Community had created a new legal order in favour
1
of which members had limited their own sovereignty". A
further case was later to confirm that this extended to
national constitutional doctrine. Was the European
Communities Act subject to repeal or had it itself repealed
the British convention that no parliament could bind its
successor ? The problem of priority of laws was thus
viciously circular and logically insoluble. The EC
treaties were also unusual in being expressed to be in
perpetuity and not having renewal clauses. The assertion of
a sovereign right to withdraw would thus involve a further
2
conflict with international treaty law. When does it become 
so difficult to exercise formal sovereignty that it becomes 
what Bagehot might have called a dignified rather than an 
effective notion ?
Ï I J.D.B Mitchell, " British Institutions Inside Europe", 
Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International
Relations, January 1973, No 249. Also see "The Judge's 
Dilemma", The Times, 18 April 1972.
2. Hansard, 28 October 1971, Col 2132.
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2. British elite views of the EC as an international actor.
The second key question concerned how the EC should evolve 
in relation to the wider world and how far the member states 
should mediate their external relations through its
multilateral frameworks. Membership of the EC had always 
entailed a commitment to the common external negotiation of 
matters covered by the Treaties. British arguments for EC 
entry and the EMU intiative suggested a greatly expanded 
agenda for bloc economic diplomacy. After the Hague 
conference in 1969, it had also been agreed to initiate an 
informal, biannual process of foreign policy discussions. 
Indeed, British elite arguments for EC entry suggested a
particular enthusiasm for the potential of foreign policy 
concertation. Home argued that Britain would have to keep up 
with a trend in Europe, Asia and Africa to pursue foreign 
policy in multilateral groupings. Outside the EC, "Britain 
was a shrinking power in a world of growing powers"...but, 
inside the EC, " we would expand our influence if the Prime 
Ministers (sic) of an enlarged Europe were to sit round a 
table once a month to discuss foreign policy".
However, there were fundamental choices implicit in a
multilateral approach to the extra EC environment. What
proportion of its relationships would Britain be prepared to
mediate through discussions with partners ? Would it be
Ï1 Home, speech to seminar of Conservative parliamentarians 
on British entry to the EC, The Times, 6 May 1971 and
interview on Panorama, BBC, 8 June 1971.
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willing for these to change anything significant in British
policy? Would Britain insist on any particular configuration
of relationships between the EC and the rest of the world or
would it allow processes of European co-operation to be
genuinely open-ended ? Would European multilateralism be
some loose, ill-defined, background reinforcement to an
undiminished national diplomacy? Or were proponents of
British entry prepared for it to become an international
1
actor in its own right ? Would processes and socialisation
at the European level be permitted to blend the initial
preferences of the sub-units into new positions: to break
out of the ad hocery of the periodic, chance agreements of
inter-state politics to trace coherent and sustained policy
initiatives to influence the world ? Would harmonisation
eventually extend to the structuring assumptions and
2
interpretative schemes basic to foreign policy ? In short, a
paradigmatic choice was implicit in the notion of bloc
diplomacy: would the status and power of the individual
nation state continue to be the unit of value, or was the
3
goal to be the quiet integration of foreign policy, while 
preserving only the forms of separate state action ? Had 
elite thinking clarified this choice ? Again, this chapter 
can only begin to answer these questions at the levels of 
policy statements and moves in anticipation of membership.
1. Taylor, op cit, P 120.
2. W, Wes sels, " EPC: a new approach to European Foreign 
Policy" in D. Allen, R. Rummell& W. Wessels (eds), European 
Political Co-operation, Butterworths, London, 1982, P 6.
3. Hill, op c^, 1983, P 21.
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The case studies of chapter 1, covering Britain's formal 
participation in EC processes from 1972 to 1974, will be 
needed to push the analysis further.
Heath developed a keen interest in the preconditions for
making the EC into an international actor as an exercise in
creative statecraft. He promoted three criteria. First, he
was eager that European policy processes should develop
their own integrity, free from excessive outside penetration
before there had been an opportunity to coordinate an EC
view. In successive conversations with Nixon, he told him
from December 1970 onwards that Britain would cease to
negotiate matters bilaterally with the US, or make
concessions to an American viewpoint in advance of European
consultation, that all EC members would be expected to
develop a common front on issues and share all information
received. He aligned with Pompidou to reject a German
suggestion that the US should enjoy formalised rights of
1
consultation with the EC. Frankel argues that he sought to
recondition the very reflexes of British foreign policy
thinking, complaining about officials who thought "first and
foremost" about how the US would react, and circulating a
2
directive to all Departments telling them to think European. 
Kissinger recalls that he came close " to insisting on
1. Kissinger, The White House Years, Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson/Michael Joseph, London, 1979, PP 937 & 964.
2. Frankel, op cit, P 322.
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1
receiving no preferential treatment". On 19 June 1970,
Nixon called Heath to suggest a continuous dialogue,
exempting him from the rule that he would never receive
unscreened calls ! However, nothing came of this because
Heath believed that the long term construction of practices
of EC concertation should not be mortgaged to outsiders'
offers to give individual member governments privileged
2
access to their own decision-making.
Second, Heath believed that the EC should work to extract
its own leverage from the skein of interdependence. He
pointed out that the enlarged EC would be the world ' s
largest trade bloc with 40% of world trade, rising to 54%
with the inclusion of association agreements. It would have
a larger combined aid budget than the US and own one third
3
of the world's monetary reserves. He was eager that Europe
should confidently deploy its economic power in spite of its
dependence on the US security system; thus the 1971 White
Paper carefully differentiated the possibility of West
Europe becoming an "economic superpower" from the overall
4
superpower status enjoyed by the US and USSR. However, over 
the longer -term. Heath believed that:
" if we want to deal with monetary and commercial affairs in
1. Kissinger, op citf^ 1979, PP 932-4.
2. Interview with Edward Heath, December 1988.
3. Interview with Heath, The Guardian, 2 November 1973.
4. Cmnd 4715 of 1971, para 27.
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the way we think is right for Europe, then we must work for 
a new balance with the US in defence.. right across the 
European field., in all aspects of European defence". 1
Even if European defence collaboration was not based on the
EC, it was important to the EC's leverage with the US that
it should be developed in parallel. In 1967 Heath had
advocated that British and French nuclear deterrents should
be multilateralised and held " in trust" for the EC as a
whole. He was to suggest this to Pompidou in 1971 and to
2
continue pressing it up to 1973. Kissinger noted that he
spoke more passionately than Pompidou about European 
3
defence.
Third, Heath sought to erode divisions between categories of 
European cooperation, so that European leverage was not
doubly fragmented by the plurality of its states and the
discussion of issues in different fora. He thus opposed 
Pompidou's insistence that the EC and EPC should be kept
rigidly separate on the grounds that the economic means of
the EC were needed to give leverage to European diplomacy. 
He also hoped that EC partners should always form some 
network of discussions between themselves wherever they 
participated in other multilateral fora.
However, beyond this there were clear limits to the degree 
to which British official thinking seemed to be prepared for 
Ï1 Interview with Heath, Panorama, 24 January 1972.
2. Interview with Edward Heath, December 1988.
3. Kissinger, op cit, 1979, P 964.
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co-operation to lead to an integrated or genuinely
socialised approach to foreign policy. The incoming Heath
Government suggested that, as late as 1970, the appeal of an
ambitious, national diplomacy was undiminished. Heath spoke
of signalling clearly to others that , in the future,
foreign policy would be based on the single criterion of "
British national interest", that Britain had " no eternal
allies and no eternal enemies" and that others could expect
a respectful hearing but that Britain would eventually make
its own foreign policy decisions. He was initially
dismissive of the argument that Britain should enter the EC
to avoid national inadequacy, crossing out some offending
passages that suggested this from the draft 1971 White
Paper. He spoke of the need for a " broadly based assessment
1
of our interests..that did not pitch aspirations too low". 
Heath’s assertions repeatedly matched enthusiasm for 
Community processes with the importance of entering the EC 
to secure a stage on which Britain could be seen to act out 
a leading, national role in foreign affairs.
Indeed, much emphasis was placed on the leadership roles that
Britain could exercise from inside the EC. Willi Brandt
recalls that George Brown, Foreign Secretary at the time of
the 1967 application, was eager to know when Britain would
2
be let into the EC so that it could give a lead. Crossman,
Edward Heath, " Realism in Foreign Policy", Foreign
Affairs,Volume 48, No 1, October 1969, Watt and Mayall, op
cit, PP359-69 & 640-5 and interview material with Mr Heath.
2. Willi Brandt, People and Politics: 1960-75, Collins,
London, 1978, P 161.
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who objected to " going into Europe to remain great",
recalls a suggestion in the official paper presented to the
1966 cabinet weekend on EC entry that it was required less
for practical reasons than for those of counting in the
1
"councils of the world". Benn’s diary records his Permanent
Secretary’s assumption that " Whitehall would dominate the
2
Common Market as it was so full of experienced people".
On the foreign policy side in particular, there was a 
tendency to slip between conceptualising entry as accession 
to a genuinely open-ended process of concertation and the 
co-option of other EC members as supports for the pre­
defined roles and policy doctrines of the British state: 
an enlarged EC was presented as allowing Britain or some 
combination of Britain, France and Germany to re-establish a 
position as interlocutor between European states, their 
third world associates and the US. This would, in turn, 
assure reasonable access to the "top table" of strategic 
diplomacy between the superpowers.
A great deal of effort was expended in presenting entry as 
a means to revive the three circles concept of Britain’s 
diplomacy by restoring its leadership in European politics. 
George Brown wrote:
" With Britain leading, we should be in a position to argue 
bluntly with the Americans..Britain’s future rests on her
1. Crossman, op cit, PP 159-61.
2. Tony Benn, Office without Power, Hutchinson, London, 
1988, P 194.
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emergence as a leader of a new European bloc..which would 
have the same power and influence as the Commonwealth in 
days gone by". 1.
An Editorial in Round Table provides an interesting
contemporary account of how Britain's global. Commonwealth
relations were thought likely to be rekindled by EC
membership. First, the Commonwealth was a malleable
grouping, " capable of adapting itself to any alteration of
orientation of members..it is not a construction of forms
and laws". Second, Britain would find it easier to secure
agreements from the Commonwalth once EC entry signalled its
clear determination to break with its imperial past. Third,
Britain's inclusion in the EC would reinforce the appeal of
the Commonwealth as a grouping that spanned the spectrum of
types of state. The Government made much of the specific
benefits for Commonwealth cohesion that would derive from
Britain's position as a channel to the trade and aid
2
available under EC schemes.
Douglas Hurd recalls that Heath was in earnest in seeking to
restore Britain's security responsibilities in the Gulf and
South East Asia ; in contrast to the notion that he " cared
a great deal for Europe and nothing for the rest of the
world ^ he spent much of his time before 1970 considering how
Britain could play a distinctive role in African and Asian
Ï1 George Brown, In My Way, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1971, P 
205-9.
2. Editorial, Round Table, January 1973, No 249,PP 3-11.
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affairs. In short, he continued to believe in a global, as
1
opposed to a regionally focused, foreign policy. The Godkin
lectures and several speeches also contained an underlying
assumption that any European co-operation would just play a
supporting role for the only serious EC international
powers, Britain and France, which would, in turn,
approximate more to the paradigm of major powers than
middling European state: global responsibilities, nuclear
2
capabilities, security council membership etc.
Sharp's survey of British Government attitudes to the EC
between 1961-71 uncovers the assumption that Britain would
somehow put itself back at the head of a third bloc in
world politics. The Six might be contributing the economic
substance, but Britain would provide the key dowry of
3
diplomatic contacts, expertise in the art of government etc.
Heath thus wrote of Britain bringing a more extensive
4
network of international contacts than other members.
It will be claimed here that these views concealed two 
failures to clarify what was entailed in foreign policy 
concertation. First, Haas suggests that it is ultimately 
necessary to be clear whether the goal of associating with
1. Douglas Hurd, op cit, P 40.
2. Heath, op cit, 1970.
3. P. Sharp, " The Place of the European Community in the 
Foreign Policy of British Governments 1961-75", Millennium, 
Vol 16, No 2, Summer 1987, P 165.
4. Heath, The Financial Times, 1 January 1973.
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others is to secure collective functional benefits or
1
individual status and prestige; the latter aim can
drastically narrow the use of an association to secure
functional goals. These entail that co-operation should
evolve flexibly, taking whatever form is functionally
optimal to the task. However, the need to preserve the
prestige of particular entitities perpetually constrains the
choice of political methods: to the extent that the
association moves at the pace of the slowest, the
unwillingness of any one national elite to sublimate its
roles and status may be a serious impediment. Moreover,
functional benefits are what Wolfers calls " milieu goals"-
they potentially benefit all players and can be divided
2
between them- but status is a "possessional goal": only at
the expense of others, could British Governments secure the 
psychic pay-off of being seen to lead in the definition of 
EC foreign policy and the luxury of collective action that
was not seen to compromise its own roles, relationships, 
preferences etc. In short, there was a risk of turning the 
EC from a co-operative to a competitive relationship.
Puchala stresses that there is a fundamental antinomy 
between a genuine Community method in international co­
operation and:
" a process of mutual exploitation whereby governments seek 
to mobilise and accumulate the resources of neighbouring 
states in their own interests and to pursue the traditional
Ï1 Lindberg and Scheingold, op cit, PP 124 & 247.
2. Wolfers, op cit, P 73.
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ends of state policy: international autonomy, heightened
influence and diplomatic prestige" 1.
In short, British rationales for entry provide evidence of 
wanting both the collective functional benefits of 
association and the restoration of national prestige, but 
there was little awareness of potential trade-offs between
the two: that effective collective action might not be
negotiable on a British agenda, or that the price of
insisting on British preferences and priorities might be a 
lower incidence of agreement to secure the much- advertised 
benefits of collusion, when the influence of the whole 
process would depend on outsiders’ perceptions of the
likelihood acting in common.
Heath might have objected that he did not propose anything
as unrealistic as British leadership of the EC, but that
such a role should be shared with France and Germany. Sir
Michael Palliser recalls that he was greatly encouraged by
the 1972 Paris summit as the big three had taken the
2
initiative and dominated procedings. However, chapter 7 will
show that a considerable degree of compromise and
socialisation would be needed to attain agreements within
the inner triangle. It had thus only limited possibilities
for delivering on Heath's promise that Britain would have a
3
chance " to lead and not to follow".
1. Puchala, op cit, P 275.
2. Interview with Sir Michael Palliser, February 1989.
3. Heath, Broadcast, 8 July 1971, RIIA Press Lib.
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The second problem was that all thinking was devoted to
predicting that the EC and non-EC circles of British
diplomacy would be mutually reinforcing to the exclusion of
agreeing priorities in the event of a choice having to be
made. The Europeanist/Atlanticist debate provides the best
example; few matters received such extensive contemporary
attention as did efforts to reconcile EC entry to Britain’s
Atlantic ties. British elites had long shown a high level of
attachment to NATO. A poll of " Who’s Who” entrants in 1971
showed that 62% thought EC membership would be very
valuable, but it also found that 58% cherished NATO
1
as a framework for Britain’s international collaboration.
The initial foreign policy of the Heath Government placed a
heavy emphasis on East/West relations - interpreted from a
traditional balance of power perspective. Home's speeches
made much of the extension of Soviet naval power into the
Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. Belief in this new threat
led to the renewal of the Simonstown agreement with South
Africa. In his memoirs. Home spoke of entry to the EC being
the main priority of the new Government after provision of
physical security at a time when the USSR was " reinforcing
the whole Warsaw Pact area with men and weapons" in
2
anticipation of some US troop withdrawals from West Europe. 
Heath expressed concern that Brandt's Ostpolitik might send
1. Frankel, op cit, P 45.
2. Lord Home, The Way the Wind Blows, Collins, London, 
1976, P 247.
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the wrong signals to the USSR and that any US collapse in
Vietnam might lead to a revival of Soviet pressures in 
1
Western Europe. The Government thus felt it necessary to
present EC entry as contributing to Atlantic security and
the reversal of any deterioration in the East/West balance.
Home told the 1971 EC debate in the Commons :
" in prudence, Britain must expect that whilst the US will 
maintain a nuclear umbrella, it will make reductions in 
conventional forces. Europe will, therefore, have to assume 
greater responsibility for the NATO framework". 2.
On July 6 1970, Home had told the House that:
" The outstanding problem of the new parliament would be 
whether Britain was going to be part of the movement towards 
European unity..The US is likely to reduce its commitment to 
Europe and Britain would have to make its reaction as part 
of the European response. 3.
Terminating the quarrel between the three major European 
powers over the political configuration of West Europe, 
giving Britain the opportunity to share in the prosperity 
and technology policies of the EC and agreement on some 
mechanism of foreign policy co-ordination were all presented 
as preconditions for West Europe to cohere more closely and 
strenghten NATO by assuming greater responsibilities for its 
own defence. It was argued that British and German 
membership of the EC would guarantee its openness to 
outside trade and capital, thus reducing the risk that 
economic tensions would spill over into the security 
relationship.
1. Kissinger, op cit, 1979, PP 932-5 & 938.
2. Hansard, 22 July 1971, Col 1715.
3. Watt and Mayall, op cit, PP 379-80
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In a contemporary survey of European elites, Alastair Buchan
had concluded that there were seven implicit models of how
West Europe should develop in its international context.
Four are worth mentioning here. Evolutionary Europe
suggested that the EC should adopt a reactive approach: the
value of outside relationships and of a Europe of nation
states meant that it should only integrate as far as
necessary to meet outside pressures. According to
Atlanticist Europe, political forms in Europe ought to be
conditioned by the priorities of the Atlantic alliance; no
benefit of integration could be worth transitional costs to
that relationship. Partnership Europe envisaged that an
Atlantic alliance would only be effective and durable if
Europe developed an equality of power and status with the US
and the ability to act independently; the problems of
transition to a" two pillar alliance" had to be tolerated.
By contrast. Independent Europe suggested that a European
international actor should re-design the pattern of global
politics, transcending the bipolar order with a new 
1
multipolarity.
There had always been two inescapable logical distinctions:
between integrating Western Europe to strengthen the
Atlantic alliance in a bipolar game and uniting it as a step
towards a new multipolarity: between liberalising economic
transactions as a means to free exchange across the whole
1. Alastair Buchan (ed), Europe's Futures : Europe's Choices, 
Chatto and Windus/IISS, London, 1969
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Aie area and integrating European arrangements for 
production and exchange so that they could be managed to 
some degree apart from the wider hurly-burly of 
interdependence. By 1970, these distinctions were reflected 
in two images of how the three circles concept could relate 
to EC entry. The conventional image of over-lapping circles 
suggested that Britain should continue to avoid becoming too 
closely involved in any grouping in order to maximise its 
own influence and to serve as an intermediary to smooth 
misunderstandings between its friends. But a new image of 
concentric circles implied that the efforts to construct a 
European foreign policy should be given priority in the 
event of conflict with the outer rings of Atlantic or 
Commonwealth contacts. Britain should not seek to smooth 
frictions where they were the corollary of desirable long­
term construction of the EC. Moreover, the De Gaulle 
experience indicated that anything which suggested that 
Britain was attempting to gain greater influence within the 
EC system by manoeuvring to secure superior contacts outside 
the EC might only be offset by a diminished wish to co­
operate with the U.K.
Of all Buchan’s models. Partnership Europe had the advantage 
for Britain’s foreign policy-makers of implying that all the 
above conflicts would remain theoretical: even an ambitious
European construction could proceed in tandem with a 
strengthened Atlantic alliance as the US would not object to 
the costs of the former and a more integrated Europe would
127
be supportive of the US. Heath's Godkin lectures had been
primarily concerned with placing his commitment to EC
enlargement in the context of Kennedy's Grand Design for an
alliance in which Europe was sufficiently integrated to
share international burdens and responsibilities with the
US. The only problem was that Heath's application to the EC
coincided with the decision of the Nixon Administration to
repeal the commitment to Partnership Europe and revert to a
preference for an Atlantic area of bilateral relations
between states, unimpeded by multilateral groupings to which
1
the US did not have an assured input. A US policy more 
sceptical of European unity, would re-open the suppressed 
fissures in British thinking.
By contrast to the above account of Heath's views on forging
the EC into an international actor, the wider government
machine still seemed to prefer to balance the Atlantic and
European poles of British foreign policy: to regard the
circles as over-lapping, rather than Euro-centric, to the
extent that European construction should be constrained by
the avoidance of any damage to the other relationships.
While Heath subsequently opposed any formalised EC
consultations with the US, Home told the House of Commons
that the problems created for the US by British entry should
be ironed out by some appropriate machinery. In response to
Ï1 A.G. Andrianopoulos, West Europe in Kissinger's Global 
Strategy, Macmillan, London, 1988.
. Hansard, 27 October 1971, Col 1714.
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us sensitivity on international monetary issues, the
Treasury and Bank of England showed an almost unseemly haste
in seeking to transfer discussions from EC fora to the IMF.
Rippon bluntly told the Council of Ministers that Britain
expected this to occur straight after the 1972 Presidential
1
elections in the US. Chapter 7 will argue further that where 
Heath responded to difficulties with Partnership Europe by 
inching toward Independent Europe, others fell back on 
Atlantic or Evolutionary Europe.
Chapter 1 showed how British goals for EC entry were 
becoming suggestive of a transformationalist foreign policy 
by implying i ) the integration of the economic and 
technological bases of British power with the EC , ii) an 
ambitious economic multilateralism, and iii) the erosion of 
the distinction between domestic and foreign policy. This 
chapter has added the further points: iv) that new foreign
policy demands on the state were creating a need for a 
multilateralism of permanent commitment to a set group of 
inner partners, in contrast to the traditionalist stress on 
a diplomacy of manoeuvre, and v) that any avoidability of 
institutional integration would not remove the need for EC 
policies to be integrated enough to constitute coherent and 
continuous initiatives to influence the environment, to gain 
leverage with outsiders by creating an expectation that the 
EC states were likely to act en bloc and to unlock the 
increasing returns from collaboration. However, it has also 
1. The Financial Times, 24 April 1972
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been suggested that British actors tended to pull back to 
claim that the goals of entry could be achieved within
traditionalist assumptions after all. Institutional 
pragmatism, the Community method and British ability to lead 
in EC policy-making were all presented as allowing the UK 
to obtain what it wanted with only limited changes in inter­
state behaviour and political forms.
3. Conclusion. The Failings of Pragmatism.
R.J. Harrison has set the movement towards European co­
operation in the context of the need for " twentieth century
1
societies to shed certain values in order to retain others". 
It has been suggested here that this was precisely the 
dilemma that British policy-makers failed to acknowledge, 
although an ability to make realistic assessments of how 
values might need to be traded off would be at a premium 
under a foreign policy change designed to respond to the 
following: the increasing difficulties of maintaining a
balance between all the structuring contexts of policy­
making and the growing exposure of these contexts to
redefinition by those who were natural structure makers, or 
able to collude to become structure makers. Chapter 7 will 
lend support to the following hypothesis : effective use of
EC membership would be a function of an ability to grasp i) 
the technical trade-offs needed to make a common policy work
1. R.J Harrrison, Europe in Question, Allen and Unwin,
London, 1974, P 10.
130
and ii) the political trade-offs needed to put together a 
coalition of member states to sustain a policy.
1
However, the theory of analytic learning might predict that 
it would be wrong to put too much store by UK attitudes at 
the time of entry, as membership itself would ensure their 
amendment and sophistication by punishing error with policy 
failure: Britain’s EC policy would move in the direction of
"value integration" as experiments in European collaboration 
exposed any under-estimates in the trade-offs that would 
have to be accepted to attain the goals of entry. Cognitive 
theory suggests that learning may proceed in this way, but 
only if decision-makers start off with "open" belief 
systems. Moreover, closed belief systems arise not only from 
a dogmatism that classifies all incoming information as 
confirming initial preconceptions, but from a failure or 
refusal to form hypotheses, categorise and make distinctions 
with the result that suppressed assumptions continue under 
their own inertia and without a sufficient comparison with 
results. Learning is only as good as the initial conceptual 
framework, as there is nothing else with which to interpret 
the lessons of feedback.
So how might the initial interpretative framework with which
British foreign policy-makers entered the EC be summarised ?
2
Steinbruner’s cybernetic view of decision-making provides a
1. See above P 12.
2. See above P 17.
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useful way to formalise aspects of the "pragmatic approach" 
that UK decision-makers claimed as their own. Actors eschew 
causal models, detailed futurologies and conscious 
calculations of trade-offs . Instead, they select just a few 
variables to monitor " thermostatically": every time one of
the variables moves out of its acceptable range, corrective 
action is taken. But correction involves a sequence of
trial and error adjustments- each of which represents the
least change from the status quo- and no elaborate 
intellectual constructs of how the environment works.
The cybernetic/pragmatic approach provides a good fit to
much of British decision-making in relation to EC entry. The
observation that the EC had seemed to work for the Six
between 1957 and 1973, while Britain had declined in
international influence and relative prosperity, was for
many sufficient justification for entry. Little effort was
made to " model" the requirements of an effective EC or
adjustments that could be needed in British foreign policy
behaviour; it was sufficient that the lessons of feedback
had shown that joining the EC could somehow increase
influence and prosperity. Northedge has pointed out that
there was little evidence of reflection on the meaning of EC
membership . British decision-makers seemed to approach EC
membership in the frame of mind predicted by Jean Monnet:
" There is one thing you British never understand, an idea, 
and one thing that you are supremely good at grasping, a 
hard fact. We will have to build Europe without you, but
1. Northedge, op cit, P 36^
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±.
then you will come in and join us".
But how can the claim that British entry was accompanied by 
conceptual deficiencies and that these would prove 
relatively closed to subsequent correction laid at the 
door of the cybernetic/pragmatic approach ? There are three 
elements to any answer;
1. The absence of explicit causal models greatly reduces the
ability of actors to identify and learn about trade-offs;
without them, there is insufficient analysis of the
intermediate steps needed to link goals to achievements.
Indeed, British foreign policy-makers came close to
believing in the automaticity of the benefits of membership.
Thus when economists objected that Britain's circumstances
would be different to those of the Six in the 1950's and
that it could only expect economic benefits with appropriate
policy adjustments, Rippon replied that the linkage of
economic growth with EC membership was " perceptible fact "
2
and that alternative views were " academic speculation" . A
conspicuously uncritical " argument from the facts" was
provided by the lumping together of economic and demographic
statistics for the enlarged EC to infer that it would be the
equivalent of the superpowers. Thus Macmillan had reflected
that "The Six plus Britain would be . .equal to the US and 
3
USSR" . The Times argued that:
1. Kizinger, op cit, 1973, P 19.
2. Rippon, speech, 26 February 1971, RIIA Press Library.
3. Horne, op cit, P 256.
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" The US, USSR, Japan, Europe and China will have overtaken 
us by the end of the century. Britain is running fifth in a 
six horse race and falling back. As part of Europe, we will 
be running jointly second and moving up" 1.
However, this was no more than a fallacy of composition; 
it substituted metaphor for analysis of what was needed to 
turn separate states into a single international actor. Only 
such loose thinking made it possible simultaneously to 
advocate a powerful EC negotiating bloc and a low level of 
internal integration: would it really be possible for the EC 
to be as effective an international bargaining unit as 
promised without this having implications for the frequency 
with which internal policies were made in common ?
2. As Frankel points out, pragmatists do not, in fact, avoid
2
implicit models of how the environment works. However, 
implicit models often serve as poor learning structures. 
As in the case of the British idea of prescription - that 
foreign policy should be based on a corpus of precepts built 
up over a long history of international experience 
implicit assumptions of how things should be done will by 
definition be orientated to a lagged view of international 
structures. This will make decision-makers poor learners 
because failure to interrogate implicit models for 
consistency and continued applicability, let alone probable 
relevance in emergent international conditions, will affect 
their ability to respond to feedback to the right degree and
1. The Times, 4 May 1971.
2. Frankel, op cit, PP 112-7
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in the right direction. Indeed, it may blunt their capacity 
to notice and correctly classify feedback at all.
3. In some ways, entry was accompanied by a series of rich 
causal insights to do with the problems of international 
political economy of global markets, sovereignty and 
autonomy in conditions of interdependence, the attainability 
of international influence by middling states and so on. 
However, in typically pragmatic style there was a reluctance 
to correlate the individual insights, as any sytematisation 
of assumptions looked like model building; thus arguments 
were made for a strong Community when the focus was on 
controlling interdependence or securing international 
influence and for a weak Community when attention shifted to 
the sovereignty and roles of the member states.
The absence of a critical interrogation of such varying
assumptions permitted a "pragmatic" quarrying of
transformationalist and traditionalist strategies for the
most pleasing insights offered by each for British foreign
policy in the EC. As Richard Little has concluded with
reference to the traditionalist/transformationalist
schizophrenia in modern British foreign policy.
" Like Janus, British policy-makers appear to be looking in 
opposite directions at the same time.. policies are being 
implemented that pull in different directions" 1.
TT Richard Little, " The Study of British Foreign Policy" in 
Smith, Smith, White, op cit. P 258
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However, cognitive theory predicts that the more functions 
a set of ideas performs other than giving decision-makers a 
consistent and realistic account of their choices, the less 
likely it is to be revised in the light of negative 
feedback. It has been seen that the traditionalist/ 
transformationalist confusion performed several "useful" 
functions in British elite thinking. It made actors feel 
better about inclusion in the EC. It allowed them to believe 
that they were at once taking steps to adapt to their 
international environment and preserving a stable concept of 
national identity, a flattering concept of the roles and 
international status of the British state, a continuity with 
Britain's foreign policy past etc. In short, the pragmatic 
failure to cross-correlate all the implicit assumptions and 
models in British entry was likely to continue under an 
inertia of its own: having arisen, the
traditionalist/transformationalist confusion acquired 
"cognitive usefulness" that would make actors reluctant to 
learn about its deficiencies.
It might be objected that it does not matter if the 
pragmatic/cybernetic decision-maker is a bad learner because 
he will carry on making incremental adjustments to his 
policy until he happens to hit upon a solution that yields a 
satisfactory result for all his values. But a failure to 
take a more critical view of his implicit assumptions about 
the political environment may lead a decision-maker to 
choose: a) value ranges that are simultaneously
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unattainable; for example degrees of sovereignty in relation 
to EC processes, and autonomy with regard to third states 
and non-governmental actors, that cannot be secured at the 
same time: and b) relatively insignificant feedback
variables to monitor. Cognitive theory would suggest that he 
would have to run through a long history of policy failure 
before considering the conclusion that there was something 
wrong with his core assumptions; in the meantime, there 
would be long-time lags before each failure is recognised as 
such, opportunities where timing is of the essence would be 
missed and the political environment would continue to 
change. The pragmatist risks being bad at reactive policy­
making, let alone meeting the pro-active ambition of using 
entry to the EC to put Britain back amongst the "makers" of 
international structures.
However, some decision-making theorists argue that, despite
its imperfections, pragmatic and incremental adjustment
yields better results in a fast-moving environment than the
"chimera" of constructing models and futurologies, either as
cognitive simplifications or detailed attempts at
1
rationalistic analysis. But a distinction has to be made
between two levels of decision-making: adjustment to the
hurly-burly of events and periodic reviews of the framework
from which events will be handled. Whatever the claims of
1. C. Lindblom, " Still Muddling: Not yet Through" in
Anthony McGrew and M.J. Wilson, eds, Decision-Making : 
Approaches and Analysis, Open University, Manchester, /PP 
125-39. I
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the pragmatic/cybernetic approach in relation to the former, 
it is claimed here i ) that some framework of assumptions is 
always implicit in pragmatic adjustment; ii) that it pays 
decision-makers to subject implicit assumptions to critical 
appraisal as they will determine the long-term success of
their pragmatic/cybernetic model, and iii) that where it may
be irrational to spend limited time on continuous re­
appraisal of assumptions, this objection does not apply to 
major foreign policy changes such as British entry to the 
EC, where long-drawn-out processes allow plenty of time for 
critical reflection. To the extent that British decision­
makers took a pragmatic/cybernetic approach to EC entry, 
they committed a category error: they failed to appreciate
that, in joining the EC, they were not making a decision
about how best to respond to events, but one about the
framework from which they would respond to future events, 
and any deficiencies caused by insufficient critical 
interrogation of structuring assumptions could be a cause of 
continuing grief.
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PART 2: THE PROCESS OF FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE.
The last two chapters have attempted to use the cognitive
theory of choice and the critical theory of structures to
advance the claim that British elite views on the
prospective relationship with the European Community were 
inchoate: there was a great deal further to go in
confronting and specifying the choices that might have to be 
made to develop EC membership successully.
Systemic analyses in the Durkheimian style suggest that 
political outcomes are directly related to subsisting
structural realities. The processes of change are thus an 
insignificant level of causation. By contrast, the
critical/cognitive combination will be employed over the 
next four chapters to claim that both the fact and
character of British entry depended on the negotiations of 
1970-1 and the domestic politics of 1970-2.
Chapters 3 and 5 will take a more empirical approach than is 
common elsewhere in the thesis in order to establish data 
that will aid analysis in chapters 4 and 6. Chapter 3, which 
follows immediately, will be concerned with the motives of 
actors amongst the Six and the Commission for and against
British entry, the preparation of negotiating positions and
the course of the talks themselves.
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CHAPTER 3: NEGOTIATING FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE.
1. Continental Views of British Entry.
De Gaulle had twice vetoed British entry. In 1963, he
objected that Britain would obstruct the construction of a
"European Europe". The Five would then succumb to the
alternative of integration into a single Atlantic hierarchy,
which Britain would find uniquely tolerable because of its
privileged relationship with the US. The 1967 veto, however,
owed more to fear of Britain ' s weaknesses than its
strengths. De Gaulle believed that governments were
constrained to champion their national interest in any
international organisation or lose authority in domestic 
1
politics. Short of a " vast and profound change" in i
economic condition, British Governments inside the EC would
be constrained to challenge the acquis communautaire and no
2
guarantee given during a negotiation could thus be credible.
Although the Soames affair showed De Gaulle moving towards
some British participation in Europe, he never explicitly
endorsed its membership of the EC. However, the years 1968-9
traumatised the assumptions of Gaullist foreign policy.
Hopes of an increasingly sturdy independence had to give
way to a review of whether France was making the most of its
multilateral supports or optimally arranging its bilateral
Ï1 Edward Kolodziej, French International Policy under De 
Gaulle and Pompidou, Ithaca, Cornell UP, 1974, PP 25, 63-111.
2. De La Serre, op cit, 1987.
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1
relationships.
Indeed, the growth of French support for British entry found
its chrysalis in France’s changing relationship with 
2
Germany. De Gaulle had found the EC congenial without
Britain because of his calculation that France would then be
the principal beneficiary of German need to mediate its
external policy through contacts with allies. Third states
would know that Germany preferred not to depart from French
preferences expressed in a special bilateral relationship at
the centre of the multilateral European Community. However
in 1968-9 Germany launched its Ostpolitik on its own
initiative, despite possibly fundamental implications for
the future arrangement of the whole of Europe. Meanwhile, in
contrast to the exposure of economic weaknesses and social
fissures by French domestic upheavals in 1968,Germany
demonstrated the extent of its international economic power
by arbitrating between France and the US on currency 
3
questions.
These developments provoked a series of neuroses about 
German power. It was variously, and contradictorily, 
described as preparing to couple with superpower condominium
1. Kolodziej, op cit^ P 399.
2. Alfred Grosser, Affaires Etrangères : La Politique De La 
France, 1944-84, Flammarion, Paris, 1984, P242.
3. Haig Simonian, The Privileged Partnership: Franco-German 
Relations in the European Community, 1969-84, OUP, London, 
1985, P 81.
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1
to neutralise central Europe, as developing a potential for
a new " Rapallo", in which it would accelerate the
reconstruction of its national power by pivoting between 
2
east and west, as learning to exploit the political leverage
of a competitive domination of the EC economy and as selling
out a European Europe to an Ostpolitik that would make it
dependent on the US. As Grosser put it, Germany would
3
becomme the real " Cheval de Troie".
Meanwhile prospects of US troop withdrawals from West Europe
were contrasted with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
The Gaullist assumption that the European blocs were melting
now seemed only to be true of the western side. Between 1969
and 1971, Pompidou developed an intimacy with the US which
rivalled Britain’s. Preparations began to be made for France
to receive nuclear assistance and, in the 1971 talks on
4
international monetary reform, other EC states were 
to be encouraged to leave matters to US/French discussions. 
Britain ’ s relationship with the US could hardly remain an 
objection to its membership.
But a strong Franco/British relationship, seemed important
1. Eric Roussel, Georges Pompidou, J.C Lattes, Paris, 1984,
P 407.
2. Haig Simonian, op cit, PP 15 & 118.
3. Grosser, op cit, P 181.
4. Kissinger, op cit, 1979, 958-9
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in itself, Kolodziej argues that, as 30 years earlier,
France’s future seemed to depend on " whither went 
1
Britain". To Pompidou it was essential that Britain and
France should stand ready to collaborate to exercise their
rights as occupying powers to resist any US/USSR/German
agreement for central Europe that was against their
interests. In complaining that Germany had launched its
2
Ostpolitik "without permission", Pompidou reflected a wish
to multilateralise Germany’s foreign policy in EC
consultations. But as Pompidou admitted to Heath, in May
3
1970, the five opposed this without British entry. Moreover,
Germany threatened to dominate a Community of the six. The
relatively greater need for partners to seek adjustments to
Federal economic policies could become a source of foreign
policy leverage. Thus further multilateralisation without
enlargement could paradoxically increase German power, or it
could be used by the Federal Republic to press for EC
development^ a more supranational character. In 1970, it
responded to France’s wish for an Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) with the Schiller plan under which there would
not even be experiments in economic co-operation without
commitment to an eventual " transformation in relationships"
4
between members of the Community. The French Government thus
1. Kolodziej, op cit, P 417.
2. Roussel, op cit, P 407.
3. Interview with Edward Heath, December 1988.
4. Loukas Tsoukalis, The Politics and Economics of European 
Monetary Integration, Allen and Unwin, 1977, P 89.
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looked to Britain to help it resist supranationalism without 
the isolation it had suffered in 1965-6.
Pompidou also developed a preoccupation with the
modernisation of the French economy and with its
diversification away from dependence on Germany. He
1
allegedly discouraged development in the East of France. He
argued that, unlike Germany, France had not yet become a
truly advanced industrial society and that it needed to
double its production in 10 years to restore a balance in
Europe. Britain was essential to his hopes. His Government
stressed potential synergies between the British and French
economies, especially in high technology. Foreign Minister,
Maurice Schumann, urged Britain to agree to a channel 
2
tunnel. Ambassador to London, Rene Massigli, argued that
Anglo-French trade should grow until the two countries
3
traded as much with each other as either did with Germany.
If European Europe was in suspense by Pompidou’s time, many 
felt that British entry was now needed to keep it in play as 
a long term possibility. According to Jean De Broglie, 
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National 
Assembly, and whose views found favour with Schumann, the 
real risk to Europe ’ s independence was that a third veto 
would make Britain a real dependent of the US. British and
1. Roussel, op cit, PP 343 and 381.
2. The Times, 23 January 1970.
3. The Times, 17 July 1971.
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French co-operation would be critical to any European
security system as the US scaled down its role. Britain's
financial markets and technological expertise were needed to
meet the challenge of the US and Japanese economies to
Europe's independence and development. Outside the EC,
Britain would remain a potent force in the field of European
interdependence, yet frustrated and ignorant of the
conventions that allowed the Europeans to live as
1
interdependent but independent states.
However, the French were no more blessed than the British
with an unambiguous interpretation of how to respond to
international pressures or a determinate view of national
interest. To former minister, Phillipe Serre, the six was
a real community of similar identifications and assumptions
a unique hope for European states to act together yet 
2
remain independent. Pompidou feared that Britain might align
with Germany, making the cure of an enlarged EC worse than
3
the disease of a German-dominated six. Former Prime
Minister Couve De Murville argued that a point would be
reached at which the US would challenge the development of
the EC as a distinct subsystem. Britain would be constrained
by its military, capital and currency entanglements with the
4
US to veto European attempts to press ahead. Massigli told
1. The Times ~ 27 May 1970.
2. P. De Serre, ^  Monde, 22 January 1971.
3. Willi Brandt, op cit, 1978, P 159.
4. International Herald Tribune, 7 April 1971.
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The Times how many in France continued to fear that Britain
1
would use divide and rule tactics on behalf of the US.
Domestic French politics also confronted Pompidou with cross
pressures. It would be wrong to underestimate the
preoccupation of his Administration with repairing France ' s
social fabric after the upheavals of 1968. Indeed, it was
not until well into 1970, that the French Government felt
2
confident that "les evenements" were fully over. The CAP had 
always been seen as necessary to reconcile French social 
stability with EC membership. Differentials between 
agricultural and industrial incomes had to be limited to 
avoid discontent, but French industry would be inhibited in 
a system of EC free trade if it alone had to bear the cost 
of farming subsidies.
In order to win the 1969 Presidential election, Pompidou had
had to put together a coalition that ran from traditional
Gaullists to centrists deeply committed to British entry. On
the one hand his Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and four
cabinet ministers were members of the pro-entry Action
Committee for a United Europe. On the other, eight former
3
Gaullist cabinet ministers were to denounce British entry. 
As mythology substituted for fresh thinking with many
1. Letter to The Times, 17 July 1971.
2. Michel Jobert, Mémoires D' Espoir, Grasset. Paris, 1974, 
P 172.
3. The Daily Telegraph, 6 April 1971
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Gaullists, Pompidou also considered it essential that he
should never be out-flanked as the authoritative interpreter
of the tradition. On entering office he wrote to De Gaulle:
" None of the great decisions that you have taken, notably 
on foreign policy and defence, will be reversed". 1.
West German elites had tended to regard Britain's inclusion
in the EC as a matter of intrinsic value. The overall
construction of West European unity was to many an
2
alternative to national ambition and identity. This was
especially important towards the end of the I960's. The FRG
was now a central power in the politics of interdependence.
It could scarcely help its domestic economic management
being a key influence in the distribution of values in other
societies. The pressures on Germany to assume greater
responsibility in international economic diplomacy and the
need to find some means of dealing with the traumatic
division between East and West meant that the task of
developing its potential to influence its external
3
environment could no longer be postponed. However, it seemed 
as important as ever to reassure others by expanding
Germany's international roles in the context of the further 
multilateral development of West Europe. But as German 
Chancellor, Willi Brandt, implied to Pompidou at the summit
1. Roussel, op cit, P 312.
2. Hans-Peter Schwarz, The Roles of the Federal Republic in 
The Community of States, in Kaiser and Morgan, op cit, P 
221.
3. M. Stael, The Federal Republic, Europe and The World, 
Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1980, P 43.
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of EC Heads of Government at the Hague, in December 1969,
the EC without both France and Britain was at risk of being
1
perceived as magnifying and not containing German power.
One interpretation of the Hague deal was that a Monetary
Union would multilateralise German economic power. Foreign
Policy co-operation would give partners expanded
opportunities to criticise German diplomacy, while British
entry would head off German domination of both processes.
This was not a pattern forced on the German Government, but
one that it felt necessary to deal with its own situation
and purposes. Brandt was only able to sustain a Bundestag
majority for his Ostpolitik so long as it was not seen as an
2
alternative to creative West European policies.
Many in Germany, Italy and Benelux hoped that British entry 
would encourage the development of European and Atlantic 
identities in tandem. They all found enforced choices 
between Paris and Washington trebly awkward due to strategic 
positioning, international economics and domestic coalition 
politics. Amongst the four, many hoped that British entry 
would put an end to the leading role of the Franco-German 
relationship, which was seen as pre-empting genuine " 
Community" discussion and the initiation of proposals by a 
Commission committed to the needs of all members. There was 
some optimism that British knowledge of institutions would
1. Bulletin of the EC^  February 1970, P 37.
2. Simonian, op cit, PP 91-2.
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improve EC decision-making and make it more accountable to
1
an effective European parliament.
Belgian Foreign Minister, Pierre Harmel, expressed a fear
common amongst the five that European integration would run
into diminishing returns and even spill-back without 
2
enlargement. The six were reaching the end of the programme
established under the original Treaties. However, all except
France were reluctant to agree new policies that would
further prejudice British adaptation to the Community. On
the other hand, many of the opportunities of further
integration could seep away with further delay. Harmel
mentioned the key area of technological collaboration where
the cumulative nature of leads and lags leant an urgency to
European responses. Moreover, speakers in the European
Parliament pointed to the dangers of intra EC friction, loss
of confidence in Community processes and a retreat to
strictly national programmes if the EC did not match
3
interdependence with intensified collaboration soon.
Lindberg and Scheingold have claimed that stalemate over 
enlargement was also eroding the " common law " of European 
collaboration, without which there was little chance of it 
achieving more than conventional inter-state politics. De
1. Emilio Colombo, speeches, 27/28 June 1971, Italian 
Chamber of Commerce, RIIA Press Library.
2. Bulletin of the EC, December 1968, PP 11-4.
3. Bulletin of the EC, March 1968, PP 8-13.
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Gaulle's vetoes of British entry had been part of a mid-60's
crisis between France and the Five , before which there had
been a greater willingness to carry on negotiations until
solutions were reached and to accept short-term sacrifices,
in the expectation that these would eventually be
reciprocated. Now " all concessions would have to be paid
for in simultaneous political change" , reducing the
1
capacity of the process to conclude agreements.
There was also a danger that to accommodate Britain,
without admimitting it to the EC, would mean displacing
forms of European co-operation away from a single
Community focus. Thus the Benelux countries had responded to
De Gaulle's second veto by proposing foreign policy co-
2
operation based on WEU and Germany had suggested an
Association agreement with Britain. The Commission argued
that the latter would " add another complication to an
already complicated institutional mechanism" and would
encourage the view that the EC was a commercial arrangement
3
rather than a political Community. Ideally, European 
collaboration would also be best served by the thickening up 
of co-operative norms in a single framework and the greater 
scope this would give to package deals, side-payments and 
the exploitation of synergies across issue areas.
Ï1 Lindberg and Scheingold, op cit, P 238
2. Bulletin of the EC, December 1968, P 13.
3. Bulletin of the EC, April 1968, Supplementary Opinion by 
the Commission on British application, P 7.
150
The Commission expressed qualified support for British entry
1
in detailed reports in September 1967 and October 1969. It 
argued that British expertise could aid the institutional 
development of the EC and help it to develop the mechanisms 
that were needed to deal with the increasing implication of 
intra EC dealings with international politics. Economically, 
the EC would benefit from a wider base of scientific 
expertise and advanced industrial capacity.
However, the Commission also felt that enlargement had to be
accompanied by further integration if it was not to be a
threat to the Community. Existing policies had to be non-
negotiable, as they represented many years of "hard won
compromise" and provided the "de facto solidarity" between
the original members. Moreover, the Commission endorsed De
Gaulle’s view that formal commitments to the "acquis" would
be insufficient; Britain had to remove any conditions that
might conceivably lead to a challenge to the " acquis".
These included fundamental uncompetitiveness and the
pound’s status as a reserve currency which, in combination,
threatened to destabilise the economy of the Six and to make
it difficult for Britain to implement its EC obligations
Without these steps, Britain would make " heavy calls on
international monetary co-operation"; it would act as a
deflationary drag and spread currency instability through
the system to the peril of the CAP and customs union. The UK
Ï1 Full details of the Commission opinions may be obtained 
from: Bulletin of the EC Sept/Oct 1967 and Nov/Dec
1969.
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could be forced " to restrict transactions in goods and 
capital" in contradiction of EC rules, which ultimately 
rested on mutual observance as much as enforcement.
On the other hand, the Commission conceded that the EC as 
constituted would only be a further strain to Britain’s 
tenuous balance of payments. The only solution lay in the 
further development of the Community to include policies 
more relevant to Britain’s circumstances. British entry 
thus reinforced the case for common regional, energy and 
technology policies,and, above all, for " economic and 
monetary union". The Commission made three political 
implications explicit: enlargement should be accompanied by
some change in emphasis from negative to positive 
integration: through positive integration, the EC should
become more relevant to the industrial mainstream of 
European political economy: as enlargement and further
integration had to occur in tandem, there would have to be 
some return to majority voting with the Commission fully 
active as initiator and mediator- " only by returning to 
the letter of the institutional arrangements laid down in 
the Treaties, will the Commission be able to accept the 
risks involved in enlargement".
2) Residual Suspicions
Historical analogies initially structured perceptions on 
all sides of how best to handle entry. Although largely
152
forgotten in the UK itself by 1970, British reactions to the 
formation of the EC had strongly coloured continental 
perceptions. As the Christian Science Monitor was to put it, 
" the traits of Britain's early hereticism always hang over 
the negotiations". In the 1950's, Britain had first tried to 
head off the formation of the EC by proposing a free trade 
area that would span all OEEC countries. It had then sought 
US support for a challenge in GATT before forming a a 
European free trade area (EFTA) of its own with six other 
non-EC countries; the aim of the latter was to exert 
pressure, that Britain expected German economic interests to 
support, to break down those features that distinguished the 
EC from the rest of the AIC area.
This experience grounded a series of perceptions about 
Britain's European policy, which were by no means confined 
to France. British Governments were seen as hostile to 
European collaboration that went beyond free trade and as 
failing to understand the urge amongst the Six for practices 
and policies limited to Europe ; indeed, that specific 
initiatives were only weft and warp to the real end of 
political integration - into common institutions and/or a 
"Community method" in relations between states. Britain was 
perceived as seeking to use outside relationships and 
divisions internal to the Six to achieve the double 
"dilution" of the EC: first, into wider transatlantic
Ï1 The Christian Science Monitor, 24 May 1971.
2. Horne, op cit, P 34.
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arrangements: second, into a field of autonomous economic
1
exchange without parallel political development.
Of greater salience to British perceptions, were De Gaulle's
vetoes of 1963 and 1967. To many in the Foreign Office, a
sense of urgency that Britain should enter the EC was
balanced by a fear that France aimed to use the manner of
enlargement to reduce the international power of the British
state. Lord Greenhill, Permanent Secretary from 1969 to
1973, recalls how De Gaulle's prediction that Britain would
be "naked" by the time it entered the EC constantly returned 
2
to mind. France was seen as seeking to use entry to strip 
Britain of its extra-EC relationships, as delaying 
enlargement until Britain's economy had slipped further 
behind without the benefits of the common market, as 
defining EC arrangements against British interests in the 
meantime and as insisting on onerous terms that would impose 
further burdens; its aim was to handle enlargement in such a 
way as to dominate the EC sub-system.
3
The Soames affair of February 1969 illustrated both the 
continued dominance of these perceptions and their ability
1. Camps, op cit, 1964.
2. Interview with Lord Greenhill, January 1989.
3. Details of the Soames Affair can be found in the 
following: A. Campbell, Anglo-French Relations a Decade Ago, 
International Affairs, Spring and Summer 1982, Vol 58, No 2 & 
3: Couve de Murville, Une Politique Etrangère, Pion, Paris,
427-8: Kitzinger, op cit ,1973, PP 45-59: Jean Lacouture,
De Gaulle: Le Souverain, Du Seuil, Paris, 1986, PP 552-5.
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to trigger a negative dynamic in British dealings with the 
Six. De Gaulle told Sir Christopher Soames, British 
Ambassador to Paris, that Britain and France should end 
their quarrel over the political and economic future of 
Europe. But existing institutions needed to be re-appraised. 
The EC should be replaced by a whole series of multilateral 
collaborations, giving a more comprehensive coverage of 
issue areas, but shifting the emphasis of joint endeavours 
from economics to foreign policy; the various levels of co­
operation should only be loosely related and should be 
strictly inter-governmental. Over a longer period, the 
European states might consider alternatives to NATO. They 
should also adjust to leadership by an inner group of 
Britain, France, Germany and Italy. Having set out this 
agenda. De Gaulle suggested that Britain should take the 
initiative in proposing bilateral talks with France.
The Foreign Office suspected an attempt to under-cut the
1
support of the five for British entry. Britain would be seen 
to be aligning with France to unravel the achievements of 
European integration since 1957 and to impose a Directoire 
on the lesser members. With Britain and the Five prised 
apart, France would then abandon its new offer to Britain 
and impose its own price for a relationship with the EC. In 
his memoirs, Stewart suggests that this might have included 
permanent relegation to some lesser, associate status in the 
economic communities, with adverse implications for
1. Wilson, op cit, 1971, P 610
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Britain’s international influence, or withdrawal from NATO.
Determined to sustain the support of the five and " not to
1
act treacherously to our allies", the Foreign Office 
considered the priority was not to seek clarification from 
the French Government but to release details to the Germans 
before Wilson left for a visit to Chancellor Kiesinger.
However, the French Government saw the British as seeking to
align the whole western world behind a concerted effort to
batter a way into the EC. The leak of the De Gaulle
conversation had won little credit with the Five. Brandt,
then German foreign minister, was unsurprised by De Gaulle’s
views. They had already been tried out on the Italian
Government. Forced to defend itself in parliament and the
media, the British Government issued successive
"clarifications" of the De Gaulle conversation. But the
French saw these as calculated falsifications of an agreed
text. De Gaulle’s explicit denial that there would be any
immediate move to replace NATO was omitted and the term
"Directoire" was substituted for a reference to regular
2
conversations between Britain, France, Germany and Italy.
3) The Preparation of Negotiating Positions.
If the Six agreed to open negotiations with Britain at the
1. Stewart, op cit, P 225.
2. Lacouture, op cit, P 552.
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Hague summit in December 1969, it was not in the context of
improved Anglo/French relations. Indeed, the task facing the
British Government was greatly complicated by the way in
which the Hague was geared to the self-contained politics of
1
reaching agreement between the Six.
The summit agreement was shot through with the perception
that British entry could lead to the dilution of the EC.
Talks were not to be allowed to open until the remaining
provisions of the existing Treaties were completely
implemented. This would underline the principle that the
"acquis" was non-negotiable. It put beyond discussion the
primary practical obstacle from Britain’s point of view: a
new budgetary mechanism, under which the EC would
automatically receive certain VAT and CET proceeds. To avoid
British attempts to divide the six in their defence of
the "acquis", France extracted a commitment that the member
2
states would negotiate en bloc.
Indeed , the French Government in particular felt that 
the Community needed to be "deepened" as well as "completed" 
if it was to be secure from the worst fears of British
entry. Although there were many other motives for the Hague 
initiatives to create a monetary union and foreign policy
co-operation, France’s unwillingness to admit the UK without
1. See below PP 206-9. ~
2. De La Serre, 1972,Documentation Française, op cit, NED 
3882-3.
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them was clear. The national management of member economies,
intra- EC trade integration and the CAP seemed to be
threatened by increasing international currency instability.
Enlargement would add to these threats unless Britain was
also prepared to accept a monetary union that would fix
exchange rates and accelerate the harmonisation of the
external characteristics of its economy with those of 
1
the Six. One attraction that British entry held for France
was that UK Governments were likely to oppose the extension
of supranational ism in the EC. However, the French were
probably unwilling to admit a further large state without a
strictly inter-governmental initiative for foreign policy
co-operation, placing that key subject firmly beyond the
reach of the Commission, while providing an alternative
2
model and precedent of European collaboration. Britain's own 
attachment to Atlantic fora also made it important to 
establish from the outset of British membership that foreign 
policy co-operation would be EC-based.
Meanwhile on the British side, thinking on how 
best to approach the negotiations produced one area of 
agreement and two of disagreement. Taking the area of 
agreement first, the 1961-3 negotiation was perceived to 
have run into difficulties because: i) a prolonged haggle
had nourished the perception that Britain was a challenge to
1. See below PP 183-4.
2. Françoise De la Serre and Phillippe Moreau Defarges,
" France: a Penchant for Leadership" in Hill, op cit, 1983,
P 59
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the Conunmunity and its plans. Doubts amongst the Five about
Britain’s commitment had then made it easier for De Gaulle 
1
to use his veto: ii) inconclusive and disillusioning talks
had further impaired the ability of the British Government
to negotiate effectively as the willingness of its
backbenchers to accept concessions declined and the chances
2
of an embarrassing party rebellion rose: iii) parallel talks 
with France on the future of European nuclear weapons had 
only complicated the negotiation of British membership of 
the EC. By 1970 it was, therefore, widely agreed in official 
circles that talks should be expeditious, involving 
unconditional acceptance of the acquis and avoiding the 
introduction of extraneous issues.
Kitzinger notes the distinction between Macmillan's
conditional application in 1961 and Wilson’s simple
3
application " to join" in 1967. In the Godkin lectures. 
Heath argued that full acceptance of the "acquis" had to be 
regarded as the price of being allowed to apply in the first 
place, while making unreasonable demands would only " weaken 
( a negotiating position) by conveying an impression of 
insincerity". In conversation with Schumann in May 1970, 
Heath had shown his primary concern for speedy talks and 
had urged that the Commission should be allowed to play a
1. Camps, op cit, 1964, P 370.
2. Kitzinger, op cit, 1973, P 77.
3. Heath, op ci^, 1970, PP 29-31.
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1
mediating role to that end. On entering office, he also 
endorsed an inter-departmental understanding that talks 
should be confined to the problems of transition to the 
existing Community ; attempts should be made to keep entry 
diplomacy to the simple question of adaptation to existing 
structures.
However, even if Britain accepted the "acquis", the terms of
transition remained to be negotiated. To many in the
British Government, this was the point at which some tough
bargaining would be needed as the question of whether
Britain had an interest in joining the EC at all remained
contingent on the timing of the transition to the "acquis".
To see why it is necessary to survey the major problem of
the costs of entry. The 1970 White Paper made a key
distinction between the impact or static effects that would
follow from immediate adaptation to EC institutions
subventions to the budget etc - and dynamic effects which
would accrue from autonomous reactions of producers to wider
3
markets, investment opportunities etc.
In an enlarged EC, the static effects would be uniquely 
unfavourable to Britain. The EC spent 90% of its budget on 
agriculture, while financing this from a share in VAT 
Ï1 Interview with Edward Heath^ December 1988.
2. Interview with Sir Frank Cooper, March 1989.
3. Cmnd 4289 of 1970, Para 75.
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1
receipts and the proceeds of the CET. But Britain had only a
fifth as much agriculture (as a proportion of GNP) to
subsidise as the EC average, while a heavy import dependence
on non EC countries would lead to large CET subventions. The
Treasury thus predicted that it would receive only 5% of the
2
budget, while contributing 31%. Britain would also have to
switch from a traditional policy of buying its food in the
cheapest world markets to giving priority to more costly
produce from the EC. With notorious vagueness the 1970 White
Paper estimated that the impact costs would be between 
, 3
100m and 1100m. However, the consensus of independent
, 4
forecasts was in the range of ' 550m to 750m .
It would be a mistake to under-estimate either the economic 
or political problems that this presented. Unlike Germany, 
which could absorb any net contributions in a balance of 
payments surplus, Britain would have to deflate its economy 
to bring its external account back into balance. The 
National Economic Development Council pointed out that 
national income growth would need to be depressed by five 
times any balance of payments cost. Thus an entry cost of 
500m could result in a loss of 4%-5% of GNP that Britain
1. D. Swann, The Economics of the Common Market, Penguin, 
Middlesex, 5th Ed, 1984, PP 74-6.
2. The Times, 12 September 1971.
3. Cmnd 4289 of 1970, Para 101.
4. John Pinder, The Economics of Europe, Charles Knight, 
London, 1971, P 120.
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1
would otherwise have enjoyed.
All the economic arguments for entry surveyed in Chapter 1
posited dynamic benefits. However, there was a danger that,
Britain could instead suffer dynamic costs. Although Lord
Kaldor was a leading anti, his argument that there were
circumstances under which Britain could deindustralise
inside the EC seeped into official thinking. A believer in
cumulative causation in economics, with sales, economies of
scale, profits, investment and competitiveness forming a
feedback loop, he argued that everything would depend on
whether Britain started in a virtuous or vicious circle at
the moment of entry to the EC. Unless the right terms were
negotiated, the latter was far more likely: fear of
deflation to pay the balance of payments costs of adopting
the CAP would hang over investment plans, compounding
disadvantages that would face Britain’s producers in any
case: their initial uncompetitiveness and peripheral
position in a large market in which freedom of capital
2
movement and the law of unequal development could work 
against outer regions. Britain would become the "Northern 
Ireland of Europe". Even if arguments for entry were correct 
to point to the dynamic benefits of enlarging the EC, they 
ignored the possibility that these might accrue only to 
existing members.
1. The Financial Times 14 March 1970.
2. See above P 86.
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Kaldor thought the only way out would be for Government to
engineer a fall in real wages of about 10%, an unlikely
event when contemporary research on inflation suggested that
expectations of a 2%-3% annual real increase were built into
each wage round. Indeed, it was more likely that
expectations of food price increases would feed into wages,
increasing the risk of British industry beginning EC
membership in a vicious spiral of cumulative
1
uncompetitiveness.
The problem of costs transformed the politics of British
entry. The British Government seems to have expected that EC
entry would be a quiet inter-government negotiation. Heath
had expressed the by no means uncommon view that there was a
national commitment to entry now that governments of both
parties had made an application to the EC, supported in 1967
2
by a parliamentary vote of approval of 488 to 62. In
parliamentary exchanges before the 1970 election, political
leaders were more concerned to accuse each other of "
playing politics" with the EC than they were to open it up
3
to wider political debate. Table 4 shows how the EEC was 
scarcely mentioned in the campaign, although the 
negotiations were due to open just 12 days after polling.
1. Nicholas Kaldor in Douglas Evans, Destiny or Delusion: 
Britain and the Common Market, Victor Gollancz, London, 
1971, PP 57-79
2. Heath, op cit, 1970, P 3.
3. The Guardian, 20 February 1970.
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TABLE 4. Stands taken on joining Europe in the election 
addresses of candidates for the 1970 Parliament
Strongly pro 
Pro with reservations 
Anti with reservations 
Strongly anti
Total taking a stand 
Ambiguous mention 
No mention
Conservât ive
2 %
10
4
7
23
15
62
Labour
1
5
4
5
15
8
77
Source: Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky, op cit,1971, P 440
However, even before the 1970 election, confirmation at the 
Hague summit that the new budgetary mechanism would be 
introduced, had the effect of bringing bureaucratic and
domestic politics back into play.
Heath and elements in the Foreign Office seem to have feared
that a haggle on transitional terms would only under-cut the
benefits of an unconditional acceptance of the "acquis"
But the Treasury was eager to " pin down arrangements that
1
would minimise cost". The influence of the Kaldor critique 
was seen in the Treasury's success in establishing the 
guiding principle that the costs of entry should be so 
staggered that there would probably always be some 
industrial gains out of which they could be met. Thus, in 
January 1971, O' Neill was to tell the Six that any
settlement would have to avoid any flows across the
exchanges that could prevent
1. Interview with Lord Armstrong, January 1989.
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1
Britain from reaping the dynamic benefits of entry. Of all
the points that Barber mentioned in his opening statement to
the negotiations as presenting Britain with difficulties,
only that of the financial burden was presented as making it
impossible to " contemplate joining" if a solution could not 
2
be found. The Treasury ensured that it fielded a strong
team of officials both as part of the delegation in Brussels
and in the European unit in the Cabinet Office which the new
Heath Government established to co-ordinate negotiating
positions from London. The Treasury may have gained
Whitehall support for its position after May 1970, when the
Foreign Office dented the confidence of other departments in
its ability to protect other perspectives of EC entry and
the "national interest" by requesting that Britain should be
consulted on the development of political co-operation, but
3
omitting to ask the same for EMU, although this seemed to 
involve many more pitfalls.
However, Anthony Royle, assistant minister to Rippon,
recalls that it was not bureaucratic politics but " what
could be sold domestically" that required that the
negotiations should incline towards the tough bargaining 
4
approach. Public support for entry plummeted as the possible
1. The Financial Times, 13 January 1971.
2. Cmnd 4401 of 1970, Para 14.
3. The Financial Times, 11 May 1970.
4. Interview with Anthony Royle, January 1989.
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costs of entry became clear with the Hague summit and the
White Paper, published by the British Government in February
1970. The Gallup opinion poll series, which had shown public
opinion to be evenly balanced throughout 1968-9, suddenly
showed a drop in approvers to just 20% and an increase in
disapprovers to around 60%, a pattern that was to persist 
1
until mid 1971.
The bipartisan consensus began to look unstable. Senior
Conservatives worried that, even if both parties remained
formally committed to entry, there would be a competition to
2
appear the more sceptical; the party that lost would be
out-flanked in a bid for public opinion and would be more
exposed to internal splits, in a political culture in which
party unity was generally taken to be an indicator of
governing credibility. Anxiety was sharpened by memories of
Wilson's descriptions of Heath in the 1966 election as a
spaniel ready to roll over at the command of the six; indeed
one Labour election broadcast did claim that the
Conservatives would agree to entry at any price. To protect
his position. Heath went to Paris in May 1970 to state that
the " terms had to be visibly beneficial in the long run and
tolerable in the short" and that there was no question of
entry without the " full hearted consent of parliament and 
3
people". The position taken on the EC in the Conservative
1. Kitzinger, op cit, 1973, P 345.
2. Peter Jenkins, The Guardian, 24 February 1970
3. Heath, speech, 6 May 1971, RIIA Press Lib.
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manifesto was later described as " two paragraphs peppered 
1
by ifs and buts". Although the public had been treated to 
little debate on entry during the 1970 election , the 
winning party had committed itself to a negotiating approach 
in anticipation of domestic political troubles.
When Heath formed his Government, it was only from those
2
thought to favour entry. However Heath’s senior colleagues
clearly looked to a negotiation to secure terms that would
remove unacceptable economic or political risk. Iain
Macleod, the new Chancellor, had attempted to commit the
shadow cabinet to a referendum on entry to ensure
3
that the matter was squared with public opinion. Perhaps
nothing better sums up the mood of British politics in
summer 1970 than a speech by David Howell, who had worked
closely with Heath; he argued that Parliament would not
accept the CAP, with its " giant welfare subsidy to France
and Germany". The only solution was a new Messina Conference
to produce a bold new concept of European collaboration to
4
suit the enlarged EC. The columnist Ronald Butt noted that
the Government had a difficult domestic agenda and there was
a risk of EC entry adding to a "multiplying conflict with 
5
public opinion".
1. Anthony Sampson, The Observer, 29 June 1970.
2. Kitzinger, op cit, 1973, P 154.
3. Prior, op cit, P 85.
4. The Times, 10 June 1970.
5. The Sunday Telegraph, 24 January 1971.
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Any impact costs could start to fall at the same time as the
next election, likely in 1974-5. O’ Neill was later to
remark that one of the most important decisions was to start
1
the negotiations within eleven days of the election; only 
then was it possible to reassure Government supporters that 
the upheavals of entry could be handled before the late 
stages of the electoral cycle. As soon as the 1970 election 
results were in, it was also noted that the number of 
Conservatives publicly committed to oppose entry exceded the 
Government’s majority of just 30. As early as February 1971, 
it was presciently predicted that the Labour pros would be
unable to support the Government beyond an initial vote,
iJt
exposingJ to defeat on the enabling legislation. Thus it
became an essential negotiating aim to conclude all items in
a way that denied Labour any credible excuse for voting
against any of the terms, or outflanking the Government in
public perception as the best defender of national interests
2
in dealing with the EC.
Hurd recalls that, in 1970, the Foreign Office strategy was
still " to isolate the French further and to build up
pressure on them from inside the Community so that in the
3
end they would be forced to let us in". This inspired the 
Ï1 Interview with Sir Con O ’Neill^ ’ The Seventies".
2. European Trends, Economist Intelligence Unit, May 1971, No 
27, P 24.
3. Hurd, 2 2  cit, P 58.
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second area of dispute within the British Government. Benn's
diaries show that Wilson had been doubtful of this course;
as early as 1968, he complained about the Foreign Office's "
Byzantine diplomacy designed to isolate the French, but
which only succeeded in annoying the Germans, worrying the
Italians and dividing the six into five, the five into four,
1
and the four into three".
On gaining power. Heath insisted that Britain could not 
expect to gain entry through the pressure of the five and 
that there was no alternative to persuading France. In 
opposition he had continued a diplomacy of his own which had 
convinced him that the French Government was not so much 
divided between a pro and anti camp as that each individual 
was, to varying degrees, pulled between scepticism and 
enthusiasm for British entry and competing perceptions of 
what it could mean for the internal and external 
development of the Community. The price of Franco/British 
adversary had been a neglect of one of the principal 
functions of diplomacy: to stabilise expectations of what
each party would do in response to the aspirations of the 
other, without which there was little basis for even 
preceding to an assessment of the value of a partnership. 
The wooing of France would be easier than the Foreign 
Office anticipated. It only needed to be made secure about
1. Benn, op cit, P 20.
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the achievements of the Community to date, after which even
1
De Gaulle would have been ready to let Britain in.
Indeed, Heath was convinced that an anti-French alignment 
would fail. Hurd recalls his thinking:
" there was no question of France accepting British 
membership because the five wanted Britain in. Only if the 
Five, had threatened to destroy the community would France 
have wavered. There was never any real chance of this 
threat being made or believed". 2.
British entry was gaining support in the French Government
precisely because of fears of isolation in a Community of
six governments dominated by Germany. Faced with the
presentiment of an enlarged Community constructed around an
Anglo-German alignment, France would probably resist
pressure from the Five, whatever the consequences. Brandt’s
memoirs suggest that Heath’s approach was wise.
" French fears of Britain’s special relationship with the 
US mingled with those of an Anglo- German get together.. 
there was a widespread tendency in Britain to believe, 
wrongly, that strong words from Germany would bring France 
to heel. On the contrary we had to avoid confronting France 
as a bloc; I was careful to avoid the 
entrenchment of collective positions." 3.
Indeed, the Commission’s line that there was no alternative
4
to the members sorting out enlargement between themselves, 
reflected a view amongst the old EC that there was no 
alternative to Britain persuading all its prospective 
Interview with Edward Heath, December 1988.
2. Hurd, op cit, P 58.
3. Brandt, op cit, PP 157-9.
4. The Times, 3 March 1971.
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partners. The use of traditional inter-state politics to 
isolate France and to compel it to admit a new partner 
against its wishes would not provide a promising start for 
what was hoped to be more than an act of enlargement: a
relauch for the Community method of inter-state dealing. Nor 
was the US likely to reinforce the five in pressing France 
to let Britain in. Schaetzel, then US Ambassador to the EC, 
recalls that in his European dealings, Kissinger was
preoccupied with repairing relations with France. He
/
eschewed the encouragement of an enlarged Europe. The 
internal organisation of Europe, the timing and form of its 
integration was a matter for the Europeans. The US should 
concentrate on forming the best system of communication and 
consultation with whatever emerged. Attempts to adumbrate 
Grand Designs for Europe had only produced acrimonious 
conflicts. Finally, a close working relationship with 
France featured prominently in the re-ordering of Britain’s 
bilateral relations that Heath himself anticipated in 
parallel with entry: an approach that provoked the comment
that he really anticipated an "isosceles triangle" with a 
peculiarly intimate foreign policy relationship between 
Britain and France to balance the economic strength of 
Germany in the new EC.
1. Andrianopoulos, op cit, P 27 and Kissinger, op cit,
1979, PP 88-9.
2. A. Hartley," The Politics of Europe", Round Table: The 
Commonwealth Journal of International Relataions, January 
1973, No 249, P 15.
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4) The Course of the Negotiations.
To summarise the position that had been reached by June 
1970, only a few aspects of the prospective relationship 
between Britain and the EC were left over for explicit 
negotiation: namely, the terms of transition to a non-
negotiable "acguis". Nevertheless, the negotiating phase 
remained politically important. Many in Britain felt that 
the national interest in entry hung on the transitional 
terms. Broad inclinations towards entry co-existed in both 
British and French elites with mutual suspicions and the 
Soames affair had shown how these could feed on each other 
during a detailed discussion. The French attached great 
importance to parallel conversations on Britain's attitudes 
to the internal and external development of the EC, 
especially to its ability to proceed with a monetary union. 
But there was a potential conflict here with Britain's wish 
for a quick and simple deal.
The initial distribution of negotiating strengths and
weaknesses was finely balanced in spite of Northedge's
claims that the six could have demanded more onerous terms
1
had they realised that "Britain had nowhere else to go".
Both Britain and France enjoyed a degree of what
2
negotiating theorists call "entrenchment": the ability to
1. Above P 5.
2. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Oxford 
University Press, London, 1963, P 21.
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project their demands as being without alternative - usually
because of intractable domestic constituencies - if other
countries wanted the talks to succeed. Moreover, any deal
had to reflect the EC’s character as both a co-operative and
competitive relationship. Any interest in boxing Britain in
to an immutable "acquis" had to be balanced against
aggravating its weak balance of payments and restive
domestic politics, as these would become shared problems for
an enlarged EC. Although the Five were hostile to British
attempts to fix the level of their own embroilment with 
1
France , they were likely to act as something of a swing
balance, strictly on their own initiative. However, Pompidou
had the advantage that he might not have to use an explicit
veto to bloc Britain; there were circumstances in which he
could exercise a "covert veto" by insisting on terms that
2
would be unsellable in Britain.
The negotiations were formally opened on 30 June 1970.
Britain requested that they should focus on the following
areas that would give particular difficulty in adapting to
the "acquis"; "certain matters of agricultural policy, our
contributions to the Community budget. Commonwealth sugar
exports. New Zealand's special problems and certain other
3
Commonwealth questions". The economies of New Zealand and 
certain sugar producing islands faced substantial disruption
1. See above P 155
2. Kitzinger, op cit, 1973, P 73.
3. Cmnd 4401 of 1970, Para 13.
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from any sudden cut-off of agricultural exports to Britain,
Replying for the six, Harmel laid down a series of
parameters that further constrained the range of possible
solutions within and beyond the principle that the "acquis"
had to be accepted in full. The terms had to involve the
minimum time needed to adapt EC rules, otherwise they would
cease to be strictly transitional arrangements and become de
facto derogations. They should be constructed to yield
parity of benefits to all parties. They would have to be
identical for all four candidates: Denmark, Ireland, Norway
and Britain. Finally, the six reserved the right to raise
1
new issues - and EMU in particular- as the talks proceded.
Two arguments developed in July 1970. The first concerned
the order in which issues should be handled. France wanted
first to deal with the details of how Britain would adapt
the CAP and proposed that the budget should only be
discussed when all other matters had been concluded. Britain
2
wanted to discuss its budgetary contributions first. In 
effect, each was attempting to prevent the other using its 
principal negotiating leverage. France wanted to tie Britain 
down to the early introduction of community preference 
under which French and other EC farmers would be first in 
the queue to export to Britain-so that this could not be 
used to attain better terms on phasing in its contributions
1. The Times" 1 July 1970.
2. The Financial Times, 21 July 1970.
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to the EC budget. Britain wanted the budget settled so that 
its search for concessions on other issues such as sugar and 
New Zealand could not be used to lever up its financial 
subventions.
Second, the British Government told the six that " it would
be hard to convince the British public that the EEC
represented a genuine pooling of interests if decisions were
made about economic and monetary union without the
1
candidates' participation." The French Government insisted 
that Britain could not be part of the formal discussions on 
new policies as that would be to pre-judge the results of 
the negotiation; Britain would have to be content with 
being consulted on plans for EMU.
In the autumn, Britain proposed differential transition
periods of 3 years for the introduction of industrial free
trade and 6 years for the adoption of the CAP. When France
objected that this would offend the Harmel guidelines above,
Britain countered that, as it would lose from the "acquis",
the terms of transition should be defined to British 
2
advantage.
In December, The British Government switched the emphasis of 
its bargaining to the budget contributions. It suggested 
that these should start at just 3% of the total budget, only
1. The Times, 22 July 1970.
2. The Times, 11 November 1970.
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moving to the full amounts prescribed over 8 years. Even 
then, they should be covered by a safeguard clause, 
guaranteeing a review if contributions become excessive.
With the publication of the Commission’s opinion and its
discussion by the Six in the Council of Ministers, the full
range of negotiating positions became clear from the end of
1970. The Commission proposed that Britain’s budget payments
be phased in over five years and that Britain should start
by contributing either 10% - 15% or 21.5%, the latter being
its initial share of total community GNP. There should be no
safeguard clause as contributions would only be excessive if
they gave rise to a balance of payments problem and the
Community already had a mechanism for mutual assistance in
such an event. Britain had proposed that New Zealand dairy
and Commonwealth sugar imports should continue de facto at a
1
level that would be little changed in the new EC. The 
Commission, however, felt that they should be progressively 
reduced throughout the transition, although help could be 
found for the sugar producers by including them in the 
Yaounde Treaty, which defined the Community’s relationship 
with a range of developing countries.
Discussions amongst the Six, however, revealed the crumbling 
of French hopes of confronting Britain with a firm and 
united line. In November 1970, The Netherlands and Italy 
supported Britain’s request for an 8 year budgetary
1. The Times 11 November 1970.
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transition. By January 1971, only France and Belgium opposed
a compromise whereby the transition would be limited to 5
years but Britain would be protected against any sudden
1
jumps in its contributions over the next 3 years. All of the
Five supported a strengthened mechanism should balance of
payments assistance ever be needed and while their
suggestions for Britain’s starting contributions ranged from
5%-10%, France supported the higher Commission option of 
2
21.5%.
In January 1971 an attempt was made to avoid the 
negotiations stalling by switching the focus from the budget 
to New Zealand and sugar, only to find that these fronts 
were equally stalemated. The French refused any concessions 
beyond 5 years, during which New Zealand’s imports should be 
run down altogether; the volume of sugar admitted to the 
Community should be halved, though the price paid for it 
should be doubled as the producers were genuinely under­
developed . Again the Five’s counter-proposals were closer 
to Britain's position. They supported the Commission view 
that sugar imports should be unchanged until 1974 and then 
reviewed in the context of a new Yaounde agreement. New 
Zealand’s imports should be only partially run down with a
review after 5 years holding out the hope of an indefinite 
3
concession; indeed, Germany wanted specific reference to be
1. The Times, 1 February 1971.
2. The Times, 19 February 1971, 13 May 1971.
3. The Daily Telegraph, 16 March 1971.
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1
made to the interests of New Zealand producers in the EEC
and Italy tried to persuade France to solve the problem in
2
the context of an international agreement on dairy produce.
Although agreements were not being reached on the major 
issues, Rippon asked in March 1971 that the negotiations 
should be completed by May. Up to that point, Britain had 
secured its wish to keep entry free from complication by 
parallel discussions about a monetary union for the enlarged 
EC. Ever since it had been refused formal participation in 
framing plans for EMU, it had been able to " free-ride" on 
the low level of agreement amongst the Six themselves. 
Ministers had repeated the formula that Britain was ready to 
go as " far and as fast" as any other country towards EMU, 
in the knowledge that this would not be very far or fast. 
However, faced with pressure to reach a quick decision on 
enlargement, France surprised the Five by insisting that 
Britain had to give definite answers to one aspect of its 
ability to join a monetary union: the future of sterling
liabilities had to be considered.
However, Britain insisted that entry negotiations would fail 
if they had to await a definitive plan of action for the 
pound balances. It would be necessary to enter discussions 
with countries that held them and to raise in the IMF the
1. The Times" 11 May 1971.
2. The Financial Times, 22 March 1971 and Sunday Telegraph 
21 March 1971.
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issue of how to replace liquidity withdrawn from the
international system . Some felt that France had exercised
its covert veto; in response to gathering signs that the
British Government could not sustain negotiations beyond the
summer for reasons of domestic politics, it had introduced
an issue that would take months to settle. Germany, Italy,
The Netherlands and Luxembourg showed their disapproval by
deciding not to be represented at principal level at a
meeting of Finance Ministers on 31 March 1971. Nevertheless,
that meeting took the first step to defusing the crisis by
suggesting that the EC should separate out those aspects of
the pound balances that could affect the enlarged EC and
1
discuss possible safeguards with the British Government.
During these consultations, it became clear that France
wanted Britain either to raise an international loan to
liquidate the pound balances immediately or to undertake to
2
run them down by 5% a year. Meanwhile, other members should 
be exempted from obligations to extend mutual assistance to 
Britain if any balance of payments crisis arose from sales 
of the pound balances. The Five opposed formal commitments 
to eliminate the balances and argued that mutual assistance 
under the Treaties could not be limited.
The British Government remained strangely sanguine 
throughout this episode because it knew the bargaining focus 
was already moving into a secret back-channel between Heath
1. The Guardian, 31 March 1971.
2. International Herald Tribune, 6 May 1971.
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and Pompidou. From February 1971, Soames and Michel Jobert,
who was both an aide to Pompidou and a friend of Heath’s
Private Secretary, Robert Armstrong, hammered out the
1
outlines of an agreement. But it was not until 8 May 1971 
that Heath and Pompidou went public and announced that they 
would meet two weeks later in Paris.
Meanwhile, it was agreed that the two governments should aim 
for some progress at the May llth-12th negotiating session 
in Brussels with remaining issues being settled in June if 
the Paris summit was successful. However, the May meeting 
showed that even with intense bilateral consultation, the 
complexity of the diplomacy was such that smooth convergence 
could not be guaranteed. Britain made the significant 
concession of immediate preference for EC agriculture in its 
domestic market, while both Britain and France accepted a 
formula for budgetary contributions, in which it was 
implicit that France had reduced its demands for Britain’s 
starting contribution from 21.5% to around 11%.
However, the talks ran into serious trouble over sugar. On
10 May 1971 agreement seemed to be reached on a formula that
had apparently been "hammered out between Soames and 
2
Jobert". Rippon announced to the press that " manifest 
progress had been made". France now accepted that sugar 
Ï1 Interview with Edward Heath, December 1988.
2. Kitzinger, op cit, 1973, P 134.
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imports could remain unchanged until 1974, after which
producers could choose either full association with the EEC
/
or a trade agreement under Yaounde. However, the next day,
Rippon spoke of a " dialogue of the deaf" and that he would
" rather stay all night at the negotiating table than leave
2
the issue in its present muddle". In the meantime, he had
heard from London that the Caribbean countries would come
3
out against the terms as then constituted. However, on 
he was unable to obtain more than an statement that the 
enlarged Community would " have at heart" the interests of 
primary producers, notably of sugar.
A week later. Heath and Pompidou held their meeting in
Paris. Thanks to the willingness of Heath and others to give 
4 5
interviews and a recent lecture Heath gave at Chatham House
it is possible to piece together some of the detail of the
summit for the first time . Heath and Pompidou agreed that
the status quo in European politics was imperfect. Heath
argued that major international decisions should no longer
be the preserve of the superpowers. Europe needed to
collaborate to become a coherent actor in international
economics, to assume greater responsibility for its own
1. Kitzinger, op cit~ 1973, P 134.
2. The Financial Times, 12 May 1971.
3. The Guardian, 13 May 1971.
4. Interviews with Edward Heath, December 1988, Lord 
Armstrong, January 1989 and Sir Michael Palliser, February 
1989.
5. Heath, op cit, 1988.
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security and to conduct a common diplomacy across the globe; 
but he suggested that an inner group of Britain, France and 
Germany would be necessary to give leadership to an enlarged 
EC.
Heath was ready with an offer to accompany British entry
with Anglo-French nuclear co-operation. Since the Godkin
lectures of 1967, he had seemed to envisage that Britain’s
access to US nuclear information and technology should be
extended to France, but the long term goal should be
collaboration to produce an increasingly independent
European deterrent. This would " be held in trust" for the
EC as a whole with other members being consulted on
deployments and doctrine in the same fashion as the McNamara
Committee in NATO. Heath claims that before his summit with
Pompidou in May 1971 he obtained Nixon’s agreement that:
" if we had a joint Franco-British deterrent there would be 
no objection to handing over the technical information from 
American sources that were then in British hands" 2.
Pompidou felt that without unity the European states could 
find neither dignity nor effectiveness, but he rejected 
Heath’s proposal for nuclear collaboration, arguing that it 
would be impossible to make two major changes in Gaullist 
foreign policy simultaneously: the end of Europe of the
Six and of a strictly independent security policy. 
Nevertheless, Heath registered his keen interest in
1. Heath, op cit, 1970, P 4.
2. Heath, op cit, 1988, P 207.
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discussing nuclear collaboration in the future, noting that 
with long lead times in defence planning this might be an 
early topic for Anglo/French co-operation in an enlarged EC.
Pompidou affirmed that his principal interest in further 
European integration lay in monetary union. Heath agreed 
that this was a precondition of European equality with the 
US in international economics and of the successful 
management of member state economies, free from disturbance 
by exogenous capital flows.
Pompidou was eager for Heath to confirm that Britain would
support French preferences for an intergovernmental
approach to integration and join it in sustaining the
Luxembourg compromise. Heath clearly satisfied Pompidou on
this point. Kitzinger notes that while the communique spoke
of " very close" views on Europe's external role, it was
able to announce " complete identity of view on internal
1
working and development".
When they turned to specifics, much of the time was spent on 
monetary questions. Pompidou expanded on the French 
perception that the pound threatened the creation of 
an EC monetary bloc. The French Government hoped that EMU 
would provide leverage to secure the removal of reserve 
currencies in forthcoming negotiations to reform the
international monetary system. These currencies had menaced 
1. Kitzinger, op cit^ 1973, P 124.
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the discretion of Governments in the management of their 
economies. They enabled the US to run an indefinite balance 
of payments deficit, to appropriate foreign assets with 
liabilities that were not fully redeemed and to determine 
unilaterally the rates of monetary expansion, growth and 
inflation in other countries. However, the pound was not 
only itself a reserve currency, but a precarious one that 
was only secured from crises by the dollar under-writing of 
sterling balances by the Basle agreement. Unless Britain was 
prepared to commit itself to liquidating those balances, it 
would surely be constrained to oppose an EC assault on the 
dollar’s privileged status. It was alarming that the pound 
balances had actually increased by 50% since Basle in 1968.
Heath accepted an informal understanding that Britain would 
aim to run down the use of the pound as a reserve currency 
by decreasing the proportion of official sterling holdings 
with dollar backing by 5% a year. But the reductions had to 
be acceptable to the countries that held pounds in their 
reserves , they had to be linked to overall progress in the 
creation of new international liquidity and it was important 
that they put no further strain on the British balance of 
payments. To aid the run-down of sterling liabilities. Heath 
implied that his Government would set its economic policy to 
strengthen Britain’s payments position and to repay debts; 
he hoped that France would join the Basle treaty as a step 
to diversify the underwriting of the pound away from the 
dollar. For the moment. Pompidou was asked not even to pass
184
on details of this agreement to the Five as there would have 
to be talks with the sterling area countries and the House 
of Commons was bound to worry about further balance of 
payments commitments during transition to full membership.
On other matters it was agreed that Britain’s initial 
contribution to the budget should reflect the costs to the 
Communities of arranging its entry, i.e. at least 7%. 
Pompidou asked Heath how he could allay his fears that the 
French language would gradually be displaced by English. 
Heath offered to copy features of the Franco-German 
agreement that had encouraged cultural exchanges, town 
twinning etc. In response to Pompidou’s concern that the 
Francophone zone would suffer as the Black Commonwealth 
would represent a larger addition to the area covered by 
Yaounde than the extra funds that the scheme would receive 
from British entry. Heath replied that Nigeria would benefit 
from oil revenues and would thus not require aid.
At the next negotiating session on June 7 1971, Rippon
announced that his Government would accept an " orderly and
gradual" run- down of the pound balances after accession, "
the progressive alignment of the characteristics of the
pound with those of other EC currencies" and the need to "
manage British policies with a view to stabilise the pound 
1
balances". Schumann used his position in the chair to
1. The Times, 8 June 1971.
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break with normal procedures and to ask French Finance
1
Minister, Giscard D’Estaing, to reply first. Giscard simply
accepted Rippon's statement, bringing all discussion to an
end, as the other delegations had come with briefs that
anticipated the need to mediate between British and French
positions. Ignorant of the secret understanding between
Heath amd Pompidou on the run-down of the pound as a reserve
currency, Raymond Barre, the Commissioner responsible for
EMU, believed that the initiative had been betrayed by the
2
acceptance of Britain’s vague commitments .
Many amongst the five believed that the June meeting
signalled the need for their diplomacy to assume
Anglo/French collusion, where it had previously been
premised on their antagonism. As one German diplomat was to
argue during the final session of June 21st-22nd: " at
previous discussions the five could have put up a sign
saying "British delegation"..now it is up to Britain to do
some genuine negotiating and France to show some
3
flexibility"
Nevertheless, the final lap was not without Anglo/French
tensions. Britain advanced the position that whatever New
Zealand was exporting at the end of a five year transition 
should continue unless there was a unanimous vote of the
1. The Guardian, 12 June 1971.
2. De La Serre, op cit, 1987, P 46.
3. The Times, 22 June 1971.
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enlarged EC to the contrary. Tempers flared and Schumann
objected that Britain clearly did not understand that the EC
was about giving priority to each others produce. Britain
then seemed to accept that New Zealand ’ s dairy exports to
the EC should be reduced to 66% of existing amounts by the
end of the transition and that any member would be able to
veto a continuation after five years. However, New Zealand's
Deputy Prime Minister, John Marshall, kept insisting that
Britain should ask for more until the Dutch insisted that
1
71% should be the final offer.
Britain's starting contribution to the budget was finally
settled at 8.64%. Both Rippon and O'Neill have subsequently
claimed that Britain accepted a slightly worse deal than
anticipated in order to secure the concessions to New 
2
Zealand, perhaps a fitting curtain fall on Commonwealth 
constraints on Britain's adaptation to a full relationship 
with its European neighbours.
The negotiators celebrated success at 4 a.m. on 23 June
1971. Nevertheless there were some residual points to be 
discussed, notably the Common Fisheries Policy, which 
Britain had refused to recognise as covered by its promise 
to adopt the acquis in full, as the Six had pushed it 
through, in what seemed to be a last minute attempt to 
change the conditions of entry, just a few days before the
1. Kitzinger, op cit  ^ 1973, PP 141-3.
2. Interviews with Rippon and O'Neill, " The Seventies"
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negotiations were due to open. As late as November 1971, 
Rippon argued that the CFP would cause such disruption to UK 
fishing that Britain would not join without its amendment. 
Under the policy, all boats would have access to
territorial waters of all member states, although the four 
candidate countries would bring 60% of the fish stocks of an 
enlarged EC. Moreoever, the candidates could reasonably 
claim that they had done more than the Six to conserve their 
stocks and that their waters were now being targeted by
"factory boats" that had exhausted catches nearer to home.
The enlarged Community had landed its first diplomatic
tangle. Fishing interests throughout the Six had built new
Ai
boats in anticipation of accessjnew waters; someone was
going to end up with excess capacity. The Five argued that
the original Six, at least, had an agreement and that their
fishers should have access to French waters. France insisted
1
that any policy would have to apply throughout the new EC. 
As it became obvious that the CFP could prevent Norwegian
entry, the Commission lobbied for Norway to be exempt. But
the British Government concluded that domestic politics 
could not allow it to fail to secure a concession that had 
been granted to another candidate, while one of the few 
hopes of selling an agreement to UK fishermen would be to 
hold out the hope of compensating gains in access to 
Norwegian waters. By the autumn, the problem was further 
complicated as Iceland threatened to extend its fishing
1. The Times, 12th July 1971,
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limits to fifty miles; loss of opportunities outside the EC
would sharpen competition within; 33% of Britain’s catch
1
would be lost by exclusion from the Icelandic fields.
As the deadline approached for concluding an agreement in
time for the signing ceremony in January 1972, the final
outcome must have been unsatisfactory to all. Over a 10 year
transition, the CFP would apply only nominally to the extent
that most stocks would be reserved for national industries:
95% in Britain’s case. However, unless all members voted for
another transition period, the CFP would come into full
2
operation after 10 years. Although Norway was not to vote to
remain outside the EC until the autumn, its accession was
known to be improbable from the time of the fishing
agreement. The Norwegian Government may have considered UK
3
acceptance of this package a betrayal. Indeed, a conflict 
may have arisen between UK and Norwegian entry at this 
point, as the British Government, which faced the most 
precarious stage of domestic ratification in early 1972, 
could not allow an issue that was discrediting EC processes 
to drag on any longer.
To make the link into the next chapter on the causal 
significance of the negotiations to entry/enlargement , it 
is worth concluding with two views that the talks were never
1. The Financial Times, 14th December 1971.
2. The Express, 13th December 1971.
3. The Guardian, 8th January 1972.
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more than game play between actors who always knew where
they would end up. According to the first, haggling and
agreement were both inevitable for the same reasons. Success 
was never really in doubt because the parties expected some 
" coalition surplus", but they were bound to "play chicken" 
over the apportionment of these benefits of combination up 
to the last moment. Thus little was decided in the ten 
months to May 1971 and then everything fell into place
within two months.
Alternatively, the negotiations can be seen as a necessary
quadrille, the rules of which were well understood by
governments and the purpose of which was to reconcile
domestic constituencies to change by perfectly
choreographing the drama in three acts: tough advocacy to
show that national positions had been pushed as far as
possible, followed by well-publicised reconciliation and
settlement and, finally, collusion between Governments to
produce packages honed to the problems of public persuasion 
1
faced by each.
Perceptions of what would be an acceptable settlement
changed as repeated negotiating deadlocks deepened
understanding of the limits of negotiability on specific
issues. On 3 February 1971, The Times had argued that the
Treasury would have reason for concern if Britain’s starting
37% R.D. Putnam, " Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the
Logic of two-level Games", International Organisation, 
Summer 1988, Vol 42, No 3, P 451.
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contributions were much higher than 5%. When the Government
settled at 8.6% in June, the general tenor of comment was
1
that no-one could have expected better terms. The substance
of the negotiations had focused on a remarkably narrow range
of phenomena constitutive of Britain’s new relationship with
the EC. To leading antis, Enoch Powell and Peter Shore, this
2
had been a deliberate trompe d'oeuil: if the
Governments had found a solution to all the questions on the
agenda, it seemed to many that all the problems involved in
entry must have been removed. It was easy to forget that the
suitability of the acquis itself to British interests had
not even been up for discussion. A final stage of collusion
to ease problems of domestic ratification faced by other
Governments can be seen in such incidents as the decision to
cut New Zealand cheese imports by 80%, although its total
dairy quotas would fall by only 29%. Pompidou had pointed
out to Heath that his own home region of the Auvergne was
more exposed to competition from New Zealand's cheese than 
3
its butter !
1. The Sunday Times, 27 June 1971.
2. The Times, 19 December 1970 and The Sunday Times
17 January 1971.
3. Interview with Edward Heath, December 1988
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CHAPTER 4: RETHINKING THE NEGOTIATIONS IN CRITICAL/COGNITIVE 
TERMS
Critical theorists advise that analytical categories should
occasionally be relaxed so that the " whole field of
dispersed events can be set free" as a preliminary to re-
1
introducing an explanatory framework. How might a dispersion 
of the actors, beliefs, structures and events that 
characterised the negotiations of British entry to the EC be 
represented ?
The field of actors might be summarised by a version of
Robert Putnam's description of negotiations as a logic of
multi-level game play. Ten Governments - 6 members and 4
candidates- were each trying to find a solution that
satisfied their own negotiating goals, while simultaneously
forging a winning coalition amongst i) the other Governments
ii) bureaucratic politics back home and iii) wider domestic
politics. The problem was that was "rational at one game
2
board was impolitic at another".
However, actors made their moves in structured contexts of 
inter-state politics, the intersubjective norms of European 
co-operation, the economics of global markets and 
interdependence etc. Each negotiating government found that 
these factors added to the fracturing of its environment by
1. Foucault, op cit, P 27.
2. Putnam, op cit, P 434.
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the multi-level game-play, in that it was often hard either 
to ignore any dimension or satisfy them all at once.
But most immediate to the moves of each actor was the 
conceptual prism through which he made sufficient sense of 
his complex environment to make decisions under conditions 
of uncertainty. Such was the ambiguity of situation and the 
indeterminacy of interests, that interpretations of what 
should be done always varied more than variations in either 
the position of actors or their access to information. These 
differences in belief systems clustered in institutions and 
nation states, but also over-lapped them.
Moreover, neither structures nor beliefs were static. There 
were three reasons for this: i) the negotiations were
partially creative of the very relationship they were 
intended to discuss, ii) the negotiations provoked and 
responded to changing events in the wider international 
system and iii) stable belief systems are not static belief 
systems; rather, in a situation like a negotiation, they 
involve predictable dynamics in the evolution of beliefs in 
response to moves, counter-moves and extraneous events.
The central contention here is that theories of cognitive 
dynamics and a recursive view of international structures 
are sufficient to extract explanatory simplicity from such 
descriptive complexity. Unlike theories of superordinate 
systemic pressures, or those of rational actors, it is
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unnecessary to step out of the evolving, interacting 
dispersions of actors, structures, beliefs and events, or to 
pretend that they were perfectly understood by actors. The 
result is to rescue the processes and events of negotiating 
British entry from marginalisation by equilibrium theories 
of foreign policy change and to re-discover them as a source 
of contingency; to show how both the fact and character of 
British entry depended on the negotiations of 1970-1.
A cognitive distinction provided by Steinbruner provides a
useful starting point. Some decision-makers operate as
"theoretical-thinkers"; they have a firmly anchored belief-
system, regard their approach as without alternatives and
are good at interpreting almost any development as
reinforcing their point of view. Others are "uncommitted"
thinkers. They frequently state a point of view with
clarity, firmness and detail, and as being without
alternative; but they are quite capable of doing the same 
/
for its opposite.
Most of those who were relevant actors without being direct 
participants in the negotiations were "uncommitted 
thinkers", while the pressures to adopt simple and clear 
lines in political discourse obscured the degree of doubt 
even amongst the principal protagonists. Although a leading
1. Steinbruner, op cit| P 128-33.
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pro-marketeer, Jenkins continued to believe that everything
hung on the terms; in his last weeks as Chancellor he asked
George Thomson, who was set to become Labour's Chief
Negotiator, " whether it was possible to get a tolerable
1
bargain on the EC" as he felt "nervous and sceptical".
Barber claims that when the negotiations opened in June
1970, he felt that there was only a 50: 50 chance of
reaching a solution that would allow the UK to enter, while
Prior wondered whether entry just " was not too difficult"
2
as reports came back to Cabinet from the negotiations.
Pompidou eventually concluded that "Europe with Britain will
be difficult, but without her it will be impossible".
However, he had earlier been determined not to accept any
terms and he had said this to private confidants, not just
3
for public consumption. Michel Jobert, then Pompidou’s
private secretary, recalls that it was still a matter of
deciding whether " Britain was sincere" and whether "
Europe of the Nine would have a form and a future, which we 
4
could accept".
Chapter 3 revealed the layers of ambiguity that confronted 
actors. In Britain, hopes that entry would modernise the 
economy and adapt it to the needs of international
competition were balanced by fears of a Kaldorian
Interview with Roy Jenkins," The Seventies".
2. Interview with James Prior, " The Seventies".
3. Roussel, op cit, PP 449 & 466.
4. Jobert, op cit, PP 182-3.
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deindustrialisation. Perceptions of the value of a Community
of nations to compensate for the shortcomings of the
middling state were matched by concern that the EC might be
just another jungle of competitive inter-state politics,
with the terms of Britain's entry designed to reduce its
influence and prosperity. The French Government was unclear
whether British entry was now needed to smooth the continued
development of the EC by removing perceptions that the Six
could be dominated by Germany, or whether Britain would
obstruct new proposals and challenge the "acquis", or even
align with Germany to limit the EC to Atlanticist
priorities. At one moment, the Five worried about going any
further with European integration without Britain; at the
next, they agreed that the priority was to protect the
achievements and relationships of the Six: the "bird in the
hand" of European co-operation. Moreover, these differences
were not a matter of differential access to information, but
of the chronic susceptibility of the same facts to different
interpretations. For example, of 600 British economists
surveyed, 208 felt that entry would not be in the national
1
interest, against 199 who took the opposite view.
Faced with a problem of making a decision on 
entry/enlargement under conditions of such uncertainty, the 
negotiations assumed a role that belied their often trivial 
substance. Actors attempted to use them i) to test
1. The Guardian, 23 October 1971.
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alternative hypotheses about each others intentions - to
1
"search and learn". ii) to reconstruct an enlarged EC in
directions that would remove their fears and confirm their
hopes. This was apparent in the linkages that the Six made
between admitting Britain and the creation of a monetary
union and foreign policy co-operation. But there was also
considerable manoeuvring to shape the intersubjective
structures of the enlarged EC. Kolodziej has put the point
perfectly in his assessment of French diplomatic thinking: "
each specific transaction contributes to a grammar of
relationships, norms and expectations.. the
2
whole structure is open to change by the next move".
The process of testing prospective partners and jockeying to
establish a " common law" of understandings for the new
partnership ran right the way through the negotiations.
Schelling has argued that most negotiations are ultimately
3
qualitative and not quantitative; it is hard to legislate 
for all outcomes, while such detailed clauses as are 
agreed may evolve very differently, depending on processes, 
relationships and understandings. Britain thus continuously 
tested the ability of the Six to recognise the problems that 
could arise under the "acquis": if the EC was characterised
by a high level of mutual understanding, the "logic of
1. John G. Cross, " Negotiations as a Learning Process" in
1. William Zartman, ed. The Negotiation Process : Theories 
and Applications, Sage, London, 1978.
2. Kolodziej, op cit, P 13.
3. Schelling, op cit, P 34.
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partnership" could even be a better guarantee against any 
economic damage to Britain than detailed terms that could 
never anticipate the precise shape of future difficulties; 
but if the EC was a disguised form of inter-state 
competition, it would be hard to remove problems arising 
from Britain's net contributions, as this would necessarily 
require other member states to pay more and any partner 
could veto changes proposed by the UK.
The tests that Britain was eager to carry out and the
principles that it wished to establish can be demonstrated
as follows. O'Neill told the Six that issues had to be
settled in a way that allowed Britain to believe that its
interests were part of the general interest and that an
enlarged EC would not have regard for the original members
only, reducing Britain to permanent inferiority on account 
1
of its late entry . As the Six had taken 12 years to adjust
to the Community budget, flexibility on safeguarding Britain
from excessive contributions for some time beyond the 5 year
transition became an acid test of whether they were prepared
to treat Britain in the same way as they had treated
themselves. Rippon spoke of the importance of the Six
showing that they could understand Britain's circumstances
2
and that they really were " friends and allies". Heath was 
anxious to establish the principle that any member whose 
prosperity was prejudiced by a common policy could expect
1. The Times, 12 January 1971.
2. Interview with Rippon, The Guardian, 25 January 1971.
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its correction by right. While accepting the "acquis", the
British Government advanced the principle that if a member's
essential interests were compromised by existing policies,
all partners would work in good faith to remove the problem.
In relation to the budget, it made much of the Commission's
view that " should unacceptable situations arise, the
very nature of the Community would require institutions to
1
find equitable solutions". On a different tack. Heath
presented the treatment of sugar producers and New Zealand
as " auguries" of the EC's openness to trade with the rest
of the world and of its consideration for outsiders in
2
taking decisions about its own integration.
Pompidou outlined on French television the tests and 
understandings that he had been determined to clarify with 
Heath before accepting the UK. First, Britain should support 
EC development along strictly intergovernmental lines. 
Second, Britain should be expected to " moor itself to the 
continent and detach itself from the Ocean". Members should 
not attempt to build superior external status in order to 
obtain special influence within the Community. Pompidou also 
claimed to have employed specific issues to test British 
acceptance of key principles in the concrete and not just 
the abstract. Willingness to liquidate the pound balances 
probed Britain's commitment to align its policies so that 
the EC could function as a single policy-making unit,
1. Hansard, 21 July, Col 1465.
2. Heath, speech, 12 February 1971, RIIA Press Lib.
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specifically as an Economic and Monetary Union. Immediate
adoption of preference for EC Agriculture in the British
market tested Britain’s preparedness to give priority to
1
intra over extra EC relationships.
However, the processes of testing prospective partners and
interacting to construct new understandings were by no means
doomed to succeed. As Snyder and Diesing point out, the
significance of each move and counter-move in a negotiation
2
rests on how it is interpreted, not on how it is intended,
with each party filtering its interpretations through
preconceived images of others. As in the EC negotiations,
actors may begin with several interpretations of their
bargaining partners, but, as they aim for certainty, some
point will normally be reached at which a particular image
becomes salient and hard to shift, as it becomes the focus
for selecting and interpreting all further information.
Successful convergence thus requires that there is no point
during the negotiation at which negative interpretative
frameworks become salient amongst sufficient government or
domestic interests to block the success of the talks,
bearing in mind that blocking combinations may be
transnational and mutually antipathetic. However, at least
three points of possible diffraction into negative dynamics
T1 French Embassy Press Release, 24 June 1971, RIIA Press 
Lib.
2. Snyder and Diesing, op cit, P 284.
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revealed themselves during the negotiations: i) actors were
susceptible to " mirror" any adverse perceptions they had of 
each other: ii) there were potentially fatal discontinuities 
in the mutual consciousness of actors. iii) when anxieties 
gained the upper hand, the incentives and pressures for 
entry/enlargement tended to be re-interpreted as being less 
urgent than had previously seemed to be the case:
i )Negative spirals in negotiations. Both British and French
actors began with some fairly robust negative images. There
was a danger that these could feed - or, as cognitive
1
theorists put it, "mirror" - each other. Anglo/French 
concerns were so structured that it was hard for one side to 
find reassurance without aggravating the anxieties of the 
other; indeed, the two governments tended to devise mutually 
exclusive tests of the other's intentions , while adverse 
perceptions easily became self-fulfilling prophecies by 
provoking the very behaviour that was feared to represent 
the true character of the other side.
Moves that many in Britain regarded as confirming evidence 
that France was determined to extract a "ransom" for 
Britain's late entry were, in fact, part of a restless 
anxiety to remove all possibility of a British challenge to 
the "acquis", a problem which was aggravated by the very 
unanswerability of De Gaulle's claim in 1967 that, whatever 
their intentions at the time of negotiations, British
1. See above P 26.
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Governments would eventually be constrained to challenge the
Community. The French Government pushed for an initial
commitment to a high start point for British contributions
for fear that if Britain was faced by large jumps in
subventions towards the end of the transition period it
would use these as an excuse for not completing the
1
adoption of the budgetary mechanism. Jean-Francois Deniau, 
the Commissioner in charge of the negotiations, concurred 
that there was also a risk in allowing Britain a review 
clause: " Britain would nod in the direction of the system
when entering, it would have 8 years to implementjin full 
and even then it would invoke any review clause"
The French also attempted to deny Britain full voting rights
in the CAP until 1978 for fear that Britain could compel its
atrophy by blocking future decisions needed to "service" the 
3
policy: a possibility that was all too evident to the French 
Government after its own attempt to force changes on the EC 
by boycotting its decision-making between 1965 and 1966. 
However, to many in Britain this move only nourished the 
fear that the UK would have to pay a price of continuing 
inferiority for its late entry to the EC. Rippon angrily 
replied that it would be absurd for Britain to be a net 
contributor between 1973 and 1978, while enjoying inferior 
voting rights to countries that would benefit from its 
Ï1 Interview with Maurice Schumann, The Times, 18 Feb 1971.
2. The Times, 2 Feb 1971.
3. The Daily Telegraph, 15 March 1971.
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1
subventions.
For their part, British negotiators responded to predictions
that France would press for a high start-point for British
subventions by opening the bidding with a suggestion that
the UK should only contribute 3% of the total EC budget in
the first year. The Treasury, which was worried about any
figure higher than 5%, felt that a dramatic move had to be
made to shatter EC misperceptions that Britain could pay
2
very much at all in the first years of membership. But such 
a move could only be made at the cost of provoking concern 
even amongst the Five that Britain was seeking a " risk­
free" approach to EC membership that demonstrated a lack of 
3
commitment. As for French actors, many felt that they now 
had all the more reason to stick to the interpretation that 
Britain was attempting to question the "acquis" while 
pretending to acknowledge it. The real difficulties that 
confronted the UK were "screened out" or reinterpreted in a 
fashion that seemed peculiarly insensitive to those British 
actors who were looking for any indication of EC 
understanding of Britain's predicament. French Agriculture 
Minister, Jacques Duhamel, argued that adoption of the 
"acquis" would be only a minor problem as Britain would only 
be adding a further 3% to the 22% inflation that it had
1. The Times, 1 February 1971.
2 The Times, 3 February 1971.
3. The Times, 10 March 1971.
203
experienced in the last three years. Schumann hinted that
Britain only needed to devalue prior to entry to get rid of
costs to its balance of payments , ignoring the fact that
1
this would still divert resources from domestic consumption.
As it seemed so obvious to many in Britain that the Six
would benefit from Britain’s net contributions but damage
their own economies by insisting on terms that were too
onerous, tough EC negotiating positions were easily taken as
implying darker purposes. Indeed, several perceptions that
were common amongst Britain and the Six fit the prediction
of cognitive theory that actors often see the moves of
others as more deliberate and directed at themselves than
they really are, while failing to understand how far their
interlocutors’ bargaining positions reflect genuine
2
difficulties inherent in their situation. Such a pattern 
will complicate convergence in any negotiation.
ii) Gaps in mutual consciousness and miscalculation. 
Steinbruner has argued that one of the strengths of using an 
information flow framework for analysing transactions is 
that it is possible to pick up points at which outcomes are 
affected by " fatal discontinuities" in the knowledge of 
actors. Governments may a) make moves without awareness of 
how they will feed into the perceptual dynamics of 
negotiating partners b) they may pay insufficient attention
1. The New York Timesl 7 March 1971.
2. See above P 27.
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to cognitive dynamics in the wider bureaucratic and domestic 
politics of interlocutor countries c) they may find 
themselves having to respond to pressures from domestic 
constituencies that are even less aware of how malapropos 
their demands are in relation to foreign perceptions.
These risks are increased by the way decision-makers often 
deal with problems one at a time, in the haphazard order in 
which they become urgent and with a simplified and highly 
selective view of the variables, rather than a synoptic 
understanding of all the possible spill-over effects from 
today's solution to tomorrow's problem. However, what starts 
as x's ignorance of the perceptions of y, or a temporary 
failure to take them into account, may produce a whole 
bargaining history of its own; y may change his subsequent 
appraisals of x, perhaps in the direction of a stubborn 
image that is impervious to rebutting evidence. Unintended, 
negative cognitive dynamics are not always open to 
subsequent diplomatic correction as efforts to undo the 
damage will have to be interpreted through perceptions that 
have changed in the meantime.
These risks can be illustrated by taking a closer look at 
the consequences of the Hague summit. As the Six were 
preoccupied with the problem of reaching an agreement 
between themselves, they may have paid insufficient regard 
to how the formula of " completion, deepening and 
enlargement" would spill into British perceptions. It has
205
been seen that the deterioration in British public opinion
can be precisely dated from February 1970; by January 1971,
the British Government was negotiating against a background
of only 16% support for entry, a factor that was, in turn,
1
spilling back into EC anxieties about the new partner.
The Luxembourg compromise of 1966 had been of great
importance in easing the House of Commons into an impressive
show of bipartisan support for British entry; it had allowed
the EC to be presented as a strictly limited relationship,
which would offer expanded markets, expanded international
influence and national vetoes over all EC decisions.
However, the Hague decision to proceed with a monetary union
resuscitated the argument that the moment of entry offered
the last realistic opportunity to decide against a process
2
of inexorable European integration.
Proposals for EMU also sharpened worries about the economic 
costs of British entry. The principal lesson of British 
economic policy before devaluation in 1967 was seen to be 
that fixed currencies only locked countries like Britain 
into cumulative uncompetitiveness: countries with intense
"sociological" wage pressures and which attempted to imitate 
the most advanced global consumption habits without the 
matching productivity needed to be able to change their 
exchange rates, if they were both to balance their external
1. The Times, 4 March 1971. — —
2. Speech by Peter Shore, December 1970, RIIA Press Lib.
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account and keep full employment. A typical objection to the 
notion that pressures for currency change could be willed 
away by political fiat was as follows:
( correct parities) " are deeply rooted in inter­
relationships in respective economic systems, that are even 
beyond medium-term policy manipulation.. to attempt to fix 
the currency of an area poorly endowed with capital, with a 
poor ratio between skilled and unskilled labour, whose 
workers would strive for similar wage and consumption habits 
to continental peer groups would only result in 
unemployment" 1.
Indeed, the Six's decision to proceed with a Monetary Union
presented Britain with a problem of integrating all the
strands of its external dealings with a successful entry
negotiation to the EC. An early pitfall was presented when
the Treasury responded favourably to a US proposal to widen
bands of currency fluctuation from 1% to 3% , probably
without anticipating that the French would interpret this as
evidence that Britain, Germany and the Netherlands would
align to keep the development of the EC in line with US
preferences. Schumann thus responded with a statement that
Britain would have to drop its candidature if it continued
2
to support a widening of currency bands.
Finally, the Hague made it more difficult for the UK 
Government to hold to an approach geared to shattering 
perceptions of a concealed British intention to challenge 
the "acquis". Cognitive theory predicts that if one party 
ÏT Professor Ivor Pearce, The Times, 18 January 1971.
2. The New York Times, 11 July 1971.
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has a well-anchored, adverse perception of the "concealed" 
motives of another, only an unequivocal reassurance will 
shatter this. There is, therefore, a tension between the
dramatic moves that are often needed to make a negotiation
work and the incremental approach that governments may have 
to take for reasons of domestic and bureaucratic politics.
Domestic reactions to the Hague forced the British
Government into a tough negotiation of the transitional 
terms, rekindling French perceptions that, behind the 
rhetoric, there had only been an incremental change in 
Britain’s earlier hostility to Community arrangements. The 
Hague thus undid some of the impact of Britain’s simple, 
unequivocal acceptance of the "acquis" in 1967.
To a degree, the combination of the Hague decision to go
ahead with automatic financing for the CAP and the
publication of the consequential costs to Britain in the
1970 White Paper can be seen as efforts by the British and
French Governments to "entrench" their positions prior to
negotiations: deliberately to put themselves in a position
in which it would be impossible to make concessions to the 
1
other’s viewpoint. However, entrenchment by two parties is 
a common reason why negotiations fail when they could have 
succeeded. Entrenchment changes the costs of making 
concessions. These are no longer limited to the merits of 
the case, but may widen to include a) domestic loss of face 
and b) a reduction in the ability of a government to make
1. See above P 172.
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credible threats in future negotiations. In extremis, the 
desire to be perceived as the "winner" becomes superordinate 
to arranging the best details for a settlement.
iii)Re-interpreting major interests in the light of minor
difficulties. The idea that the negotiations were doomed to
succeed often rested on the distinction between the so-
called "high politics" of overall national positioning in
the international field and the "low politics" of technical
1
modalities and specific interests. Surely bargaining about 
"low politics" would not be allowed to affect judgements of 
"high political" interest in entry/enlargement ? The above 
answer to this point was that Governments were not always 
certain what their interests in " high politics" were, so 
they used the talks on "low politics" to test alternative 
hypotheses of how prospective partners would behave in the 
new relationship. It will now be claimed that even where 
Governments had fairly firm views on what they should do in 
response to " high politics", these were open to 
redefinition when difficulties arose on specific negotiating 
points. It will be recalled from the theory of cognitive 
consistency, that actors will want to end up in an 
unambiguous situation without cross pressures and with most 
of their values either pointing to the acceptance or refusal 
of a decision; where their perceptions point in different 
directions, they will restructure them to eliminate "
1. William Wallace, op cit~ 1975, PP 11-3.
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dissonances". However, there were perfectly good reasons why 
anxieties about "low politics" had a potential to redefine 
perceptions of overall national interest and not the other 
way round.
First, what cognitivists call " affect" shows how actors can
allow their feelings and moral commitments to change their
1
assessments of what is rational. On the British side, the
negotiations roused powerful emotions in at least four
areas. Copious press comment reveals the outrage at what
Wilson called " paying the housekeeping bills of Europe" or
Powell referred to as " helping the Governments of Europe to
2
spread the load of buying peasant votes". Several M.P's made
it known that they could not vote for entry unless
satisfactory arrangements were found for Commonwealth sugar
producers, who faced losses of up to 90% of export earnings
and 40% of employment on British entry to the EC ; Rippon
considered it essential to gain the producers’ endorsement
and returned to the negotiations to ask for improved terms
3
when this looked uncertain. New Zealand also emerged as a 
matter of conscience. The "kith and kin" argument was 
underlined by a strong sense of obligation for wartime 
contributions. Former Conservative Minister, Duncan Sandys, 
phoned Pompidou to warn him that he must take his decision 
on New Zealand in the knowledge that several Conservatives
1. See above PP 21 .
2. The Sunday Telegraph, 17 January 1971.
3. Kitzinger, op cit, 1973, PP 128-36.
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would vote against any solution they considered 
1
dishonourable . New Zealand's Deputy Prime Minister, John
Marshall, decamped in London and Brussels during the final
stages of the negotiations. Royle recalls that " he knew he
had a constituency and made the most of it, stirring up
2
Conservative M.P's through backbench committees". He too was
able to insist that Rippon should return to the negotiations
after the British team considered it had obtained a good
settlement. Finally, although not formally part of the
negotiations, 21 Conservative seats were exposed to the
3
discussion of a Fishing Policy with the Six.
Second, actors can allow their interpretations of long-term 
interests to be coloured by what cognitive theorists call an 
"evoked set" of transient preoccupations. Assessments are 
distorted by a shortening of time frames, a narrowing of 
issues in terms of which costs and benefits are judged and a 
psychological resistance to moves that involve immediate 
inconvenience. The immediate contexts of British politics 
were not propitious to bargaining about the assumption of 
the static costs of EC entry. Just as many looked forward 
to the resumption of growth after three years of economic 
pain to cure an external deficit, the EC seemed to threaten 
to plunge Britain back into the red by 
Interview with Edward Heath, December 1988.
2. Interview with Anthony Royle, January 1989.
3. " European Trends", The Economist Intelligence Unit,
May 1971, P 30.
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asking it to make net contributions to its budget. British 
consumers felt that EC entry would put them back on a tread-
XH
mill. The analysis of polling data on page will show
that a majority of the British public accepted the argument
that EC entry would leave them better off in ten years time.
However, overall approval ratings were correlated not with
long-range optimism but with perceptions that the immediate
effect of membership would be to interrupt any improvement
1
in living standards.
Third, it was often belief in Britain's overall interest in 
EC entry that was abandoned when adjustment costs were 
predicted as the former were ambiguous, contested and long­
term in contrast to the certainty, concreteness and 
immediacy of the latter. Because decision-makers tend to 
"satisfice", baulking at a decision if it causes excessive 
problems in terms of one variable, cognitivists predict that 
they easily slip into inertia: the belief that a move that
is generally considered necessary can always be postponed 
until it becomes less problematic. Grounds can often be 
found for believing that bargaining partners will prove more 
flexible, or even come round to one's own point of view, with 
time and that muddling through will do in the interim. In 
1966, the then Cabinet Secretary, Lord Trend, advised the
government that Britain should "stand on the threshold and
Z
wait" if negotiations failed at first.
1. Kitzinger, op cit  ^ 1973, PP 353-4.
2. Ponting, op cit, P 211.
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Accounts of opinions in the outgoing Labour cabinet of 1970
reveal how easy it was to slip into the argument that there
was no immediate necessity for entry. Crossman recalls that:
" Wilson and Stewart are ardent Marketeers now, more than 
Jenkins, who as Chancellor, sees the real difficulties and 
is certainly prepared to postpone" 1.
Both Defence Secretary, Dennis Healey, and Technology
Minister, Tony Benn, had, at various stages, advanced
arguments for entry. However, Healey's response to the 1970
White Paper was to point out that EC entry might not be an
urgent need if it confronted Britain with difficulties;
other EFTA members had grown as fast as the Six without
being members of the EC and the " political benefits should
not be exaggerated", as Europe would be compelled to include
Britain in some closer defence and foreign policy
2
collaboration whatever happened. Similarly, Benn's reaction
to the Soames affair was that:
" Britain should be relaxed about its European relations.. 
we had NATO and technlogical relations.. good relations with 
EFTA, developing trade and industrial links with the Six". 3
Others believed that Britain could use its improved balance
of payments to resume a higher rate of growth, rather than
pay an entry fee to the EC. It could achieve the same effect
as dismantling tariffs with the Six by devaluing the pound.
The Six would be forced to reform the CAP themselves without
Britain's net contributions to save the policy from
mounting costs and without the addition of one of the
1. Crossman, op cit, P 710.
2. Castle, op cit P 759.
3. Benn, pp cit, P 150.
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world’s largest food importers to save it from an incipient 
crisis of over-production.
In fact, even Heath's initial rhetoric suggested that
Britain could delay entry if need be. Moreover, this seems
to have been more than a case of not going into negotiations
without sending signals to other Governments that one has
alternative options. In February 1972, he confessed that
there had been a few months after June 1970 when he had
1
considered Britain's problems easily reversible. Indeed, at
a press conference in December 1970, he had suggested that
the decline of British international influence since 1964
was not endemic, but the product of the mishandling of
2
foreign policy by the Labour Government. The extent to which 
members of Heath's Cabinet might have wanted to delay in the 
event of problem^ic terms was never fully tested, but 
evidence has been presented of their openness to doubt.
British official opinion also showed greater propensity to 
fluctuating judgement than was obvious from public 
statements. In 1960, the Treasury had taken the lead in 
proposing entry. By 1966, Permanent Secretary, Sir William 
Armstrong, gave a presentation to a cabinet seminar, in 
which he judged that entry was no longer feasible without 
several years devoted to turning round Britain's economy;
1. Hansard, Col 751, 17 February 1972.
2. Watt and Mayall, op cit, 1971, P 762.
3. See above PP 166-7 & 195.
214
otherwise, no transitional measures could stem a capital
1
outflow in anticipation of entry. Lord Greenhill recalls
that by Heath's time, the new Permanent Secretary, Sir
Douglas Allen, was a " lukewarm European who felt that
British industry was so uncompetitive it would not know what 
2
had hit it" . Allen himself admits that he did not ” see eye
3
to eye with Heath on all the virtues of EC entry", In the
mid 1960's, the Ministry of Technology had similarly been
enthusiastic for entry and its use to create a new "
technological community". By 1969, Permanent Secretary Sir
Otto Clarke felt that " The Balance of Payments problems
were too great" and it was necessary to look again at the 
4
US/UK link.
Cognitive theory illuminates many features of the eventual 
convergence, as well as revealing how divergence might have
occurred along the way. Five factors promoted favourable
cognitive dynamics: the effects on perceptions of i)
i) ensnaring processes: ii ) skillful negotiating: iii)
fortuitous developments: iv) deadlines and v) room for
ambiguity in any settlement.
The converse of negotiations degenerating into a competition 
Ï1 Crossman, op cit, PP 259-60.
2. Interview with Lord Greenhill, January 1989.
3. Interview with Sir Douglas Allen, "The Seventies".
4. Benn, op cit, P 194.
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to emerge as the perceived winner is that interlocutors may
up-grade their perceptions of pay-offs and screen out
problems as they become increasingly committed to the
success of the talks. They become psychologically involved
in a process and reluctant that it should miscarry after a
sunk investment of time, resources and personal political 
1
credibility. So long as the negotiations did not slip 
irredeemably into any of the above negative dynamics, they 
may have become increasingly resistant to the dangers of 
breakdown.
The idea that it would be possible to establish the terms on
which British entry might occur and only then make an
evaluation had always been something of a myth; it ignored
the extent to which politicians initiate processes which
overtake their perceived freedom of decision. By October
1971, Home was telling the House of Commons that "if we were
to reject the invitation to join now, we must ask ourselves
how our reputation for reliable dealing would be looked upon
in Europe and the world; with what authority would any
2
Government negotiate overseas ?" Up to February 1971, press
analysis of public perceptions was that Heath had preserved
sufficient distance from the negotiations for the Government
3
to retain the option of refusing terms. However, there were
1. Edmead, " Changes in Perception during the Course of 
Conflict" in Jonsen, op cit, PP 158-75.
1. Hansard, 20 October 1971, Col 914.
2. The Observer, 31 January 1971.
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signs of waning enthusiasm for British membership in Germany
in particular as British public support fell below 20%, a
wave of strikes was taken to be suggestive of poor
adaptation to modern industrial culture and the collapse of
Rolls Royce highlighted Britain's precarious international
competitiveness. It seemed that Britain might become
1
politically obstructive and economically dependent. To 
sustain the confidence of its supporters amongst the Six, 
the British Government decided by mid February 1971 to risk 
its own governing credibility by abandoning non-committal 
rhetoric for a full-blooded campaign of public persuasion to 
present EC entry as necessary to Britain's international
influence and economic future. By the summer, press comment
held that the EC was both the Government ' s principal foreign 
and domestic policy; it could not allow entry to fail.
Pompidou had also attempted to retain his manoeuvre.
Nevertheless, by spring 1971, Pompidou's position is well
summed up by the advice he took from Jobert:
" If it is in our interest to have a European crisis and if
you are able to cope with it in terms of the domestic
programme, then you must discourage Soames" 2.
In theory, France had only committed itself to open
negotiations in exchange for the automatic CAP financing
mechanism. However, the greater the efforts invested in the
talks , the more the Five considered France to be bound in
1. The Times, 4 March 1971, covers opinions expressed in 
Frankfurther Rudschau and Stuttgarter Zeitung.
2. Jobert, op cit, P 183.
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good faith to reciprocate for automatic financing with 
enlargement. By April 1971 Dutch Foreign Minister, Joseph
Luns, warned Pompidou that, whatever the eventual decision
on enlargement, it was important that the Six should agree 
that it had been justly arrived at, otherwise European co­
operation would whither in an atmosphere of sullen 
1
discontent.
Pompidou also had a personal reason for avoiding EC crises.
On the retirement of De Gaulle, it was unclear whether
concentration of French political authority in the
Presidency was unique to De Gaulle or a structural feature
of the constitution of the Fifth Republic. Pompidou expected
the Assembly and his ministers to make a bid for a more
2
extensive role in policy. However, the collapse of De 
Gaulle's global diplomacy meant that Pompidou had to look to 
a creative EC policy if he was to use his international 
standing to shore up his domestic position. A primary
advantage to Heath of switching the real denouement of entry 
talks from Brussels to Paris was that Pompidou became more 
implicated in any failure, while being offered the 
opportunity to present British entry as a specifically 
French, and Presidential, act of statecraft. Indeed, one 
that would put Pompidou at the culmination of a far-sighted 
Gaullist policy to exclude Britain from the EC until it had 
adjusted its foreign policy assumptions to the ways of the
1. Guardian, 2 April 1971.
2. Roussel, og cit, PP 343-50.
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Community.
In spite of above failures to understand how moves might
feed into the perceptual dynamics of negotiating partners,
there were many important instances of skilled handling,
implying, in some cases, a grasp of the importance of
perceptions and processes in a context of ambiguity. Heath’s
1
decision, against Foreign Office advice, to approach entry 
through a bilateral relationship with France, turned out 
well. While not losing the willingness of the Five to 
support Britain’s negotiating positions on their own 
initiative. Heath’s whole approach to the negotiations 
played skillfully to France’s main incentive for British 
entry: confidence in the possiblity of Anglo-French co­
operation as a counter-balance to Germany was restored, 
despite years of antipathy and a pervasive perception that 
reflexes of co-operation between officials in London and 
Paris would need much time to catch up with those between 
Paris and Bonn, or even Bonn and London.
Likewise, the Five chose their linkage well in establishing 
a relationship between automatic financing of the CAP and 
enlargement. Any hitch in the implementation of the former 
could have caused serious problems for the CAP with the 
result that French agricultural interests faced the same 
risks with or without enlargement. Indeed, the Five showed 
flexibility in allowing the benefits of entry to be 
IT , Interview with Lord Greenhill, January 1989.
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concentrated on France, as they knew that was where it could
meet its principal resistance. The British Treasury
calculated that if Britain contributed an extra 750 million
units net to the budget, the French Government would save
1
735 million units. At one point, the German and Italian
Foreign Ministers were so eager to reconcile British and
French positions that they suggested London should be loaned
the funds to allow France to benefit from a quick phasing in
2
of British contributions to the budget. The central 
compromise in the settlement of a low starting point for 
Britain's budgetary contributions in exchange for immediate 
adoption of Community preference in candidate countries was 
peculiarly geared to French circumstances, as French 
agriculture was closest to over-production.
However, fortuitous developments also had a favourable 
impact on the evolution of perceptions. As the CAP worked by 
making up the difference between market prices and " support 
prices", a jump in world food prices during 1971 had two 
important effects; it decreased the extra costs to Britain 
of switching from buying in the cheapest world markets to 
importing food from Europe; it cut the costs of the CAP to 
the benefit of those who expected to be net contributors 
T1 Documentation Française, NED 3882-3, op cit. Chapter 2.
2. The Guardian, 13 February 1971.
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under the EC budget. The result of this was that, when the
final terms came to be considered in British bureaucratic
and domestic politics, it was against the background of what
were to prove the most favourable projections during the
whole of the 1970’s for the final costs of British
1
membership.
It was seen above how the linkage between deepening and 
enlargement had had uneasy implications for the likely 
success of the negotiations. However, from the end of 1970 
the overall equation improved markedly. Where Pompidou had 
partly sought monetary union to ensure that British entry 
did not prevent the EC from acting as a bloc in 
international economic affairs, he now sought enlargement to 
protect France from unwanted forms of monetary union.
Haig Simonian argues that Pompidou " began a rearguard
action against the Werner Report" ( November 1970), which 
implied an eventually supranational monetary union. However, 
Germany favoured the Werner approach and the possibility
that it could dictate the terms of a monetary union to an EC 
of the Six was raised just before the Paris summit in May 
1971 when Brandt decided to allow the mark to float 
upwards. Not only was this the decision that caused least 
trouble to the US and most to France, it was also the move
most likely to turn the EC into a Deutschmark zone; to 
protect their own parities against a rising mark, other
members of the EC would have to shadow German monetary
Ï1 Sam Brittan, The Financial Times, 24 June 1971.
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policy. As Simonian concludes, Pompidou reacted by
1
accelerating rapprochement with London".
While British antis were even more determined to associate 
monetary union with loss of sovereignty after Werner, the 
bargaining between France and Germany proceeded in a way 
that allowed the Heath Government to sway the undecided 
centre of its own party with the arguments that i) there was 
clearly going to be some European monetary initiative, and 
ii ) it would be better for Britain to participate in 
defining the terms; an Anglo/French alignment could restrain 
the supranationalists , while an Anglo/German alignment 
could prevent a closed form of monetary integration at the 
expense of non EC countries.
Brecher shows that, once a basic dispositon to settle has
taken root, the urgency of deadlines can often aid the
2
final adjustments in actor perceptions needed for agreement. 
Under such conditions, actors take a progressively simpler 
view of the problems under discussion, allowing anxieties 
that previously dominated their thinking to slip from focus. 
The goal of reaching some solution within the time alloted 
becomes superordinate. A key development in the convergence 
between British and EC Governments may, therefore, have been 
Heath's success in convincing the latter that unless a 
solution was reached by June 1971 the negotiations could
1. Simonian, op cit, PP 90 & 105.
2. Brecher, op cit, PP 551-2.
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fail not on substance, but through a "misjudgement of 
1
timing". If Britain was to enter by January 1973, 
legislation would have to be prepared for early in the 
1971-2 parliamentary session. Postponement until the 1972-3 
session would not only put entry back until 1974, but could 
lead to failure altogether. The position of the Labour pros 
was deteriorating and their ability to vote with the 
Government would only decline further in the second half of 
a parliament torn by domestic controversy over unemployment, 
inflation, strikes and trade union law. The lesson of the 
1961-3 negotiations seemed to be that there were also limits 
to the time that the Conservative parliamentary party was 
prepared to exist under the psychological strain of a 
foreign policy negotiation about which it was itself 
divided.
The role of deadlines in producing solutions that the 
protagonists may well have previously thought unsatisfactory 
can be seen in conjunction with the point that convergence 
will be aided where i) some issues can be settled by 
solutions that are "cognitively suggestive" to all parties 
and ii ) the remainder leave room for everyone to be 
satisfied with ambiguity. Schelling argues that parties to a 
negotiation rarely find it easy to break out of their 
separate interpretations of what is a correct solution. It 
is, therefore, almost with relief that they find "focal
1. The Guardian, 10 April 1971.
2. Schelling, op cit P 57.,
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points" in the environment that can " settle the argument". 
Thus Heath and Pompidou agreed that Britain’s initial 
contribution should be in the region of the Commission’s 
estimate of the 7% of the budget needed to pay the costs of 
Britain’s admission. Similarly, the discussions on sugar 
always seemed to return to the happy coincidence that the 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement and the Yaounde agreement were 
both due for renewal in 1974.
Otherwise, there were few points that were decisively
settled, although, as late as April 1971, the French Prime
Minister had spoke of " dangers of allowing ambiguities to
persist as the political and economic map of Europe is 
1
redrawn". Most of the terms were, in reality, postponements, 
or agreements on which the British and French Governments 
had some scope to place different interpretations. The 
Guardian commented as follows:
" it had been expected that the conclusion of the 
negotiation would introduce more calculability, but, as the 
first terms emerge, it becomes apparent that it is still 
down to trusting one’s prospective partners". 2.
At first sight, the French Government obtained the equal 
transition periods that it had considered necessary to meet 
the Harmel principles: if Britain wanted industrial free
trade within five years, it could only expect concessions on 
the budget. New Zealand etc of the same duration. But,
1. The Guardian, 21 April 1971.
2. The Guardian, 14 May 1971.
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although Britain accepted that it could be formally liable 
to the full budgetary contributions after five years, it was 
able to represent the terms at home as affording seven years 
of protection, as a corrective mechanism would apply for a 
further two years against contributions increasing too
quickly. Also on the budget, the French Government could 
claim success in avoiding a formal review clause, but the
British noted that they had read a statement into the
negotiating record without objection from the Six to the
effect that " unacceptable situations would be corrected, 
should they arise". Although both industrial free trade and 
agricultural protection would be complete by the end of five 
years, Britain was able to claim a success in the key aim of 
phasing in dynamic industrial opportunities before static 
agricultural costs by "front-loading" tariff disarmament 
towards the beginning of the transition period.
The Six only received a statement of intent from Britain on 
the liquidation of the pound balances. Although Pompidou was 
given more concrete assurances by Heath, even these were 
qualified by the need for successful talks with several 
other parties. Where the French Government was able to claim 
that Commonwealth sugar and New Zealand Dairy producers 
would have no assured rights of access to the EC beyond 1974 
and 1977 respectively, the British Government argued that it 
had firm understandings that concessions to New Zealand 
would be continued so long as world markets inhibiited 
diversification away from exports to Britain, while the
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sugar producers would be taken care of under the Community 
arrangement of their choice. A concession to ground-nut 
producers in the Francophone zone was deftly included in the 
settlement so that the British Government would be able to 
show Parliament that it had some means of retaliation if 
Commonwealth producers were inadequately protected.
Before concluding, it is useful to ask whether the Heath
Government could have better adapted Britain's interests to
membership at the point of entry. Attempts have been made to
claim that later problems of heavy net contributions to the
EC budget derived from a failure to attain sound terms in 
1
1970-1. But such critiques suffer from two flaws. First,
they are conditioned by retrospection. Independent
contemporary judgements put the ” Heath terms" at the better
2
end of expectations. The Treasury commented that problems
could develop by the end of the 1970’s, but it accepted that
this left time to develop new policies that would be
advantageous to Britain and that prospective partners had
understood the need for these in soundings parallel to the 
3
entry talks. The Heath Government could not have predicted 
the recession after 1974, which made it harder to negotiate 
a new distributive pattern in EC policies in time for the 
full application of the budgetary mechanism between 1978 and
1. Martin Holmes, " The Case against Revisionism", 
Contemporary Record, PP 26-7, November 1989.
2. Sam Brittan, The Financial Times, 24 June 1971.
3. Interview with Lord Armstrong, January 1989.
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1980. In this connection, the Wilson renegotiation may have
worsened Britain's position; in exchange for a corrective
mechanism that was unlikely ever to be very helpful, it
1
created a feeling that Britain had had its second chance 
and it dissipated the understandings with partner 
governments on which Heath would have preferred to rely to 
protect Britain from " unacceptable situations".
Secondly, negotiating strategies appropriate to making once-
off deals are very different to those required for entry to
a continuing relationship with an existing association.
Lindberg and Scheingold have shown that the costs of
renegotiating a whole complex of deals make it hard for
2
established groupings to undergo "systems transformation"; 
together with the cognitive analysis above, it would, 
therefore, seem that the Heath Government was correct to 
stick to the position that Britain would only seek to 
negotiate terms of transition to the acquis communautaire 
and not the content of the latter. This also had the 
advantage of keeping Britain within the normative order of 
European co-operation, increasing its own claims to 
reciprocal understanding if EC arrangements should prove 
problematic to its interests and cementing its reputation as 
a reliable partner in a system in which the ability to make 
profitable deals often depends on mutual confidence rather
1. For further evidence on Britain's continuing budgetary 
problem see Swann, op cit, PP 48-9 and 85-8 and Taylor, op 
cit, PP 231-65.
2. Lindberg and Scheingold, op cit, 221-49.
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than centralised enforcement.
* * * * * * *
There was clearly scope for the following parallel processes 
to end up in different places, as a result of the 
negotiations: i) interaction to create new EC policy
structures, ii) adjustment of the intersubjective features 
of the EC to an enlarged partnership, iii) learning about 
the goals and perceptions of actors that would make up the
new EC and iv) discussion of the modes of adaptation to
existing arrangements. To conclude, it is useful to follow 
through the claim that the cognitive/critical approach 
allows the character and not just the fact of foreign policy 
change to be presented as a variable with a brief overview 
of where the 1970-1 negotiations left some of the structures 
and assumptions of European co-operation : how did the
process of British adaptation to the EC change some of the 
very contexts to which British foreign policy was adapting ?
The negotiations for EC enlargement spurred the reappraisal 
of European structures but with varying degrees of
helpfulness. Although the bid for monetary union was partly 
motivated by expectation of British membership, the 
negotiating dynamics involved in UK entry contributed to the 
stalemate that was to afflict EMU until its demise in 1973. 
Consensus was not created around British entry on the basis 
of the Commission's advice that members and applicants 
should attempt to work out a common view on EMU in parallel 
with the negotiations; on the contrary, entry/enlargement
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became more attractive to Britain, France and Germany, 
precisely because it offered greater hopes to each of 
blocking the preferred international monetary policies of 
the others. Paradoxically, US actors were impressed the 
relationship of monetary union to enlargement thus ensuring 
that the birth of the new EC would be complicated by a 
transatlantic context more challenging to European 
integration and its interests in the international economy 
than had been the case in the 1950's.
A happier relationship was, however, established between the 
development of foreign policy co-operation and enlargement. 
The decision to include Britain and the other candidates in 
consultations with the EPC process from November 1970 may 
have been of great importance. Britain was anxious to please 
the Six as the entry negotiations were still in play. The 
results of the first liaison meeting were thus greeted with 
enthusiasm on all sides. On the one hand, added confidence 
that the prospective partners of the enlarged EC could form 
a foreign policy identity contributed to the incentive of 
all to ensure that entry negotiations succeeded. On the 
other hand, EPC got off to a more consensual start, and with 
a clearer reputation for success that was to feed upon 
itself than might have been the case if it had not started 
in the context of the negotiations and of Heath's strategy 
of seeking entry through an Anglo/French bilateral
1. Kissinger, op cit  ^ 1979, P 949-68.
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understanding in particular. From Schumann's visit to London 
in July 1970 onwards, there were several instances of 
Anglo/French attempts to reach similar positions across the 
range of contemporary foreign policy issues.
By contrast, two elements of structural change that might
have been caught up in the politics of entry slipped from
view during the talks. Heath was unable to begin a process
of Anglo-French nuclear co-operation in parallel with the
1
development of the EC. Not only were there formidable
technical difficulties here. Sir Frank Cooper, later
Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, recalls that
the option never got beyond loose discussions between Heath,
Pompidou and Nixon. The M.O.D. was not called upon to make
detailed operational appraisals of options: in spite of his
personal beliefs. Heath was unable to begin the integration
2
of Britain's security planning to its new EC relationship.
Apart from the strictly inter-governmental procedures for 
EPC, the prospective partners of the enlarged EC also made 
little progress towards an agreed view on the further 
institutional development of the Community. It will be seen 
in chapter 7 that even Heath and Pompidou were further apart 
on institutions than the latter believed to be the case at
1. For two contemporary assessments see Andrew Pierre, The 
British Experience with an Independent Nuclear Force, 
Macmillan, London, 1972 and Ian Smart, Future Conditional: 
The Prospect for Anglo-French Nuclear Co-operation, Adelphi 
Papers No 78, IISS, London, 1968
2. Interview with Sir Frank Cooper. March 1989.
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the Paris summit. This was in spite of the Commission's
warning that enlargement and deepening could not occur
without improving institutions that were cumbersome even for
1
the limited membership and functions of the old EC.
Amongst the prospective EC partners themselves, decision­
making theory allows a key question to be asked as to 
whether the negotiations produced intersubjective 
structures and actor learning in a) the rationalistic style 
or b) the cognitive style ? A rationalistic ideal might be 
that parties to a continuing relationship should converge 
after their initial negotiations around intersubjective 
structures that are identically understood and which 
prepare partners for the trade-offs needed to make the new 
grouping work. However, cognitive theory alerts us to the 
possibility of convergence taking place between a series of 
actors all afflicted by conceptual deficiencies. The 
simplification of perceptions under the pressure of 
deadlines, the tendency for actors to reach decisions 
without abandoning their disparate belief systems by 
screening out dissonances, exaggerating consistencies and 
postponing disagreements can leave many conflicting 
assumptions to be resolved after the foreign policy change. 
All of these features have been seen to have been present in 
the case of the negotiation of British entry and chapter 7 
will have to return to the point of whether the talks of 
1970-1 left a serious element of inchoateness at the heart 
of the new relationship between the UK and its EC partners.
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CHAPTER 5: SMALLER FISH TO FRY ? THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL GAME 
AND EC ENTRY.
At first sight, EC entry was pushed through with little
regard for domestic constraint. However, the next two
chapters will continue to apply the combination of critical
and cognitive analysis to show how both the fact and
character of Britain's foreign policy change were closely
conditioned by the domestic politics of 1970-2. British
foreign policy has been conventionally analysed as an elite
1
activity that is well insulated from domestic politics. 
However, this view reflects an excessive concentration on 
formal institutional processes to the exclusion of models of 
the domestic political game and considerations of political 
culture, both of which reveal more subtle cross­
sensitivities with British foreign policy-making.
Jim Bulpitt, British Governments have to develop
their foreign policies as part of a domestic political game
between the parties to attain four related objectives:
projection of a superior air of governing competence,
coherent party management, discovery of a winning electoral
strategy, and the creation of a series of presumptions that
the policies they favour reflect some basic intellectual
soundness without alternatives. By contrast to formal
1. Models of British Foreign Policy-making are surveyed in 
J. Barber, Who Makes British Foreign Policy? , Open 
University, Milton Keynes, 1976. D. Vital, The Making of 
British Foreign Policy, Allen & Unwin, London, 1968. W. 
Wallace, op cit, 1976.
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insitutional analyses, accounts of the political game can
present domestic politics as a highly absorbing context for
UK foreign policy makers. The complete exclusion of losing
parties from influence, the high probability that power may
change hands on the swing of a few votes and a tradition of
adversary politics, under which parties are expected to
1
oppose positions adopted by each other, all combine to give
British domestic politics a frenetic quality, in which they
are said to resemble a continuous election campaign. Parties
have to worry about the impact of their handling of each
issue, even where the effects on public perceptions are
indirect and do not arise from any public interest in the
issue itself; for example, a foreign policy may affect
perceptions of party unity or consumer feelings of material 
2
security.
The principal assumptions that politicians themselves made
about the political game in the early 1970 ' s might be
summarised as follows. First, Wilson had highlighted the
importance, in Britain's apparently non-ideological
politics, of being perceived as the competent party of
Government. Conservatives feared and Labour hoped that the
mantle was currently in the process of being passed between
Nevil Johnson, In Search of the Constitution: Reflections 
on State and Society in Britain, Methuen, London, 1977, PP 
63-80.
2. Jim Bulpitt, " Rational Politicians and Conservative 
Statecraft in the Open Polity" in Peter Byrd (ed), British 
Foreign Policy Under Thatcher, St Martin's Press, London, 
1988, PP 180-203.
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1
their two parties. Second, parties were increasingly exposed
to electoral swings as more voters were "choosing" a party
with each new election, instead of relying on habitual
2
voting or traditional allegiances. Third, when voters made a
"choice", they cared about the outlook for personal living
standards more than anything else and their perceptions of
this were formed by extrapolating recent trends into the 
3
future. Fourth, it was believed that parties were severely
punished for disunity. Fifth, it was understood that
mistakes had enduring effects on party fortunes as the
political happenings of formative years had a continuing
4
influence on the voting habits of " generational cohorts".
It will now be claimed that at each level of British 
domestic politics - parties, parliament, interest groups and 
public opinion- the dynamics of the domestic political game 
shaped individual political positions and the ways in which 
the Heath Government and other actors grounded the new 
relationship in domestic assumptions. Chapter 6 will go on 
to examine how, in combination with features of Britain's 
political culture, the position of the domestic political 
game at " the end of play" in 1972 made certain trajectories 
in UK/EC development more probable than others. 
Ï1 Rhodes-James, op cit  ^ P 95.
2. See above P 64.
3. Butler and Stokes, op cit, 1969, P 434.
4. Rhodes James, op cit, P 90.
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1. The Conservative Party.
British Government is party Government. Since the war, the 
Conservative and Labour Parties had enjoyed a duopoly of the 
legislature and an alternating monopoly of the executive. 
The dynamics of intra and inter-party competition help to 
determine the ways in which an issue of foreign policy is 
perceived, the sustainability of its political base and even 
those aspects of the issue that reach the political agenda 
at all.
If the Conservatives were seen in 1970 as the pro-European
party, this was largely due to Heath's deep personal
commitment. In the 1964 election. Home had indulged the mood
1
of faint relief that EC entry was not " an issue". When
Heath became leader in 1965, he decided on a complete review
of party policy, with the exception of the commitment to
enter the EC, which was placed off-limits. 29 party groups
were established to research options for a Conservative
2
Government, but none of them covered European policy. In the 
1967 parliamentary debate on the Labour Government's 
application to the EC, Heath was personally responsible for 
imposing the first opposition three line whip in history in 
support of a Government motion since 1945.
1. D.E Butler and Anthony King, The British General Election 
of 1964, Macmillan, London, 1965, P 132.
2. Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky, op cit, 1971, P 67.
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But in reality. Heath presided over a party that was deeply
ambivalent about EC entry. In February 1971, the whips
calculated that 194 Conservative M.P's were in favour, but
71 were doubtful and 62 against. Both pros and antis felt
1
the constituency parties to be hostile until mid 1971.
Rather unusually for newly-elected Conservative M.P’s, 18 of
the new intake of 82 signed an "early day" motion calling
for demonstrably un-negotiable terms in the first month of
2
the new parliament. Of 35 motions received for debate at the
1969 Conference, 28 had been opposed to entry. In March
1971, the Conservative Political Centre’s network of
discussion groups approved entry by only 124 to 79 with 10 
4
absentions . Amongst Conservative voters, opponents of entry
outnumbered supporters by a massive 49% in a Gallup poll
5
taken in March 1970.
Conservative opposition reflected most kinds of doubt about 
entry. Some saw the EC as a protectionist combine that 
disturbed the automatically optimising mechanisms of the 
international market; they dismissed the argument that 
interdependence created a need for transnational political 
management of markets, as just threatening to compound the
1. Kitzinger, op cit^ 1973, PP 158 & 188.
2. The Times, 26 July 1970
3. Gamble, op cit, 1974, P 19.
4. The Daily Telegraph, 29 March 1971.
5. Anthony King, Britain Says Yes, American Institute for 
Policy Research, Washington D.C., 1977, P 27.
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muddles of intra state interference in markets with those of
inter-state interference. Others saw the EC as a diversion
from the task of preserving post-imperial attachments
through the Commonwealth. Prior recalls that Heath's
commitment to EC entry would probably have confronted a
serious challenge between 1965 and 1970 had it not been for
1
Home’s role in reassuring the Commonwealth lobby.
However, the dominant concern was with national sovereignty
and identity. Gamble's study of the 1969 Conference
concludes that the party was fundamentally split between
those who saw EC entry as the last opportunity for Britain
to become a modern, successful society and those who
regarded it as the point of no return for the "Conservative 
2
Nation": the latter concept combined ideas of Britain's
proud place in the world with a dislike of outside
influences over its domestic policy-making and, above all,
with a belief that the ultimate value to be conserved was
the national way of life. Hailsham, Lord Chancellor in the
Heath Government, had once argued that being Conservative
was just another way of being English and that one's "
country was the highest of all natural units that command
3
affection". Many Conservatives now found it hard to deal
with a change that would at the least make national identity 
Ï1 Interview with James Priori "The Seventies".
2. Gamble, op ci^, 1974, PP 197-200.
3. Ian Gilmour, Inside Right: a study of Conservatism,
Quartet, London, 1978, P 105.
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more ambiguous ; would Britain now become a provisional 
entity, pending European integration ? Could national pride 
and ambition be meaningfully attached to such an entity ? 
Would integrated markets and European policies substitute 
soulless harmonisation for "national character" ?
To Powell, economic arguments for EC entry were beside the
point: " independence, the freedom of a self-governing
nation, is in my estimation the highest political good, for
which any disadvantage is a cheap price". He argued that
unless policies and laws enjoyed an effortless legitimacy,
government and society would be thrust into a mutually
enervating friction. European publics were prepared to
accept the authority of the EC because consensus had never
formed around their national ins titutions; indeed, they
were accustomed to them being up-rooted and re-designed. By
contrast the sovereignty of Britain’s parliament and the
robust defence of an autonomous national community were in
1
themselves the ideologies of British society. Powell thus 
concluded that Britain would not be a compatible partner for 
the EC states; anyone who valued European integration should 
not want Britain to join. Conservative antis also rejected 
the belief that limited goals of membership could be 
achieved without formal transfers of sovereignty for a view 
of EC membership as cumulatively entangling or nothing. 
Ï1 The Times, 13 February 1971.
238
Powell argued that the ceding of sovereignty would be the
precondition of " everything solid that the EC has to 
1
offer". Edward du Gann, Chairman of the Conservative
backbench 1922 Committee, stated that Britain could not
accept the " derogation of its parliament to the status of a 
2
County Council". Other antis argued that Britain would be
substituting " an illiberal and bureaucratic leviathan,
3
obsessed with harmonisation" , just as the complexities and
insecurities of modern society required methods of
4
government that were close, comprehensible and familiar . In
his broadcast on the success of the negotiations. Heath felt
it necessary to mention that that six of the expected ten
5
members of the EC would have monarchies, as some critics had 
even questioned the continued relevance of the crown in an 
eventually united Europe.
Table 5 shows an analysis of all pro and anti speeches
made over the ten days of debate in the House of Commons in
July and October 1971. Two-thirds of Conservative antis were
concerned about sovereignty. Amongst voters, only 14% of
those generally opposed mentioned sovereignty; but this rose
6
to 75% amongst Conservative identifiers.
1. The Sunday Telegraph ,17 January 1971.
2. Hansard, 20 October 1971, Cols 933-4
3. Hansard, 20 October 1971, Col 942
4.The Times, 7 May 1971/The Sunday Telegraph, 24 April 1971.
5. Heath, Broadcast, 8 July 1971, RIIA Press Library.
6. Gallup, The Daily Telegraph, 18 October 1971.
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TABLE 5 : THEMES MENTIONED BY CATEGORY OVER 10 DAYS DEBATE 
IN HOUSE OF COMMONS, JULY & OCTOBER 1971.
1. CONSERVATIVE PROS
Economic growth. 48.1%
Party political points. 37.5%
Must avoid isolation in world of blocs. 30.7%
Better to change the EC from within. 28.8%
Commonwealth ties would be preserved. 27.9%
No loss of sovereignty on entry. 26.9%
Need for greater British influence in world. 26.0%
European disunity causes wars. 26.0%
Need to strengthen European defence 15.4%
More balanced relationship with US 8.6%
2. CONSERVATIVE ANTIS.
Loss of Sovereignty. 65.8%
Food price rises/attacks on CAP. 34.2%
Importance of global free trade. 23.7%
Damage to Commonwealth. 21.0%
New Zealand betrayed. 13.1%
Sugar Producers betrayed, 13.1%
3. LABOUR PROS.
Higher Economic growth. 50.0%
Improved conditions for Social Democracy. 40.9%
Sovereignty meaningless/interdependence 31.4%
Would help developing world/Commonwealth. 29.5%
Labour would have accepted terms. 29.5%
EC would help peace and detente. 22.7%
Technological collaboration. 18.2%
Control of multinationals. 15.9%
4 LABOUR ANTIS
Balance of payments burden/deflation. 45.4%
Higher food prices/attack CAP. 32.4%
Regional policy constrained in EC. 31.4%
Loss of Sovereignty. 26.9%
Damage to under-developed countries. 26.0%
Low income families would suffer. 25.0%
EC undemocratic/bureaucratic. 22.2%
Dangers of a new superpower/ Eu deterrent. 22.2%
Capitalist club/block to social change. 20.3%
No mandate for entry. 20.3%
New Zealand betrayed. 13.0%
Sugar producers betrayed. 13.0%
METHODOLOGICAL NOTES. The table is based on a survey of 294 
speeches: 104 Conservative pro, 38 Conservative anti, 44
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Labour pro and 108 Labour anti. As there are limits to the 
points that can be mentioned in a ten minute speech and 
M.P’s may divide their labours, it is assumed that any 
theme mentioned by more than around 10% of speakers is 
significant. It is appreciated that there are methodological 
problems; for example, public justifications and true 
motivations may differ. However, a table such as the above 
has clear advantages in establishing patterns of political 
thinking over isolated quotations from Hansard.
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However, it was eventually the Labour party that was to
split most seriously while the Conservatives rallied to
support entry. Although given a free vote in October 1971,
Conservative backbench dissent fell to 39 opposed with 2 
1
abstentions . Moreover, this was largely an irreducible core
of those who were either bitterly opposed to Heath's 
2
leadership or so publicly committed to resist entry as to 
make any change in position embarrassing; 27 had become 
patrons of an anti-group, known as the Safeguards Committee, 
by February 1971. In October 1971, the constituencies swung 
round to give entry an 8:1 majority in the only card vote in 
the history of the party conference. By April 1972, 42% more 
Conservative voters approved than disapproved of entry.
Although many Conservatives acquired a strong intellectual 
belief about the need for entry, many were caught up in a 
triangle of interacting influences that involved them in 
little reflection on the nature of EC membership. First, 
there was Heath's almost reckless determination not to let 
his party off lightly. At every point of possible 
hesitation, he raised the risks that the Conservative Party 
would face from the failure of his European policy. It has 
been seen how he deliberately relinquished his room to 
manoeuvre to abort the negotiations because he preferred to 
shore up the confidence of EC negotiating partners by
1. Philip Norton, Dissension in the House of Commons : 1945- 
74, Macmillan, London, 1971, PP 397-8.
2. Interview with Anthony Royle, January 1989.
242
shifting the campaign of domestic persuasion from presenting
1
entry as desirable to necessary. By the summer, it was felt 
that if entry failed, the Government would have lost both 
its main foreign and economic policies; with diminished 
governing credibility it would drift for the remainder of 
its term, disappointing its constituency amongst those who 
had looked to it as a reforming administration committed to 
the reversal of national decline. Heath was helped by the 
fact that a failed EC negotiation had preceded the last
Conservative fall from power; in party lore, this was a 
parallel to be avoided, as it had contributed to a crisis of 
confidence in Conservative handling of national affairs.
The antis attempted to challenge entry at a meeting of the
1922 Committee in May 1971. It was billed as the most
important meeting since Suez and most of the 22 M.P’s who
spoke had some doubts. The antis attempted to swing
predictions of electoral retribution in their favour with
grim prognostications of 10-15 years of exclusion from
2
Government for the party that took Britain into the EC 
However, just two days later Heath announced that he would 
take personal charge by meeting Pompidou at the Paris 
summit, thus further diminishing the affordability of 
failure for the reputation of the Conservative Party for 
governing competence. But Heath’s most extraordinary gamble
1. Above P 217.
2. European Trends, The Economist Intelligence Unit,
No 27, P 31^ /rf/
243
was when the second reading of the European Communities Act
appeared to be in danger in February 1972. He tolc^Commons
that the cabinet had unanimously agreed that, in the event
of failure, the present parliament " could not realistically 
1
continue" . He thus foreclosed the wishful thinking of some
antis that a new Conservative Government might be formed
2
under a different leader and threatened his party with what
political textbooks consider the ultimate, but unusable
deterrent in the hands of a Prime Minister: that of calling
3
a General Election that his party is unlikely to win.
Heath’s party management was, of course, reinforced by the 
inherent authority of the leadership in the Conservative 
Party. As McKenzie puts it in his key study of British 
political parties:
" The most striking feature of the Conservative Party is the 
enormous power which is concentrated in the hands of the 
leader..he has the sole responsibility for policy" 4.
But even this might have been insufficient if it had not
been for the nature of inter-party competition in British
politics and the need for Conservatives to base their
behaviour in part on whatever was happening in the Labour
Party. Between 1950 and 1970, the contest between the two
main parties had been closely fought with an average winning
1. Hansard, 17 February 1972, Col 752.
2. The Financial Times, 14 October 1971.
3. John P MacKintosh, The British Cabinet, 3rd 
edition,Stevens, London, 1977, P 455.
4. R.T. McKenzie, British Political Parties, Heinemann, 
London, 1967, P 21.
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margin of just 3.1% in general elections. However, the
1
British electoral system operated by the so-called cube law: 
if parties won votes in the proportion A:B this would 
translate into seats in the proportion A^: B"? This meant
not only that power hung on the swing of a very few votes,
but also that with the loss of just a few more, a party
could be in deep electoral trouble; Labour came in 107 seats 
behind the Conservatives when it lost by just 5% in 1959 and 
the Conservatives 110 seats behind Labour when they lost by
7.5% in 1966. If Heath insisted on putting his party on the
wrong side of the EC issue in terms of substantive 
preferences registered in public opinion polls, it became 
all the more important that the Conservatives should handle 
EC entry more effectively in respect of other aspects of the 
political game: that they should emerge more united and with 
greater credibility as a party of government than Labour.
In many ways the inter- party game play took over from
substantive debate. The percentage of Commons speeches that
included some party point scoring rose to 60% amongst
Conservative front-benchers. Norton has analysed the 21
Conservative constituency parties which brought some
pressure on their M.P's. The dominant theme was the need to
preserve the position of the Conservatives in
2
the inter-party competition and not the merits of EC entry.
1. Finer, op cit, P 61.
2. Philip Norton, Conservative Dissidents, Temple Smith, 
London, 1978, P79.
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The sense of Conservative outrage at being left to carry an
unpopular policy as a result of Labour’s perceived
opportunism may have been reflected in polling responses.
Between November 1970 and - 1971, the period coeval
with the breakthrough in negotiations, the lead of
Conservative approvers over disapprovers rose by 19%. But it
increased by 29% between June and September, as it became
1
obvious that Labour would oppose entry. Norton suggests- on
the basis of interview evidence- that Heath might have
reduced backbench dissent over the EC still further if he
had observed certain "conventions" in his party management;
younger members were disappointed by his formation of a
government of only 68 ministers and older members by his
2
contempt for political honours.
Conservatives also warmed to entry as the issue unexpectedly
turned to their advantage. In the first poll after Labour’s
special conference in July 1971, its lead over the
Conservatives narrowed from 11% to 5%; the turnabout damaged
Labour’s credibility more than it won converts from those
opposed to the EC; only 18% thought Wilson to have had a
3
convincing reason to change his position. Butler and
Kavanagh suggest that Labour’s failure to win a single by-
election after July 1971 reflected the extent of the loss of 
credibility it suffered with its splits and about-turns on
1. King, op cit, P 27.
2. Norton, op cit, 1978, P 236.
3. ORC Poll, The Evening Standard, 6th August 1971.
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1
EC entry. By November 1971, 70% saw Labour as disunited and
18% united, against 35% and 49% in the case of the 
2
Conservatives. Conservative Central Office was able to give
Heath the up-beat advice that the negotiating breakthrough
had added to the Government's standing as an Administration
that could obtain results; more than 80% of the public
remembered Labour’s own application and this would devalue
any commitment to take Britain out of the EC; only 2% of
Conservatives would even consider switching their vote
3
because of EC entry. Heath got by because he managed to play
the domestic political game to his advantage. Moreover,
events had shown that it is often the indirect linkages
between foreign and domestic politics that are decisive; in
spite of often being on the wrong side of the substantive
issue, the Heath Government felt by the end of 1971 that it
had negotiated terms that would not affect electoral
fortunes by damaging living standards, while it had solved
the problems of party management and credibility better than
its Labour rivals. However, it will be seen that Heath had
only managed to create a stand-off in the Conservative
Party; he had used its disciplined party management as a
substitute for a bipartisan approach to EC entry, but he had
not yet forged a political base to support his own
preferences for an ambitious European policy.
Ï1 David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General 
Election of February 1974, Macmillan, London, 1974, P 18
2. Gallup series, Vol 105-37, 1970-1, P 200
3. Interview with Edward Heath, December 1988.
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2. The Labour Party
In the Godkin lectures. Heath had expressed a widely held
view that the 1966-70 Parliament would be historically
significant for committing both Labour and Conservative to 
1
entry. Indeed, the Wilson Government had bid for entry with
2
fewer reservations than Macmillan. However, events had
obscured the reality that Labour was probably always divided
between opposition, indifference and enthusiasm. Ten days
after the 1970 election, former Chairman of the
Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), Manny Shinwell, predicted
that Labour would split if the leadership attempted to
support the Government on entry: it had been " the biggest
swindle of the century to suggest that the three parties
3
were united on entry during the election" . Within a month,
4
one in four Labour M.P’s had signed a motion of opposition.
Crossman had noted a preponderance of indifference and even
expedience on the issue while Labour was still in
Government. He judged that only four members of the cabinet
were likely to oppose reasonable terms, but only between
four and seven could be relied upon to resist the temptation
5
to reject terms that carried short-term risk . Kitzinger 
notes the remarkable fact that the outgoing cabinet had not
1. Heath, op cit, 1970 , P3.
2. Kitzinger, op cit, 1973, P 77.
3. The Times, 29 June 1970
4. The Times, 22 July 1970.
5. Crossman, op cit, 1979, P 730.
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discussed the preparation of Britain's negotiating position,
1
although talks were due to open 10 days after the election;
Wilson probably intended to reinforce his authority with an
election victory and then to strengthen the pros in the
Cabinet before proceeding. In the PLP as a whole, one in
three backbenchers had voted against or abstained in May
1967, although the vote was later described as a "nine-line 
2
whip".
The tilt of the Labour Party towards opposition to entry 
after 1970 resulted from a struggle by the leadership to 
deal with inner party dynamics while minimising the damage 
in terms of earlier accounts of the British political game. 
It has already been seen how EC entry offered an unusual 
opportunity to defeat the sitting Government in the House of 
Commons and on a policy that seemed bitterly unpopular. Many 
Labour politicians assessed EC entry in terms of the 
domestic strategy of the sitting government; thus it assumed 
an altogether different significance as it was taken out of 
the hands of a Labour administration and placed in the 
context of what was taken to be an integrated Conservative 
offensive of unemployment, trade union legislation and 
greater exposure to international competition. This package 
was also perceived as intended to weaken the Labour Movement 
and to do so in ways that a future Labour Government would 
be unable to reverse, whatever the level of the their
1. Kitzinger, op cit^ 1973, P 292.
2. Hansard, 22nd July 1971, Col 1872.
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electoral support. Significantly, some Labour politicians
hinted at a deal with the Government to the effect that it
should modify its domestic programme if it expected
1
continued bipartisan support for entry.
Bipartisanship was further poisoned by the perception that
Heath had snatched power, when the polls had promised a
handsome Labour victory, by disingenuous last minute
promises to cut inflation "at a stroke". Harold Lever, a
Treasury Minister in the outgoing Government, recalls the
feeling that Labour had established its credentials as the
responsible party of Government by working hard for six
years to correct a balance of payments problem inherited
from the Conservatives: just as it was ready at last to "
launch on a genuinely Social Democratic programme".. it was
2
" robbed of its natural inheritance". The Labour Chief Whip,
Bob Mellish, made two attempts to persuade the Liberals to
bring down the Government by voting against the Second
3
Reading of the European Communities Bill. When it passed 
only on the strength of Liberal support, there were bitter 
scenes in the House of Commons; Mellish accused the Liberals 
of sustaining a Government with objectionable policies on 
Rhodesia, Unemployment and strikes. The difficulties of 
cross-party support for EC entry in the heated, and often
1. William Rodgers, The Daily Telegraph  ^ 4 February 1971.
2. Interview with Harold Lever, "The Seventies".
3. The Times, 18 February 1972.
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bizarre, domestic climate of the time is well illustrated by
the story of striking miners attempting to break down the
doors of the Palace of Westminster during the debate on the 
1
Second Reading. Leading pro-marketeer. Bill Rodgers, recalls
how difficult it became to vote with the Government after
2
the passing of the Industrial Relations Act. After voting 
for the principle of EC entry. Labour pros, with a few 
critical exceptions, accepted the "Houghton compromise" that 
the Government should be left to find its own majority for 
the enabling legislation.
Some Labour politicians may have miscalculated that opposing
the Heath terms would provide them with a winning electoral
strategy. One deceptive poll suggested that such a step
could enable Labour to increase its lead
3
over the Conservatives from 12% to 22%. Some, like Denis
Healey, calculated that Heath would succeed in taking
Britain into the EC, but that it was better for Labour if
the Conservatives were seen to have exclusive
4
responsibility for an unpopular policy. However, most Labour 
leaders knew that their task would be fundamentally 
defensive: to contain the damage to their position in the
political game from party fragmentation.
1. David Watt, The Financial Times^ 18 February 1972.
2. Interview with William Rodgers, "The Seventies".
3. Gallup, The Daily Telegraph, 21 May 1971.
4. Benn, op cit, P 325.
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As a party that had developed outside parliament. Labour had
never conclusively resolved the location of the sovereign
1
right to define policy. Its conference, at which the trade
unions had 89% of the vote and constituencies 11% in 1971,
had a right to define the party's programme. However, the
PLP leadership had long asserted its discretion to adopt
positions on its own, on the grounds that it had to project
an appeal to the nation as a whole and respond to changing
circumstances when in Government. For most of the previous
fifty years, " a bond of confidence between parliamentary
leaders and a sufficient number of leading trade unionists"
had allowed the party to operate despite the conflicts
2
between these two principles.
However, by 1968, the Transport and Steel unions, which
alone held 30% of the vote at the party conference, came
under leaderships determined to end deference to the PLP and
to assert their own rights to define Labour policy. While
still in Government, Wilson attempted to deal with this by
simply ignoring the mounting record of defeat by his own 
3
conference. The frustration this caused fused with a
growing left-wing belief that Labour Governments would 
tend to betray socialism unless the powers of conference 
were reasserted and a union insecurity that the PLP
1. Richard Rose, The Problem of Party Government, Penguin, 
London, 1974, P 262.
2. McKenzie, op cit, P 640.
3. Lew Minkin, The Labour Conference, Allen Lane, 
London, 1978, P 293.
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leadership could not be trusted after the failed industrial
relations reform of 1969; indeed, from one point of view it
was the PLP leadership which had departed from the
understanding that it would define Labour policy, while
1
industrial politics were left to the union leaders.
In such circumstances, loss of power became particularly
dangerous for Labour, as opposition is the time in any party
for factions to wage their suppressed conflicts for power,
jurisdiction and ideas in order to structure the character
of any future government. The PLP swung to the left with the
membership of the Tribune group increasing from 40 to 69
after the election. This group in alliance with those newly
radicalised unions gained what Sam Finer has called an
"unprecedented grip" on the extra - parliamentary party
institutions : a clear majority at Conference and an ability
2
to stalemate the National Executive. Not only did they feel 
themselves not to be bound by the European policy of the
previous Labour Government, they were determined to use the
issue to assert the right of conference to make Labour
policy. On 3 March 1971, Michael Stewart wrote to ^  Figaro 
arguing that the Six need have no fear of Labour ' s 
commitment to Europe as its spokesmen had accepted the 
acquis on numerous occassions. On March 6th 1971, Ian 
Mikardo, Chairman of the conference for that year, replied 
to ^  Figaro that the party's policy would not be
1. Minkin, op cit' P 298
2. Finer, op cit, P 113.
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1
made until the conference had made its decision. At this 
point, the PLP could in theory have asserted its right to 
self-management. Indeed, pros were to criticise Wilson for 
not laying down the law that Labour remained committed to 
entry at the start of the Parliament.
However, Wilson held to what was known as the Attlee, as
2
opposed to the Gaitskell, approach to party leadership.
Believing that Labour had a natural majority on which it had
only failed to capitalise because of disunity or failure to
project a sufficient air of governing competence, Wilson
tried to avoid the sharp differences of principle on which
everyone disagreed; he struggled for formulae which
continuously postponed a final decision on the EC so that
representatives of all parts of the Labour coalition would
be prepared to remain in the leadership to fight for their
preferred positions. The pros had to be retained in the
leadership as their public stature was essential to claims
that Labour was a skilled party of Government. A third of
his front bench was to defy the party whip to vote
3
for EC entry and it was noted that, if Wilson allowed a 
rigidly anti EC position to become a part of Labour's 
election platform, he might have difficulty in assembling a 
Letters in Le Figaro" 3 and 6 March 1971.
2. Vernon Bogdanor, " The Labour Party in Opposition; 1951- 
64 in Vernon Bogdanor and Robert Skidelsky, eds. The Age of 
Affluence: 1951-1964, Penguin, London, 1970, PP 85 & 104.
3. Uwe Kitzinger, The Observer, 31 October 1971.
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cabinet which included some of the party’s most familiar 
1
faces. On the other hand, Wilson did not want a break with 
conference, as public rows at conferences had been seen as 
responsible for defeats between 1951 and 1964; indeed, as 
industrial relations worsened, he sought to offer Labour’s 
relationship with the unions as a distinctive feature of its 
electoral appeal.
The pros soon lost any majority in the PLP as the centre
calculated that any balancing formula on the EC would have
to satisfy the extra-parliamentary party. At the 1970
conference, a TGWU motion hostile to the EC had only failed
by 3, 045, 000 to 2,950, 000, from which moment it was
widely expected that the 1971 conference would vote against
entry. As the conference approached, Wilson felt he would be
personally threatened if he did not move to pre-empt a slide
into full opposition to entry. Callaghan, who was as
favoured by union opinion as Wilson was mistrusted after the
aborted industrial relations reforms of 1969, began to force
the pace in May 1971, urging that the party should come out
against the Heath terms; he allegedly advised journalists to
cover the speech if they wanted to hear the views of the
2
next Labour leader. On the other hand. Lever recalls 
Wilson’s assumption that if he supported entry, his only 
friends in the party would be the pros, who would then 
choose some future opportunity to dump him, leaving 
Î1 Peter Jenkins, The Guardian, 13 October 1971.
2. Kitzinger, op cit, 1973, P 300
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1
the way open for a Jenkins bid for the leadership.
Indeed, Wilson knew that the factional struggle within his 
own party was potentially unstable in that both left and 
right had reason to fear the use to which the other might 
put the EC issue, unless it moved pre-emptively to protect 
its position. During the Gaitskell period, many who were now
pros, had argued that Labour could only survive with an
h
approach to Social Democracy suited to a post-indusrialised
and not a newly industrialj/ng society, but conference would
always inhibit this; the PLP should, therefore, break links
with the extra parliamentary party, on which it was no
2
longer dependent to mobilise votes in an age of mass media. 
Reflecting in his diary in May 1971 on the ways in which the 
right could use the EC issue, Benn wrote:
" The pros see an opportunity to do what they failed to do 
over disarmament and clause 4 and purge it of its trade 
unions and the left" 3.
For their part, the pros felt entrapped. On the one hand, 
they felt they would be publicly discredited if they did not 
make a principled stand for entry. On the other, they knew 
that they would be labelled with supporting a Conservative 
Government, showing elitist contempt for conference etc. 
Given the definition of original sin in Labour folklore, 
perhaps the unkindest quip of all after the October 1971 
Î1 Interview with Harold Lever," The Seventies".
2. Minkin, op cit, PP 276-7.
3. Benn, op cit, P 345.
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vote on EC entry was that at least Ramsay MacDonald had had
1
the decency to join with the Conservatives.
Wilson concluded that he could only avoid a fatal split if
he premised Labour's European policy on seeing the party
back to power without any definite commitment for or against
entry in principle; in Government, the matter could be
settled with greater reserves of unity and authority;
indeed, with greater control over the detail, various
viewpoints would be more easily accommodated. Although Peter
Jenkins remarked that the history of Labour and the EC was
an example of how foreign policy can end up by being defined
2
by those with " smaller fish to fry", there are suggestions
that Wilson never entirely lost sight of the perception
that, on return to Government, Labour would have to form
some credible relationship with its nearest European
neighbours and would have to protect international
perceptions of the steadiness and reliability of British 
3
foreign policy.
In October 1971, he persuaded conference to limit its 
opposition to the Heath terms, although Thomson, who had 
prepared Labour's own negotiating position in 1970, 
testified that the terms were at the better end of 
expectations. Wilson later announced that if EC partners did
1. The Sunday Times" 31 October 1971.
2. Peter Jenkins, The Guardian, 15 February 1971.
3. The Guardian, 4 November 1971.
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not accept a re-negotiation, a Labour Government would bring
1
EC institutions to a halt as De Gaulle had in 1965. A party
truce held around this position until March 1972, when in
the absence of Wilson, Callaghan and Jenkins, Benn pushed a
2
motion through the NEC committing Labour to a referendum on
the EC, Labour opinion having been outraged by Pompidou's
decision to give the French an opportunity denied to the
British public to vote on UK entry. The shadow cabinet
endorsed the decision, although only four of its members had
supported it just two weeks earlier. The immediate result
was to re-open Labour divisions as Jenkins resigned as
Deputy leader and Lever and Thomson left the shadow cabinet.
However, the long-term effect was more paradoxical; with the
expectation that Britain would vote to withdraw, reinforced
3
in November 1972 when Norway voted against entry, it seemed 
pointlessly divisive for many of the natural supporters of a 
principled rejection of entry to resist Wilson's attempts to 
avoid such a commitment. At the 1972 conference, the TGWU 
refused to support the engineers' demand for outright 
withdrawal; indeed, the unions' stake in finessing the EC 
issue to ensure the return of a Labour Government was 
increased by the completion of a party programme that would 
give them extensive involvement in economic and social 
decision-making. Nontheless, Wilson's room for manoeuvre 
almost disappeared as the antis moved during 1973 to specify
1. The Times, 29 October 1971.
2. Kitzinger, op cit, 1973, P 391.
3. Benn, op cit, P 451.
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the terms that a Labour re-negotiation should demand. In
June 1973, the NEC defined these as the effective suspension
of the CAP in favour of low cost food imports, equitable
budget contributions between members, the retention of power
by the British parliament over regional, industrial and
fiscal policies and the abandonment of EMU for global
solutions to international monetary questions. Indeed,
Wilson still had to threaten^resign the day before the 1973
conference to prevent the NEC recommending outright
withdrawal and it was again only with TGWU help that such a
1
motion was rejected by 3,316, 000 to 2, 800, 000.
However, debates within the Labour Party crystallised some
important conceptual differences that would be part of the
domestic context of Britain's continuing relationship with
the EC. Frustrated by the experiences of the 1964-70
Government, many Labour pros came to see EC entry as
critical to providing the economic growth and control of
interdependence needed for their social democratic
programme. 50% of Labour pros speeches in the Commons
stressed the extra economic growth they expected from
membership. Tony Crosland, whose ideas about a new socialism
provided the intellectual reference point for many on the 
2
Labour right , had rejected nationalisation for the
Schumpeter thesis that socialism would emerge not from the
Ï1 Harold Wilson, Final Term: The Labour Government 1974-6, 
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1979, PP 50-4.
2. Interview with Shirley Williams, "The Seventies".
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failure of capitalism, but from its success and maturation. 
Large-scale capitalism, with its need for a stable planning 
environment, would become increasingly dependent on the co­
operation of the state, which would be given in return for 
the gearing of production to social priorities and the 
acceptance of substantial welfare provision and
redistribution. But for all this to work, economy and 
society would have to reach a highly advanced stage and only 
continuing, brisk growth could keep the whole structure in 
motion; the synergy between state and producers would break 
down if surplus had to be diverted from investment. The 
state would also need to retain a strong bargaining 
relationship with producers.
In the EC debates, John MacKintosh argued that governments
had depressed publics with their failures and that social
democracy was being discredited by reluctance to admit that
national policy-making was not a " context adequate to 
1
circumstances" . David Marquand added that the key to
democratic socialism was redistribution, but this could only
2
come from higher economic growth . Roy Hattersley argued
that if the Wilson Government had been able to enjoy
European rates of growth, it would have " achieved its
housing targets, the school leaving age would have been
3
raised and the NHS financed differently . John Roper argued
1. Hansard, 27 October 1971, Col 2021.
2. Hansard, 27 October 1971, Col 1911.
3. Hansard, 27 October 1971, Col 1802.
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that socialism meant the substitution of social
control and choice for outcomes based on unfettered market
forces. In conditions of interdependence, a healthy
bargaining relationship between state and producers could
only be secured in conjunction with such transnational fora 
1
as the EC. Lord Kennet, a minister in the Labour Government,
argued that membership of the EC would bring a reassertion
of control over the means of distribution, production and
exchange, in an age in which private interests were able to
2
use their international manoeuvrability to elude controls.
Dick Taverne, a Treasury minister in the Wilson Government,
argued that Labour should welcome EMU given the experience
of 1964-70, when its programme had been overwhelmed by
3
unconstrained international finance. Thomson spoke of the
left/right split being translated to the European level as
the left realised the diminishing ability of national
4
governments to deal with planning and reform.
In all table 5 on page 240, shows how 41% of Labour pro 
speakers argued that EC membership would ease the
introduction of social democracy or that European socialists 
would be strengthened by co-operation. Here they differed 
from Labour antis who believed that there would be a 
permanent anti-socialist majority in an integrated Europe,
1. Hansard, 22 July 1971, Col 1795.
2. The Financial Times, 12 July 1971
3. The Times, 16 April 1971.
4. George Thomson, Speech to RIIA, The Times,26 May 1971.
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or at least that the nature of European socialism and 
coalition politics would give decisive advantages to right- 
wing socialists. Of all groups. Labour pros were the least 
defensive about sovereignty; their ambitions focused on a 
desired society; the state, participation in international 
organisations etc were just alternative means. 31% of 
speakers specifically promoted entry as a rational response 
to interdependence or argued that sovereignty was a matter 
of little value.
By contrast, many Labour antis saw entry as removing all
hopes of socialism in Britain. In the early 1970's, the left
believed that it had the best chance for years to work for a
radical Labour Government. Its grip on the party conference
was to culminate in the 1973 programme to nationalise
Britain’s banks and 25 leading companies. As Stuart Holland
has argued, the left saw the EC as entrenching economic and
social structures opposed to their goals; " there was a
1
conflict of irreversibilities" . To Eric Heffer, the EC
2
"put the locks on" prospects of socialism . It was premised
on the freest movement of all goods, capital and labour and
thus prevented the socialisation of production. Such free
market philosophies only led to monopolistic concentrations;
these were recession prone, while they also pre-empted
resources from consumers and
Ï1 Stuart Holland, The Uncommon Market, Papermac, London, 
1980, P7.
2. Hansard, 22 July 1971, Col 1906.
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workers to the owners of capital. Only institutions at the
EC level could work to correct the inequities and
instabilities of such a system, but stuck between the size
of the task and imperfect authority transfers from the
nation state. Community institutions would be easily
overwhelmed by corporate lobbying and bargaining power. A
favourite criticism of the left was that matters would be
transferred to a bureaucratic and unaccountable organisation
that was absorbed in harmonising all conditions to ease
1
monopolistic and multinational transactions.
In so far as nationalisation would not be prohibited, it
would be meaningless. As governments would not be able to
intervene in the management of public corporations, these
would function like any other monopoly. On learning that
governments would no longer be able to to issue directives
to the coal and steel industries, 110 Labour M.P's signed a
motion calling for the Coal and Steel Nationalisation Acts
2
to be safeguarded. 27% of Labour anti speakers in the 
Commons condemned loss of sovereignty, though, as 20% were 
eager to point out, their objections rested on the obstacles 
that would be placed to social transformation and the 
entrenchment of Britain in a transnational capitalist club.
The Labour right saw EC entry as a contribution to socialist 
internationalism. It could be used to promote detente in
1. Table 5 , page 240.
2. The Times, 1 July 1971.
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Europe and it already had a better record of foreign aid 
than Britain. Over the longer term, it set an example in the 
transcendence of the state and global integration could be 
promoted incrementally through regional experiments.
By contrast, some Labour antis saw European integration as
harmful to the structure of international society. Michael
Foot told the Commons that he had little respect for the
ways in which " great blocs and super-states conducted their 
1
affairs" . To others, a second western power bloc would
plunge the world back into cold war and encourage nuclear
proliferation if it pursued Heath's idea of an Anglo-French
deterrent. The future of the continent should be negotiated
between all European states, both east and west, through the
proposed conference on collective security. The EC was also
considered harmful to North/South relations. Its selfish
protection of the European area and its disruption of world
agricultural markets by the dumping of surplus produce
prevented developing countries from establishing trades and
2
accumulating surpluses needed to industrialise. Joan Lestor
felt that the main aim of the EC was to protect the rich
3
nations of Europe against the rest of the world. Frank Judd 
argued that the third world population in need of employment 
would grow by 225 million over ten years, yet the EC was
disrupting international markets in those very products that
 (222___________________________________________
1. Hansard, 23 July,Col 60.
2. Frank Judd, Morning Star, 31 August 1971.
3. Hansard, 20 October 1971, Col 956.
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countries needed to sell in their primary stages of
development. To Shore and Judd, a foreign policy focus on
the UN and Commonwealth would keep Britain alive to
international problems of peace and poverty; inside the EC
1
it would lose itself to petty wranglings.
To the centre of the Labour Party, socialist models were of
little concern and preferences for different kinds of
international order were various. They saw Labour as being
about the protection of the perceived needs of working
people. Many thus reflected public anxieties about the
effects of entry on living standards. Where Labour pros
hoped that Britain would be compelled to harmonise its
2
social security to European levels, former President of
the Board of Trade, Douglas Jay, argued that entry would
threaten fifty years of social improvement in Britain. A
shift in the tax burden to food and the introduction of
3
Value Added Tax could " redistribute income backwards". The
regions would be depressed, as governments would lose the
power to direct industry to particular regions and the EC
sucked economic activity to the centre of the market. Foot
4
argued that entry could " splinter the United Kingdom". 
George Thomas told the Commons that 30% of all industry that
had come to Wales in 1970 had done so as a result of
1. The Times, 17 May 1971.
2. The Times, 10 November 1971.
3. Jay in Evans, op cit, PP 15-31.
4. Hansard, 23 July 1971, Col 59
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Government development certificates directing industry to 
1
priority areas. It was reported that Labour M.P’s were
already worried that unemployment increased by 2% of the
work force with each 100 miles from London: what would
happen to their constituenciess if the centre of economic
2
gravity shifted to Cologne ? A calculation in Regional
Studies suggested that parts of the EC could produce goods
on average 27% more cheaply/South England, which, in turn,
^ 3
had a 14% advantage over the rest of Britain.
3. The Liberals and the Peripheries.
The Liberal Party took great pride in being the only party
that had supported British membership since the formation of
the EC in 1957. By voting in favour of the Second Reading of
the European Communities Bill in February 1972, it could
claim some credit for the survival of EC entry. In one
respect it remained distinctive amongst British political
parties even after 1972; it emerged with a commitment to a
Federal Europe. Its leader, Jeremy Thorpe, told the House of
Commons that the removal of restrictions between a Europe of
nation states was too timid an aim; the EC had been formed "
4
collectively to build a better world".
1. Hansard, 26 October 1971, Col 1598.
2. Christian Science Monitor, 24 July 1971.
3. The Sunday Times, 17 October 1971.
4. Hansard, 28 October 1971, Cols 2124-2131
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To a degree, EC entry was seen as an escape from Liberal
marginalisation in domestic politics. Although the 1970-4
Parliament was to see a sharp Liberal revival. Liberals were
preoccupied until late 1972 with the fact that the 1970
election had been their worst since the disastrous 1950
result; all the gains they had made between 1951 and 1966
had been reversed leaving them with just 6 seats and 7.7% of 
1
the vote. However, a European Parliament was thought likely
to be elected by Proportional Representation and to
offer opportunities for Liberals to make coalitions with
like-minded groups in other EC countries. The EC
was also seen as making idealistic politics feasible. Thus
former leader Joe Grimond wrote of the role that only a
transnational organisation could play in dealing with the
problems of post-industrial capitalism by decoupling the
provision of social and environmental policies from the
tendency of countries to under-supply these in their
2
struggle to compete economically. Thorpe urged that the EC
should take primary responsibility for UN aid targets in
relation to the 70 or so countries within its network of 
3
trading agreements.
A fascinating , but little noticed aspect of EC entry, was 
that it raised questions of the definition of the United 
Kingdom. Entry was far more unpopular in peripheral than
1. Butler and Kavanagh, op cit, P 400.
2. The Guardian, 10 February 1971.
3. Hansard, 28 October 1972, Cols 2124-32.
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central regions. Where, in July 1971, there was a lead of
13% for entry in the South, Wales and the West were, on
balance, 10% against, with this figure rising to 26% in 
1
Scotland. The Scottish Nationalist Party was bitterly
opposed and some questioned the right of the Westminster
Parliament to commit Scotland to the EC; the Act of Union
was held only to cover a transfer of powers to Westminster
and not their further delegation to a foreign body. However,
as Bogdanor explains, it was soon recognised that EC entry
created new flexibility for the political evolution of
Scotland and Wales; they could enjoy substantial self-
determination and even independence with a political
guarantee of access to a wide free market; a common
regulatory framework would avoid the creeping introduction
of hidden protectionism that presented the main obstacle to
an ambitious scheme of devolution within the United Kingdom.
Many also predicted that any transfer of functions to
supranational bodies would have to be balanced by the
strengthening of sub-national, regional units to articulate
local demands and head off discontent with the remoteness of
government. At the Scottish Conservative Party Conference in
1968, Heath had, in fact, argued for a Scottish Assembly in
2
parallel with EC entry for just these reasons.
1. Kitzinger, op cit~ P 361.
2. Vernon Bogdanor, Devolution, Oxford University Press, 
1979, PP 98-100 & 108.
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Many Ulster Unionists feared that, one way or another,
the attachment of Northern Ireland to the United Kingdom
would become more tenuous. Immigration from the South could
threaten the Protestant majority in the North, even
Protestants might come to look to the Eire Government as
better placed to represent the economic interests of Ireland
as a whole in the EC, the British Government might come to
give priority to building its bilateral relationship with
Dublin over the interests of Unionists for reasons of EC
coalition building and it would become more exposed to
1
EC Catholic lobbies demanding changes in Northern Ireland.
Finally, special arrangements had to be negotiated for the
Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. On the one hand, it was
doubted whether they could survive economically if they were
outside the Common External Tariff. On the other, their
status as tax havens was threatened by fiscal harmonisation;
payment of VAT contributions to the EC would involve a
susbstantial net outflow of funds and the free movement of
labour seemed likely to lead to over-crowding on the 
2
islands. Finally, when it came to the demographic, as
opposed to the territorial base of the United Kingdom, the
Government found itself having to negotiate enormously
3
complicated definitions of citizenship and rights of abode.
1. The Guardian, 30 December 1970. Hansard 13 & 14 
June 1972.
2. The Times 19 November 1971.
3. Norton, op cit, 1975, P 524
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4. Parliament.
Norton shows that in 6 860 divisions betweeen 1945 and 1974,
there were only 40 in which more than 10% of the PLP voted
against its own party line and only 15 in which 10% of the
1
Conservative Party did so. Policies may be changed by well- 
worn channels within parties, but if a Government is 
determined on a policy it is unlikely that it will be 
changed by the ebb and flow of debate in Parliament or that 
a majority should remain uncertain and have to be carefully 
negotiated across parties. The British system is said to be 
one in which the Government sweeps all before it and not one 
of coalition politics. EC entry may, however, count as an 
instance in which parliamentary politics were significant to 
foreign policy change.
In some ways, this may seem a strange conclusion. The 
passage of the European Communities Act appears as a 
paradigmatic example of the penetration of parliament by 
ruthless party discipline. Heath only reluctantly allowed 
his own members a free vote in October 1971. After October, 
the "no" lobbies continuously included between 70 and 100 
Labour M.P's, known to be in favour of entry and to believe 
that the Heath terms were acceptable. Although the 
Government allowed the whole House to participate in the 
Committee stage. Heath insisted that the legislation should
1. Norton, op cit, 1978, P 23.
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pass without a single amendment in order to demonstrate
1
Britain's ability to keep faith with prospective partners.
In an exercise that was described as " looking at an entire
new legal system through the back end of a telescope", the
Government reduced 9 Treaties and 43 volumes of regulations
to a Bill of just 12 clauses. Although the Government was
caught in a dilemma here, as the only alternative seemed to
be a Bill of "a thousand clauses", which would have been a
hostage to parliamentary obstruction, the overall effect of
2
its decision was to make amendment harder still.
However, against this rather dismissive view. Parliament
played a subtle role in the negotiations,with the Government
eager to avoid rough receptions for reported terms, but also
prepared to use these to reinforce the credibility with
which it could play its domestic card with the Six. Two days
before the Paris summit, the Times noted that Rippon had
been subjected to " hard questioning and mockery" with
Conservatives giving their minister little support; a clear
signal had been sent that Heath should not concede to
3
Pompidou " more than the House of Commons can bear".
Meanwhile, Duncan Sandys, a senior Conservative M.P, had
phoned Pompidou direct to discuss the terms that his
4
colleagues would accept.
1. Hansard, 17 February 1972, Col 746.
2. The Guardian, 27 January 1972
3. The Times, 18 May 1971.
4. Interview with Edward Heath, December 1988.
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The October 1971 vote faced the Government with an unusual
challenge of parliamentary persuasion. Media comment in both
Britain and the EC picked up a contemporary mood that entry
could not be legitimised by a simple majority alone; at
1
least 50 to 100 would be necessary . In an interesting
comment that suggests there may be circumstances in which
domestic constraints become more significant as an indirect
result of the expectations of foreign partners, the Heath
Government was eager to signal to the EC that there was a
sufficient constituency in Britain for it to take a leading
role in defining European policy and that the hostility of
the principal opposition party should not inhibit dealings
with Britain, as Labour pros would always be prepared to
prevent any disruption of the new relationship. Both these
factors pointed to the need for Government to manage things
to obtain a large cross-party vote. The whips were thus
removed from Conservative M.P's in the expectation that it
would be more valuable to maximise Labour support by
removing the taint of voting in a Government lobby than to
2
minimise Conservative rebels.
The October 1971 vote can be taken as a high point of 
parliamentary self-assertion in the postwar period. The 
Commons voted 358 to 246 for entry, a majority of 112. Both 
totals comprised a substantial cross-party mix by British
1. Le Monde and Financial Times, 28 October 1971.
2. Interview with Francis Pym (Government Chief Whip, 1970- 
3)," The Seventies".
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standards with pros including 284 Conservatives, 69 Labour
and 5 Liberal M.P's and antis 200 Labour and 39
Conservatives. 20 Labour and 2 Conservative M.P's abstained.
Leading cross-voters recall an atmosphere of exhiliharation
and even recklessness at having discovered an issue that was
1
larger than party discipline. Indeed, the whole episode was
accompanied by the more explicit development of factions
within the parties together with new patterns of
communication and signalling to friendly groups across party
lines. Labour pros made it clear that they would deliver
more votes if the Conservatives did not impose a whip and
they asked for Heath's initiative for an Anglo-French
deterrent to be toned down as it was causing some disquiet
2
amongst Laborites otherwise inclined to entry.
William Rodgers organised a whipping system to ensure that
the Labour pros held firm under pressure from the rest of
3
the PLP and threats from conference and constituencies. Many 
pros were eventually to form the core of the break away 
Social Democratic Party in 1981. Perhaps with a touch of 
hindsight, they have argued that their experiences between 
1970 and the EC referendum of 1975 left them a cohesive 
group, but one that never succeeded in regaining a confident 
and comfortable relationship with the rest of the 
TT Interview with Shirley Williams, "The Seventies".
2. Interview with Anthony Royle, January 1989.
3. Kitzinger, op cit, 1973, PP 313-4.
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1
Labour party.
The Conservative Party has also been described as emerging
from the EC debates as a party of factions, where it had
2
previously only been one of tendencies. The 41 members who
rebelled in October 1971 and some of the identifiably
reluctant converts to entry formed the clearest nucleus of a
group opposed to the leadership and philosophy of a sitting
Conservative Government since the 1902-5 split over imperial
preference. Heath may have got away with playing a high-risk
hand in the domestic political game because of the greater
difficulties faced by Labour and it will be seen that he
did make key compromises to backbench opinion, but, Norton
reveals that he was still seen as having violated the subtle
understandings of the Government: backbench relationship, in
large part through the way in which he took Britain into the 
3
EC. Both parties thus found foreign policy to be covered by 
the observation that party discipline is not without its 
long-term costs either to factionalisation or the security 
of a sitting leadership.
Moreover, the return to party discipline after October 1971
obscured many subtleties of the political game play. The
T1 Interviews with Roy Jenkins and Shirley Williams, " The 
Seventies".
2. Patrick Seyd, " Factionalism in the 1970's", in 
Zig Layton-Henry (ed) , Conservative Party Politics, 
Macmillan, 1980, P 235.
3. Norton, op cit, PP 239-241.
274
Government continued to rely on cross-party support,
conspicuously on the Second Reading of the European
Communities Bill when its majority of only 8 would have
disappeared without 5 Liberals votes and 9 Labour
abstentions. Over a gruelling three months, its majority
fell as low as 4 and rarely exceeded 20. Anthony Hoyle, then
a Foreign Office Minister with a background in the whips
office, had operated a contact group with members of other
1
parties through the European Movement. During the passage of
the Bill he was telephoned each morning by a Labour pro with
a request for an estimate of the number of abstentions the
2
Government would need that night. The aims of the
Conservative antis remain obscure, though it is, at least,
necessary to take seriously Biffen's claim that they sought
with mathematical precision to cut the Government’s majority
to the bone, in order to signal that even if there was no
stopping EC entry there would be no authority for an
3
ambitious European policy. Hoyle, however, believes that the 
antis had not abandoned hope of defeating the Government; 
being unaware of the arrangement with the Labour pros, they 
may have expected to succeed. However, perhaps the main 
point was that, in spite of the subsequent reassertion of 
party discipline, the single free vote/rebellion of October 
1971 was sufficient to create an enduring perception that 
there was an underlying majority of around 100 for entry.
1. Kitzinger, op cit' 1973, P 199.
2. Interview with Anthony Hoyle, January 1988.
3. Norton, op cit, 1979, P 192.
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5. Public Opinion.
Table 6 shows the changes in public support for EC entry 
between 1967 and 1974. Table 7 analyses the reasons the 
public gave for supporting or opposing entry. Table 8 gives 
a breakdown of public expectations of membership and table 
11 on page 297 compares the feelings of European identity 
amongst the publics of Britain and the Six.
At no time, did public opinion register enthusiasm for the
EC, though there were moments of clear hostility. However,
the very instability of popular reactions casts doubt on
their depth; in cognitive terms, the public seem to have
been uncommitted thinkers, open to being swayed one way or
the other. Surveys discovered a low level of knowledge and
thus interest in EC affairs. In one, only 13% could
1
correctly name all members of the Six . In a monthly poll
that asked what were the most important issues facing
Britain, the EC was only mentioned by more than 10% on four
2
occasions between spring 1970 and summer 1972.
The two factors that did tend to influence opinion were 
concern for personal living standards and the heat of the 
party battle. The improvement in approval ratings during the 
summer of 1971 can be entirely accounted for by 
by the higher number of Conservative voters expressing
1. King, op cit, P 24.
2. King, op cit, P 25.
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TABLE 6 EC ENTRY: PUBLIC APPROVAL RATINGS.
For Against Balance
January 1967 65 20 +45
June 1968 37 44 - 7
Nov 1969 37 45 - 8
April 1970 20 62 -42
Nov 1970 17 68 -50
March 1971 22 60 —48
May 1971 27 60 -33
July 1971 28 55 -27
Sept 1971 37 50 -13
Feb 1972 44 42 - 2
Gallup 1series. Kitzinger, op cit. 1973, PP 354-5.
TABLE 7: PERCEIVED ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
EC ENTRY
1. Advantages NOV 69 JUL 71 SEP 71
Benefits to Industry. 16
Better wages 7
Keep down cost of living 8
Political links with Europe. 11
Full Employment. 6
Wider range of goods in shops. 12
Strengthened security. 6
No advantages. 32
Don’t know. 21
20
8
6
7
4
4
4
36
16
26
7
5
8 
9 
8
6 
27 
15
2. Di sadvantages.
Price increases.
Bad for Commonwealth. 
Unemployment.
Loss of Sovereignty. 
Close links with Europe. 
No disadvantages 
Don’t know
67
12
11
10
5
5
15
67
9
12
9
5
5
15
64
12
6
6
3
8
9
Gallup series, Vol 105-37, 1970-1, PP 127-8 & 143.
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TABLE 8 : FINANCIAL TIMES PUBLIC ATTITUDE SURVEYS
June 71 July/Aug 71
Y N Y N
Are You in Favour ? 22 67 34 51
Will the Economy Grow ? 33 36 44 23
Will Britain lose identity? 52 34 40 46
Will most people lose ? 65 21 48 33
Will food prices rise ? 93 2 95 2
In National Interest? 49 39
The Financial Times 16th August/27th September 1971.
Better Off in 10 years time ? Y 48
N 10
ORC, The Evening Standard, *9th August 1971.
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themselves in favour of entry as the negotiations came to be
seen as an achievement of their Government and Labour
confirmed that the issue would be one of party politics.
As cognitive consistency would predict, NOP discovered
respondents to be far more likely to support entry where
1
they thought this to be the position of " their party".
Concern for the impact on personal living standards fits 
every statistical series, in particular the higher levels of 
hostility amongst pensioners, housewives, low income groups 
and inhabitants of less prosperous regions. It has been seen 
how the inflation predictions in the 1970 White Paper
decisively shifted the public mood to one of hostility. 
Throughout the period, two-thirds of antis consistently 
opposed entry for reasons of higher prices; indeed, where 
most reasons for being for or against attracted only pockets 
of support, fear of higher prices produced the only large 
bloc response. An interesting subtlety contained in Table 8 
is that voters expected to be better off in ten years time
and saw entry in the " national interest". Nevertheless
overall approval ratings for entry were most closely linked 
to pessimism for short-term, personal living standards. 
Combining the two above tables, voters cared little for the 
foreign policy aspects of entry, or European integration; on 
the other hand, the sovereignty and identity of Britain, and 
its national interest, also meant little.
1. King, op cit, P 28.
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Public opinion may enter the policy process through careful
official monitoring of opinion polls. This effect was,
however, limited in the case of the Heath Government.
Polling had recently suffered the most severe setback of its
history by seemingly miscalculating the result of the 1970
election by up to 15% .Heath's personal beliefs stood in
what some would call the elitist, and others the
constitutionally correct, tradition that governments were
elected to do what they thought best for the duration of a
parliament. It has been seen how he believed that foreign
policy could be based on a national interest discoverable by
expert opinion, whilst Government by opinion poll was one of
1
his principal complaints about the Wilson era. Moreover, as
cognitive dissonance would predict, pros often interpreted
the polls in such a way as to deflect themselves as little
as possible from their course; the polls always gave a
sufficiently elusive picture of public opinion to make this 
2
possible. During the negotiations, it was repeatedly
argued that poor ratings for entry would improve as soon as
a breakthrough removed the sense of frustration and
3
rejection caused by ten years of argument with the EC. The 
historical analogy of public scepticism in some parts of the 
Six giving way to enthusiasm for the EC as soon as it was 
seen to bring economic benefits was also employed to argue
1. Hurd, op citl P 14.
2. Christopher Hill, Public Opinion and British Foreign 
Policy since 1945, Millenium, Vol 10, NO 1, Spring 1981.
3. The Guardian, 20 November 1970.
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that opposition would be transient. Before the October 1971 
vote, some polls had conveniently registered a balance of 
pros and antis, while the nuances of detailed responses were 
eagerly exploited for signs that the public was more 
favourable than appeared. It was noted that up to 80% 
expected the UK to enter, that many felt they knew too 
little and could only leave the decision to Parliament and 
that 50% felt entry to be in the national interest.
However, it has also been seen how public opinion tended to 
seep into the shaping of British entry. Paradoxically, it 
may have re-entered British policy-making through the need 
to satisfy foreign governments. The stubbornly low approval 
ratings of early 1971 compelled the Government to shore up 
the confidence of the Five by altering its presentation of 
entry from being an option to a necessity. Even if 
anticipations - and not facts of public opinion- are most 
immediate to decision-making, it will be seen that the goal 
of delivering material returns ran right the way through 
Heath's European policy. In this respect it was attentive to 
the central public expectation placed on British Governments 
and, at least, concern for living standards was a constant 
of public opinion, on which policy could reasonably be 
based, whilst overall approval ratings for EC entry gyrated. 
Even if public opinion had not always been followed on the 
substance of the issue, the need to arrange entry with an 
eye to its role in the domestic political game would have a 
continuing effect on the character of the new relationship.
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6.Interest Groups.
Robert Lieber’s study of the role of the principal interest 
groups in the making of Britain’s EC policy in the 1960's 
concluded that their influence was positively correlated 
with a perception that entry was a technocratic question, 
affecting the conditions of agricultural and industrial 
production, and negatively correlated with a belief that it 
involved an over-riding national interest , particularly in 
the conduct of foreign policy. The Heath Government had a 
determined view that entry was in the national interest. 
Nevertheless, interest groups contributed to the shaping of 
Britain’s relationship with the EC.
As table 9 shows, British industry strongly favoured entry.
Sectoral surveys reveal interesting perceptions of how
Table 9: Survey of 100 of the 500 largest Companies
in Britain.
Do you regard membership as good or bad for your Company/ 
the Countryf
Company Country
Good 85 87
Bad 5 4
Don’t Know. 10 9
Source: The Guardian, 16 July 1971.
pressures and opportunities of transnational economics were
seen to require membership of an organisation like the EC.
1. Robert Lieber, British Politics and European Unity: Parties, 
Elites and Pressure Groups, University of California, Berkeley, 
1970.
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The chemical industry had already integrated production 
arrangements across West Europe in response to technical 
pressures to take an international approach to manufacture. 
The output from any one plant was so huge as to depress 
prices if sales were confined to a single national market. 
Each process produced by-products that others needed as 
inputs; intermediate goods thus needed to move around Europe 
without the imposition of tariffs at every boundary if 
producers were to meet US and Japanese competition. The 
British car industry faced a consumer rebellion against the 
homogeneous consumption patterns implied in everyone buying 
national models; it hoped that EC entry would allow it to 
make up for loss of domestic sales. British steel producers 
hoped to gain from the fact that their plant size was higher 
than that of the European competition, while the coal 
industry expected to provide some of the 13 million tons of 
coal currently imported to the EC. Advanced technologies 
such as aircraft, heavy electricals and computers were all 
thought likely to benefit from freeing of trade in public 
procurement and from transnational collaboration in research 
and production. The Central Electricity Generating Board 
felt that the whole European economy would lose 
competitiveness if countries duplicated efforts in 
developing new sources of energy; for instance, nuclear 
energy would be unaffordable if Europe pressed ahead with 
three or four different prototypes.
1. Christopher Layton, " The Benefits of Scale for Industry" 
in Finder, op cit, PP 46-69. The Times, 26th October 1971 
and The Financial Times, 23rd December 1971.
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The Confederation of British Industry had access to
Britain's negotiating team in Brussels and began to develop
an infrastructure of transnational lobbying which would
focus on the Commission and employers organisations in other 
1
member countries. Heath began his term of office by making
the assumption that the Government could turn round the
2
economy by listening to industrialists; the former Director 
of the CBl was appointed Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry. By contrast. Trade Union input to the negotiations 
was blocked by Heath's initial belief that Government had 
mired in union consultations and that its authority to 
represent the whole country needed to be re-asserted. For 
their part, the unions were in any case reluctant to become 
involved with consultations on EC entry while the 
Industrial Relations Act was passing through Parliament.
Although the TUC had supported entry in the 1960's , it 
condemned entry on the Heath terms in 1971. As with the 
centre of the Labour party, its objections were essentially 
concerned with pessimistic assessments of the implications 
of entry for the employment and living standards of the 
working man. It argued that only other countries would 
benefit from Britain's entry. Britain should be expected to 
pay no more into the budget than it received. The 
Government's hope for new policies to compensate Britain 
for the acquis were chimerical as the other members would
1. Kitzinger, op citj 1973, P 163. ~
2. Interview with Sir Leo Pliatsky, The Seventies.
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not give up the advantage of Britain’s net contributions.
Not only would workers face deflation and higher
unemployment, but many in the lowest income groups, who
spent up to 50% of income on food, would be hard hit by the 
1
CAP and VAT. Both the TUC and CBI would nontheless have a 
critical role after the success of the negotiations and it 
will be necessary to examine this in the next chapter.
The National Farmers Union was involved in intensive
consultations during the negotiations and it was sometimes
hard to please. But this may have reflected the delicacy of
its position. On the one hand, specific producers such as
hill-farmers and horticulturalists were threatened with
serious loss, but if the negotiations were to fail the
overall NFU membership would be deprived of a rich
opportunity. Prior told the Commons that farmers would
receive 30% more for wheat and barley, pasture in the south
and west would become more competitive than continental
2
farms and, overall, agricultural output would rise by 8%. 
Indeed, agriculture would benefit from definite, direct 
effects where the advantages to industry were speculative. 
There was even some criticism that entry would encourage an 
inappropriate diversion of national resources into farming 
and mistreatment of the land. The problems of identifying a 
clear sectoral interest in the EC question, let alone an 
unambiguous national interest, is evident from the CBI/TUC
1. The Times, 27 July 1971.
/?7/
2. Hansard, 27 October/Col 1853.
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NFU experience. Even the CBI faced the doubts of small 
business, which was exposed to domestic cost inflation and 
import penetration without having opportunities to export.
There is little that can be added to Kitzinger ' s detailed
1
account of the campaign groups. These special groups became 
important as discreet contact points for like-minded 
politicians of different parties. They helped to articulate 
and mobilise opinion, while structuring the flow of 
information. The anti movements staged référendums, designed 
to " show" that the Government had no " mandate" for entry. 
The pros concentrated on skilled briefings of the media. 
At their peak, groups on both sides had publication runs of 
over 1 million, while Kitzinger estimates that the European 
Movement arranged 3,000-4,000 meetings. As occassionally 
happens in UK politics, a foreign policy issue had produced 
a lively group politics. Such a role for special groups may 
be linked to the difficulties of pursuing any single issue 
through a party, especially where cross-cutting alignments 
complicate the ability of parties to handle an issue.
A lengthy conclusion will not be attempted at this point. 
Instead, the above analysis of EC entry as deeply implicated 
in the domestic political game, should be borne in mind as 
the next chapter goes on to discuss UK political culture and 
entry, in order to form a complete picture of the role of 
domestic politics in Britain's foreign policy change.
1. Kitzinger, op cit  ^ 1973, PP 189-253.
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CHAPTER 6: THE PROBLEMS OF ADAPTING DOMESTIC TO
TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS.
In a system of decentralised transnational politics such as
the EC, in which each state possesses a veto, the domestic
politics of each country forms a sub-system significant to
1
the prospects of the Community as a whole. The EC thus 
redefines itself as each new member adds its own distinctive 
internal spurs and constraints to European co-operation. On 
the other hand, movement from a self-enclosed national 
politics to participation in a transnational grouping may 
change the domestic structures of member states. It is, 
therefore, useful to ask the following: how well adjusted
were British politics to EC membership ? Did the experiences 
of 1970-2 improve matters or make them worse ? Did the Heath 
Government seek to change the internal contexts from which 
it would have to operate a European policy and, if so, with 
what success ? Did the eventual interface between EC and 
British politics make some trajectories in the evolution of 
the new relationship more probable than others ?
Answers to these questions need a mixture of cognitive and
organisational analysis . The critique that will now be
attempted of the interpretative frameworks, structuring
assumptions and information flows that characterised the
"mind-sets" of domestic actors in relation to the EC is of
1. S. Bulmer," Domestic Politics and EC policy-making". The 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol XXI, No 4, Autumn 
1983.
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little value without continuing the analysis in the last
chapter of how the holders of different attitudes were
bunched in relation to " organised formations" of British
1
politics and to the domestic political game.
Rosenau has speculated that the more a foreign policy is
implicated in the allocation of domestic political values,
the less easy it will be to achieve consensus in a
pluralistic polity. However, consensus per se is not the
best test. Of greater import is that organisational and
conceptual patterns should be capable of extracting
coherence from the diversity and disagreement that are
defining features of pluralism in the first place. Indeed,
cults of consensus that attempt to deny disagreement may
2
even lower the coherence of foreign policy.
It will be claimed here that the operational/cognitive
intersection between patterns of organised British politics
and the distribution of attitudes towards the EC emerged
from 1970-2 in a condition that would make it hard for
British Governments to sustain a coherent approach to
European co-operation. The events of EC entry seriously
eroded traditional practices of effective foreign and
European policy-making without substituting replacements.
Bipartisanship had at least had advantages in providing
Î1 Samuel Hi Beer, Modern British Politics: A Study of
Parties and Pressure Groups, London, 1969, Introduction.
2. James Rosenau, ed. The Domestic Source of Foreign Policy, 
New York, 1967.
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continuity to British foreign policy and in insulating its 
consideration from the problems of adversary politics. Above 
all, the party leaderships had been able to find a political 
base in cross party support for coherent foreign policy­
making to compensate for the propensity of their own parties 
to split on external issues, as British political alignments 
had been largely conditioned by domestic criteria.
Conservative ministers recall that the earliest attempts to
form new packages of EC policies to improve Britain's stake
in EC membership were inhibited by the greater probability,
in Britain's case, that any commitments made by its
Government might be reversed by transfer of power to the
1
principal opposition party. Apart from the specific traumas 
of contemporary Labour party politics, there was a potential 
tension between Community politics, in which complex inter­
state bargains need to accumulate over long periods with 
uninterrupted confidence in reciprocation between partners 
and a British approach to domestic politics in which 
policies are not negotiated across parties or framed for 
their inter-party sustainability, but reflect an alternating 
monopoly of power by individual parties, encouraged to 
reverse positions taken by opponents.
The problem was only compounded by the extraordinary 
awkwardness with which each of the three camps with views on 
how the EC should develop - the activists, minimalists and 
Ï1 Interview with Anthony Royle^ January 1989.
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the hostile- cut across party divisions, reducing the
likelihood that coherent policies could be developed from
single party bases and without bipartisanship. If reasonably
reliable evidence of alignments undistorted by parliamentary
whipping is taken, 100 out of 287 Labour M.P’s were prepared
to sign a Guardian advertisement that the " causes of Social
Democracy, world peace and economic prosperity would be
1
advanced" through EC membership. Anthony King identifies
2
the same number of convinced Labour antis in 1970. On the
Conservative side, 127 M.P’s were signed up members of the
Conservative Group for Europe and 62 were firmly opposed
3
before the party battle began in earnest. Allowing for a 
certain haziness of categorisation and fluidity of 
commitment, a crude guess might be that around 610 M.P’s in 
the two main parties were divided as below in their 
attitudes to European co-operation.
Table 10: Estimates of underlying cross-party cleavages
in the House of Commons to different approaches to
EC membership.
Cons Lab Total
Activist 130 100 230
Minimalist 135 85 220
Hostile 60 100 160
In many other political systems. the disturbance of old
divisions formed in the context of an enclosed national
1. The Guardian, 11 May 1971.
2. King, op cit, PP 34-5.
3. Kitzinger, op cit, P 188.
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politics might have either been followed by a relatively 
frictionless realignment or by cross-party coalition- 
building to allow various groups to form coherent political 
bases for their preferred approaches to transnational 
politics. However, the new context had yet to be seen as 
sufficiently important in British politics to merit such 
changes, while any breakaway groupings would have taken 
enormous risks, as the British electoral system normally 
only leaves room for two parties. As a result, there were 
those who articulated either clearly traditionalist or 
transformationalist strategies for Britain's evolving 
relationship with the EC, but they were unable to make 
common cause because they were locked into opposing parties 
and often dissipated their clarity of perception in the 
continuous negotiation of obfuscating formulae with those of 
conflicting persuasions on their own side.
Of the two parties. Labour probably emerged in the worse 
condition to sustain an effective European policy. It has 
been seen how Wilson had concluded in 1971 that a decision 
could not be made on the principle of British membership 
without either defying the extra-parliamentary party or 
losing some of the politicians with the clearest public 
appeal from the leadership. The idea of a referendum was 
partly a substitute for a decision by the party itself. 
However, the Heath Government had made it clear to 
Parliament in February 1972 that the matrix of discussions 
in which Britain had become involved with its new EC
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partners could involve the framing of new treaties. The new 
relationship could confront British parties with a 
continuing flow of fundamental decisions of principle. It 
was perhaps fortunate for Labour that further initiatives 
for European co-operation lost much of their impetus when 
the Party returned to Government in the mid-1970's.
The fact that entry was in many ways a distinctively
Conservative foreign policy achievement probably socialised
many natural doubters on the right into its defence. Between
February and August 1971 the 127 M.P's, out of a total of
326, who were enthusiastic enough to have joined the
Conservative Group for Europe before the main political
1
battle, were joined by a further 75 members.
However, it should be noted that Heath had only achieved a
stand-off with the hostile and doubtful in his own party. A
probable result of his need to rely almost exclusively on
his own party to pass the European Act was that more
constraining guarantees were made to Parliament on the
preservation of its role in EC matters than would probably
have been the case if entry had been carried by a cross-
2
party coalition of its most enthusiastic supporters. Table 5 
showed how 27% of Conservative frontbench speakers were 
anxious to emphasise that there would be no loss of
1. Kitzinger, op cit~ 1973, P 188.
2. See above P 240.
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sovereignty on entry. Conservative backbenchers showed their
determination to hold the Government to this promise, when
in 1973 a special committee of the House of Commons
unanimously recommended what were to prove unrealistically
1
rigorous rights of parliamentary scrutiny over EC proposals.
It should also be noted that if only 41 Conservative M.P's
voted against entry or abstained in October 1971, more than
120 had decided not to join the CGE by August 1971. Although
Conservative hostility towards the EC was not to return to
its 1970 levels, it can be seen to have recovered some
ground once the duel with Labour was over in 1972. The lead
of pros over antis amongst Conservative voters fell from its
peak of 42% to 17% by October 1973 . In the February 1974
election, only 22% of Conservative candidates mentioned the
EC in their election addresses, while 83% touched on
2
pensions and 64% on housing.
The other main channel of organised British politics was 
provided by interest groups, notably the CBI and TUC. By 
defining clear economic interests in potential forms of 
European co-operation, the CBI and TUC might have been able 
to put pressure on the political parties to frame their 
European policies with greater coherence and continuity than 
would have been the case if everything had been left to the 
dynamics of intra and inter-party politics alone. It has 
been little appreciated how Heath's "U-turns" - 
T1 Sasse, et al, op cit, P 61.
2. Butler and Kavanagh, op cit, 1974, P 62.
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his resort to CBI/TUC participation in government after 
1972 - were in fact, related to EC entry. It was only in the 
Spring of 1972 that the Heath Government and British
industry could be fully confident that the European Act 
would pass into law, by which time there was only a matter 
of months to gear up for entry. Whether the British economy 
shifted up from a long-term growth path of 2.5%-3.0% to one 
of 4.5%-5.0%, as the Government hoped, or slipped into 
cumulative deindustrialisation, as critics such as Kaldor 
feared, would depend on the competitiveness of British
industry at the moment of entry. In practice, this meant 
that there was an urgent need for new investment. Yet a poll
of 100 companies as late as July 1971 had shown that only 30
1
expected to increase investment. There was a widespread
feeling at the time that the picture would only be improved 
if the economy was reflated to restore industry’s confidence 
and if Britain was made more attractive to foreign
investment in anticipation of membership.
This challenge was to throw the Heath Government back to a 
system of economic management by discussion with the TUC and 
CBI, which it had rejected between 1970 and 1972. A pay 
policy was thought to be necessary to prevent the extra 
demand intended to stimulate profits and thus investment in 
parallel with EC entry from running into wages and 
inflation. Although it was convenient for the unions to 
reject a voluntary pay policy, they contributed far more
1. The Guardian, 16 July 1971.
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than admitted to the development of Heath's statutory 
regulations. As far as the CBI was concerned, both Barber 
and its then Director General, Sir Campbell Adamson, recall 
that industry's direct participation in government policy­
making was an attempt at indicative planning: a self-
conscious effort to adopt what Heath believed to be a West 
European model whereby government and industry exchanged 
their spending and investment plans in order to avoid the
opposite pitfalls of centralised economic direction or
1
under-investment because no-one knows the plans of others.
Although Heath created a special unit in the Cabinet Office
to work with the organised economic interests to create a
complex of agencies and interests working for an energetic
2
British response to European economic integration, his
efforts were dogged by three problems: the loose federative
structures of the TUC and CBI made it increasingly difficult
for them to hold their members to tripartite deals with 
3
Government: the fact that the TUC had opposed entry, in
contrast to 1961-3, when both the TUC and CBI had been in
favour, made it far harder to create an unambiguous
impression of producer interest in an ambitious approach to
EC membership : the doubtful legitimacy of what many in
Heath's own party considered to be "corporatist" government.
There were thus limits to which principal interest groups
Interviews with Anthony Barber and Campbell Adamson,"The 
Seventies"
2. Interview with Sir Douglas Allen, " The Seventies".
3. Interview with Sir Campbell Adamson, "The Seventies".
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could be mobilised to counter the difficulties of developing 
coherent policies for EC membership from party bases.
Turning to points of political culture, a common theme is
that Britain had a more pronounced sense of nationhood than
the original six members of the EC and that this would
greatly complicate the mediation of a substantial proportion
of public issues through a process of transnational
politics. British domestic actors faced greater cognitive
difficulties than counterparts amongst the original Six in
adjusting to the splitting of political functions between
the nation state and the EC and in resisting the temptation
to see the role of the latter as an interference. To some,
this would create a mismatch between functional needs for
transnational co-operation and identative values in British
politics. Earlier sections, particularly those on initial
Conservative opposition to entry and the heat that was
generated by the prospect of net British contributions to 
1
the EC budget, suggested that there was some evidence of low 
British adaptability from national to transnational politics 
and Table 11 would seem to provide further confirmation.
Entry was also accompanied by a substantial level of 
mistrust from both left and right of the prospect of British 
entanglement with foreign political processes. Comments from 
the House of Commons debates of 1971 will show how some
1. See above P 210 & PP 237-9.
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still saw the latter as likely to involve the UK in a vortex
of institutional breakdown, compensating bureaucratisation
TABLE 11 Eurobarometer poll of attitudes to European 
Integration. Balance of favourable over 
unfavourable replies.
Holl Lux Ger Bel Fr It The Six Br
In favour of EC +71 +64 +62 +55 +55 +42 +56 -14
A United States +47 +70 +60 +50 +56 +53 +56 -18
of Europe
Directly +38 +61 +55 +45 +44 +49 +48 -10
Elected Parliament
European foreign/ +18 +12 +38 +32 +26 +40 +33 -38
economic policy
Would you vote +45 +47 +57 +28 +37 +26 +41 -2
for a European
President of a different nationality ?
and authoritarianism, in contrast to Britain's own discovery
of the secrets of gentle and stable political evolution. The
Conservative member, Derek Walker-Smith, argued that Britain
would be " trading in its parliamentary system for one
devised for countries that do not have a long tradition of
1
parliamentary democracy". Labour member, Stanley Clinton-
Davies, claimed that the " Europe of the Six was politically
unstable. Brandt has a majority of three with a very
sinister right wing element poised to take power. France
2
has a political structure that is less than democratic"
Another Labour member. Dr John Gilbert, argued:
" if Britain does have a special contribution to make, it 
will not be strengthened by being integrated with a 
community whose decision-making institutions are
1. Hansard, 27 October 1971, Cols 2133-7.
2. Hansard, 25 October 1971, Cols 1488-93.
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undemocratic..whose concept of the relationship between 
state and individual is different and a large part of whose 
electorate has a persistent partiality for parties of the 
left and right. . the prospects are extremely slim of a 
democratic party of change attaining a majority in the 
European Parliament". 1.
The conceit that Britain was the world ' s laboratory in the 
ingenious development of political institutions -and that it 
could only provide the rest of the world with a paradigm if 
it remained apart from European integration- was not dead.
Nevertheless, conclusions about British concepts of 
nationhood and implications for UK relations with the EC 
need to be deployed with discrimination. The relatively 
lower propensity of British actors to develop a sense of 
community with other European peoples or to transfer 
loyalties to transnational institutions has been put down to 
the way in which continental states were either discredited 
or defeated at some point in the Second World War, while 
Britain emerged from its "lonely stand" against the rest of 
Europe with an enhanced sense of the peculiar strengths of 
its institutions and national bonding; at the time of entry, 
many thought that these assets should not be blurred by 
participation in the EC, in case they should be needed again 
at a time of crisis. However, the formative experiences of 
different generational cohorts in British politics had 
cross-cutting cognitive effects on perceptions of 
nationhood. Even the war itself was open to an opposite 
interpretation, as exemplified by Heath himself. Close 
Ï1 The New York Times, 23 October 1971.
298
friends have dated European integration as the ruling
passion of his political career from his travels as a
student, when he witnessed the Nuremburg rallies and later
1
the amassing of German troops to invade Poland. Table 5 on 
page 240 shows that many Conservative M.P’s shared his 
belief that Europe had to integrate to the point at which 
nation states could no longer cause European wars.
Table 12 below also shows that support for EC entry was 
inversely related to age. Although this may have reflected 
youthful idealism or the psychosclerosis of age, it may also 
be that the cognitions of younger cohorts were more exposed 
to i) transnational channels of communication that were 
corrosive of national identifications ii) feelings of 
national failure following the relatively greater 
difficulties faced by Britain's state, society and economy 
since the formation of the EC.
TABLE 12: BALANCE OF APPROVERS OVER DISAPPROVERS OF EC 
ENTRY BY AGE
15-24 25-44 45-66 65+
ORC
March '71 +5 -4 -14 -41
18-24 35-44 55-64
NOP
March '72 +9 +2 -15
Source Kitzinger, op cit, P 416. King, op cit, P 26.
More fundamentally, there is evidence that strong feelings 
Interview with Madron Seligman," The Seventies".
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of national identity were primarily significant because of
their holders' positioning in organised politics: they were
well represented in the Conservative Party and Parliament.
Outside organised politics, research had shown British
society to be one of weak political identifications of all 
1
kinds . This is supported by polling evidence on EC entry.
Tables 7 and 8 on Pages 277-8 show that although around 40%-
50% of all respondents expected some loss of identity, only
around 10% of antis opposed entry for reasons of
sovereignty. Table 8 shows that respondents distinguished
perceptions of what entry would mean for personal living
standards from assessments of the national interest and
based their positions on the former. The need to project
Britain as likely to assume a leadership role in the EC was
clearly a response to actors in organised , rather than
popular politics. By 1969, the public had come to expect
that the UK would " take a back seat" to other states in the 
2
EC - but there was no sign that this was a reason for public 
opposition to entry !
A pattern of public opinion low on both national or European
identification, but high on "utilitarian" assessments of
political options had mixed, and not necessarily
constraining, implications for the ways in which British
Governments could approach EC membership. Lindberg and
Ï1 See Butler and Stokes, op citl 1971. Also Richard Rose, 
ed. Studies in British Politics, Macmillan, London, 1976.
2. R. Jowell and G. Hoinville , Britain into Europe: Public 
Opinion and the EEC, Croom Helm, London, 1976, P 27.
300
Scheingold point out that once a public becomes accustomed
to positive material feedback from European co-operation it
may begin to expect a continuing flow of such gains and
become impatient with those actors who hold up EC processes.
Governments may also find that "spill-over" operates;
circumstances may arise in which they have to
choose between rolling back some of the utilitarian gains
received by their electorates or protecting them by
1
extending transnational co-operation into new issue areas.
From the polling data, it can be hypothesised that British 
opinion functioned cybernetically. It had chosen one
critical variable to monitor - expectations of the value of 
EC membership to living standards- and it would largely 
judge European co-operation by results for this single 
measure: if results were good, public opinion would be
available to support the forces in organised politics which 
favoured an activist approach to the EC: if they were bad,
public discontent would lend justification to those who 
favoured minimalist or hostile approaches to the EC; 
frustration with EC dealings might even be convertible into 
feelings of Britain’s embattled nationhood that were by no 
means a necessary feature of its political culture. Various 
corollaries for Britain's evolving relationship with the EC 
can be drawn from this cybernetic model of public opinion. 
First, much would depend on the early, " formative" 
experiences of UK membership. As the columnist David Watt 
T1 Lindberg and Scheingold, op cit, 117-20
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put it, Britain could not even be counted safely inside the
EC for another five years, during which time it would be
necessary to demonstrate that there would be " cash prizes
1
for all" and not just for the original Six. Second, in line
2
with the above critique of cybernetics/pragmatics they 
represented a peremptory and unreflective criterion for 
assessing the new relationship. Third, even if a simple 
utilitarian feedback model could be supportive of what 
Taylor has called a gesellschaft approach to European co­
operation - " different actors pursuing their own interests,
3
when coincidentally convergent" - low levels of British
socio-psychological identification with the EC might also
inhibit the development of the relationship . There was a
risk that Britain would react with incomprehension to any
expectation by its partners that policies designed to tap
the material potential of European co-operation should be
matched by progress in the creation of a European
gemeinschaft. Lindberg and Scheingold also point out that
feelings of " mutual identification will be supportive of
4
the EC problem-solving capacity" : gemeinschaft may be
needed to smooth the way for gesellschaft by easing problems 
of international co-operation such as the near impossibility 
of arranging an exact equality in costs and benefits or a 
precise synchrony in the delivery of promises.
1. The Financial Times, 20 October 1971.
2. See above PP 133-7.
3. Taylor, op cit, P 84.
4. Lindberg and Scheingold, op cit, P 39.
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But although there is some evidence that feelings of 
national identity could limit the options available to 
British Government in the new relationship with the EC, it 
is claimed here that the real difficulty was conceptual 
rather than emotional. The domestic politics of the early 
1970's presents evidence of low ability to reconceptualise 
politics in transnational terms: indeed, of a failure to
recognise that this would even be important to the viability 
of EC membership.
As elite bipartisanship has been much criticised for the 
cognitive under-development of British domestic thinking 
about the relationship between the UK and its external 
environment, the conjunction of its demise with a 
fundamental change in Britain's foreign policy could have 
provided an important opportunity. In a comparative study 
between British and US foreign-policy making at the end of 
the 1960's. Waltz had argued that the UK stress on achieving 
consensus within a closed elite process was actually less 
effective than more open and pluralistic US methods; the 
need for US policy-makers to win the support of other 
executive and legislative agencies put them under greater
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pressure to ensure that their assumptions possessed
sufficient consistency and coherence to survive in open 
1
debate. In 1973, Frankel argued that elite bipartisanship
made Britain a society in which its elite neglected domestic
affairs for the glamour of foreign policy, while its mass
formed no conception of the need to set domestic preferences
in the context of the external relationships that made them 
2
feasible. In 1968, opinion polls found that no foreign
policy issue had been considered important by more than 2%
of the public. Moreover, interest in foreign affairs had
declined over the previous twenty years; paradoxically,
discontent with economic and social performance may have
been leading to an even more sel preoccupied domestic
politics, just as discussion of cause and cure required
3
international perspectives.
In the light of these criticisms, patterns of British 
political discourse during 1970-2 should be tested for three 
related characteristics that were likely to be helpful to 
the successful development of the relationship with the EC:
i) intellectually challenging processes that would help 
policy-makers move towards value integration: a gradual
resolution of any initial failure to confront trade-offs 
that might be needed to make EC membership work, ii ) 
Ï1 k ] Waltz, op cit~ 1967.
2. Frankel, op cit, PP 13-9.
3. Philip Abrams, " Social Structure, Social Change and 
British Foreign Policy", Kaiser and Morgan, op cit, PP127-51
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1
"cognitively open" learning patterns. British domestic 
actors relevant to the multi-level game of successfully 
negotiating international collaboration should at least be 
open to "up-grading" mind-sets based on a self-enclosed 
national politics with the beginnings of concepts of 
transnational politics and economics: iii) in particular,
they should be able to adapt shared meanings and norms to 
the possibilities of a new transnational politics. This 
would be important domestically and not just to facilitate 
co-operation with EC partners. It would not matter if a 
consensus failed to emerge on the substantive issues 
involved in developing British membership in a 
transformationalist or traditionalist mode, if it was agreed 
that one side or the other had legitimately established the 
right to enact its preferred approach.
The House of Commons debates provide a useful starting point 
to apply these three tests of the adaptability of British 
domestic attitudes to EC membership, as Parliament’s 
defenders suggest that its true role has shifted from 
selecting governments to providing a central focus for 
public debate: to providing a point at which the assumptions
of governments can be tested and the consciousness of the
2
public adapted to changing contexts. However, the ten days 
T1 See above P 131.
"2^. See Michael Ryle, "The Commons in the Seventies: A
General Survey", in S.A. Walkland and Michael Ryle, The 
Commons in the Seventies, Fontana, 1977, PP 11-33.
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Commons debate on EC entry in 1971 received poor
contemporary reviews. Le Monde wrote of " history being 
made ±n ^ air of boredom" and of the parliamentary debate 
contributing to the fracturing of British thinking between
apocalyptic visions, inflated expectations and shortterm
1 f
niggardliness. David Watt thought that entry was being
approached in an air of regretful nostalgia. The case was
too often made in terms of how Britain might have had a
"better yesterday" if it had joined the EC in 1957. By
diverting attention from changing international contexts,
this inhibited psychological preparation for further
adjustments that might be needed in Britain’s relationship
with the EC; it deepened expectations that entry would bring
a " restoration rather than a transformation in Britain’s 
2
policy". Peter Jenkins complained of pros tending to play
safe with homogenised, anodyne arguments, which enabled them
to get through the immediate task of forming a majority for
entry, but only at the price of little debate on exactly how
Britain should develop its membership; this was a missed
3
opportunity as the was " at its most malleable". To another 
reviewer, the whole experience challenged belief in the " 
capacity of the British political system to handle 
sophisticated questions". It was no more than a " shallow 
dialectic of personalities
1. Le Monde, 23 and 29 October 1971.
2. David Watt, The Financial Times, 29 October 1971,
3. Peter Jenkins, The Guardian, 29 October 1971.
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1
and ill-considered ideas".
The research of House of Commons speeches, on which table 5
2
is based, adds some further perspectives. Both Conservative 
and Labour pros slipped too easily into presenting the EC as 
a source of assured economic benefits, at the expense of 
assessing adjustments that might have to be made in 
political practices and forms. Also apparent was the 
tendency for self-preoccupied domestic tussles to crowd out 
analysis of international context in parliamentary foreign 
policy debates. A great deal of time was spent on quoting 
old statements to embarrass leading members of the opposite 
party; this occurred in 15 of the 25 speeches by government 
ministers.
A common approach was to itemise desiderata and features of 
membership that Britain should not tolerate as separate 
lists, i.e. without explicit consideration of whether the 
one could be had without the other. In the manner of the 
theory of cognitive consistency, the Government seems 
likewise to have responded to the unfolding debate by 
claiming that entry was consistent with every concern 
raised. In other words, domestic debate did not compel 
greater coherence in government thinking; the pattern of
1. Philip Allott, "Britain and Europe: A Political Analysis" 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol XIII, No 3, March 
1973.
2. See above P 240.
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over-justification and under-articulation of trade-offs was
deepened by the Government ’ s need to get through the
immediate domestic exigencies of ratifying entry. Royle and
Armstrong both recall that the Government was almost
exclusively focused on the turbulent daily politics of EC
entry with little time remaining for detailed planning of
1
the new relationship.
The remarkable stability, in Table 7, of polling responses
between 1969 and 1971 to the request to itemise advantages
or disadvantages of EC entry suggests that the " Great
Debate" declared by the Government in summer 1971 was a
limited learning experience as far as the public was 
1
concerned. There was still little inclination to
conceptualise entry as a re-ordering of Britain’s
relationship with its external environment, as opposed to a
change that would affect prices or the prospects of British
industry. The benefit of establishing closer links with
Europe was mentioned by only 5% in both 1969 and 1971. The
Gallup Series shows that those who considered the EC to be
the most urgent public issue did increase from 4% to 13%
during the Great Debate, but even at its peak it was on a
par with Northern Ireland (12%) and well behind immediate
domestic concerns of unemployment (36%) and inflation (22%).
Moreover, by early 1972, EC entry was back to being the most
2
important issue for only 2% of the public.
See above P 277.
2. Gallup Series, 105-37 (1970-1) & 138-72 (1971-2)
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Two examples will now be cited of the lack of progress in
stabilising shared meanings and norms to govern the new
relationship with the EC. Norton has argued that Heath’s
refusal to " engage in a process of concession in advance"
with his party violated all the conventions of
1
frontbench/backbench relationships. However, an alternative 
perspective is that it was hard to maintain many domestic 
conventions in the new context of EC membership. The refusal 
to accept any amendments to the European Communities Act 
reflected the priority Heath gave to keeping faith with his 
new EC partners. The Government did not want to refer any 
matters back to the negotiations, given that talks about 
fish had dragged on for a further six months after the 
conclusion of the main agreement. The difficulty of 
injecting parliamentary accountability to the new 
transnational relationship would be increased further if the 
Government also had to negotiate with the CBI and TUC to 
attain the goals of EC entry. On the other hand, the problem 
was not convincingly answered by a special Ways and Means 
Committee of the Commons in 1973. By i) making arrangements 
for every Community measure to be put before a scrutiny 
committee of the Commons, which would then alert the House 
as a whole to matters it considered important and ii) 
stipulating that the Government should not allow the Council 
of Ministers to proceed on a proposal until Parliament had 
stated its views, the Ways and Means committee devised a 
method that would meet the formalities of parliamentary
i. Norton, op cit, 1978, P 230.
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accountability, but without devising norms that were likely
to be practicable in terms of parliamentary time, the
understanding and attention that the average British M.P.
could give even to EC issues sifted by a scrutiny committee,
or the ability of the Council of Ministers to accommodate
1
further delays in the handling of the EC’s business.
2
An especially trenchant contemporary article in Round Table
by Professor of Government, J.D.B, Mitcell, argued that the
fundamental intellectual problem of British politics in
relation to EC entry was that the preservation of national
vetoes was being falsely assumed to remove any need to adapt
to the " inter-play of levels of Government":
intergovernmental ism was assumed to remove all need for new
political forms, although it has been seen that it requires
transnational policies and processes to dominate, if they
3
are to secure coherence and continuity. Unless Britain was 
to abandon many of the goals of membership in chapter 1, it 
was not only supranational integration, but effective inter­
governmental ism that required an ability to re-think and re­
order domestic politics, Mitchell continues:
" It would be impossible to try to work the Community 
process subject to detailed control by nine parliaments..for 
Westminster to attempt to grab back detailed powers of 
control.. if the aim is to work in the new European- wide
Ï1 Basse et al, op cit, P 61.
2. J.D. B. Michell, " British Institutions inside Europe", 
Round Table, No 249, January 1973.
3. See above PP 106-7.
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dimension, processes should be accountable to a parliament 
that thinks in that dimension. . . if inter-governmental 
processes are inefficient, efficiency would be still lower 
if an inter-parliamentary process were added".
Contemporary writers on British politics and society such as
Nevil Johnson and A.H. Halsey suggested that the long
dominance of a particular form of political order - that of
the sovereignty of the national parliament- inhibited the
1
conceptualisation of alternative principles of arrangement:
the low rate of change of institutional and social bondings
in Britain encouraged a belief that political forms were
hallowed by tradition and not by the functional requirements
1
of changing contexts, domestic or international. Such
observations explain the paradox, pointed out by Donald
Chapman, of equating the defence of nationhood with the role
of Parliament, although the latter was in many ways a
compromised political form; 2000 legislative instruments
were already made every year under powers delegated to
individual ministers and " everyone, except for the House of
2
Commons was consulted on pre-legislative work".
A second institutional issue would seem, at first sight, to 
have suggested greater willing to reconceptualise political 
forms . Entry to the EC raised the issue of how to 
legitimise major foreign policy change that was also 
constitutional. Many antis claimed that a
1. Johnson, op cit, P 30. A.H. Halsey, Change in British 
Society, GUP, London, 1981.
2. The Guardian, 20 October 1971.
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1
General Election was needed . However, it was soon conceded
that elections could not easily be held on single issues in 
2
modern politics, especially when the parties were themselves 
too split to campaign as cohesive entities or offer the 
electors in each constituency a clear choice of candidates 
for or against the issue. From this point of view, a 
referendum was the only feasible instrument of mass consent 
and the case for its use was reinforced by the fact that 
British Governments had allowed Gibraltarians to decide 
their sovereignty by referendum and were considering a 
similar exercise in Northern Ireland. Indeed, the three 
other candidate countries to the EC and France were due to 
decide entry/enlargement by popular vote.
Opponents of referendum argued that it could not be used for
a once-off foreign policy change, without facing the
implications of its establishment as a constitutional
precedent and defining the criteria for its future use. The
irony of antis thus implying that parliamentary sovereignty
3
should be tempered was not missed, though the latter replied 
that a referendum could be consultative only. However, 
several pros argued that referenda would introduce a 
mechanism for popular maninipulation to British politics. 
Sir Ian Gilmour, then a Defence Minister, argued that any
1. Douglas Jay, The Times, 1 August 1970 and The Guardian,
17 June 1971.
2. Neil Marten, The Financial Times, 17 March 1971.
3. The Times, 12 June 1971.
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competent draftsman could obtain whatever result he wanted
by fixing the question. The Times argued that the timing of
a referendum would be in the control of the Government of
the day: it would be a device of " pseudo-democratic
dialogue", the over-simplification of issues and 
1
demagoguery. Roy Jenkins finally resigned from the Deputy
Leadership of the Labour Party not on the EC itself, but on
the use of a referendum which he condemned as a potentially
" powerful instrument against progressive ( domestic) 
2
legislation".
It might have been useful at this point to stabilise i ) 
definitions of when a change in the relationship between 
Britain and the EC would be defined as constitutional and
ii) procedures for the future legitimation of this kind of 
change. The Government, after all, anticipated that further 
Treaty changes might be needed and acknowledged both 
explicitly and implicitly in the principle of institutional 
pragmatism that these could involve authority transfers to 
the EC level. However, the British political debate of 1970- 
2 failed to stabilise such principles. The pros' habit 
of claiming that all change was reconcilable with existing 
forms and the anti tendency to see all change as moving 
towards full European integration, did not suggest that 
British politics was likely to develop agreed 
classifications for future changes in UK/EC relations. On
1. The Times, 1 August 1970.
2. The Times, 13 April 1972.
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the other hand, the various cases that were made for 
ratifying future changes by parliamentary decision, election 
or referendum never succeeded in establishing an identity , 
free from the perception that actors merely preferred the 
device that they thought would produce the desired result in 
the particular instance of EC entry; in short, the debate 
was perceived as being about expediency, not the 
establishment of " universally generalisable" principles.
Cognitive theory would predict that any domestic debate to
clarify British thinking towards the new relationship would
only be as good as pre-existing analytical categories for
making good sense of Britain's evolving situation. An
interesting critique of British political discourse in this
regard has been provided by Nevil Johnson's , ^  Search of
the Constitution( 1977). To Johnson, " years of floundering
in a world of pure pragmatism" had produced an "atrophy" of
1
" political language". British politics had eschewed the 
explicit articulation of principles of political arrangement 
for government by precedents and unstated assumptions. The 
problem was that it was operating at the very limits of this 
method, as the changing contexts of Britain's economy, 
society and international relations demanded institutional 
renewal. But politicians could only set about analysing 
the problem and establishing criteria for change if they 
abandoned the pragmatism on which they had been raised. To 
Johnson EC entry had been a primary example of:
Ï1 Johnson, op cit  ^ PP 14-27.
314
" a psychological aversion to any kind of change that 
requires the explicit revision of principles...virtually the 
whole of the opposition to the EC was founded on the fear 
that we might someday have to behave differently"
From this point of view, the urge to relate entry to
continuities in British foreign policy, or as Hill puts it,
to give considerable attention to historical example, but
little to planning the future, may have been a form of
pathology; a displacement activity designed to keep
1
uncomfortable issues of principle out of mind.
The point might be added in the case of EC entry that the
transition from years of a foreign policy debate cocooned in
elite bipartisanship to a critical domestic debate on the
best alignment between British institutions and their
international context could not be made in one stride. If
there had been an atrophy in thinking about domestic
principles of arrangement, the problem was surely even more
2
pronounced in the case of foreign policy. The heavy lacing
of the case for entry with security arguments, may have
partially reflected the greater ease of mobilising a
consensus for change around notions of national security,
but Tooze has also analysed the genuine difficulties
Britain’s elite has found in reconceptualising its external
context as one in which British society is caught in a
TT Christopher Hill, " The Historical Background: Past and 
Present in British Foreign Policy" in Smith, Smith, White, 
op cit, P 26.
2. W. F. Hanrieder and G.P. Auton, The Foreign Policies of 
West Germany, France and Britain,, Prentice-Hall, NJ, 1980, 
PP 290-5.
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1
matrix of politico-economic relationships.
As far as the wider public was concerned, the Government
felt constrained in its explication of the full meaning of
EC membership by, amongst other factors, the need to present
its efforts at public persuasion within the existing
structuring of popular attitudes. Given the urgency with
which public opinion needed to be turned round, cognitive
theory would suggest that the public would have just
"screened out" arguments that did not address its salient
concerns. The advice of Conservative Central Office to Heath
was that the public would be most receptive to a well argued 
2
economic case. Accordingly , he concentrated on two themes
when he made his broadcast in July 1971- neutralising fears
of higher prices by raising expectations of higher earnings
and tapping the continued salience of the world wars in
British culture by arguing that European co-operation would
3
prevent similar tragedies. Neither point provoked thought 
about the unfolding relationship between Britain, the EC and 
the international environment.
However, the main " learning opportunity" for the public was
provided by the media, rather than the Government. Although,
there is no comparable evidence for 1970-2, Table 13 shows
Ï1 Roger Tooze, " Security and Order: the Economic
Dimension" in Smith, Smith, White, op cit, PP 124-47.
2. Interview with Edward Heath, December 1988.
3. Braodcast by Heath, 8 July 1971. RIIA Press Lib.
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by whom the public considered itself to have been informed 
during the 1975 referendum campaign.
TABLE I3l SOURCES OF PUBLIC INFORMATION DURING THE 
REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN OF 1975
Television 83% Radio 17
Press 71 Official leaflets 15
Friends, family 23 Workmates 12
Source Jowell and Hoinville , op cit, P 64.
Of the major national newspapers, only the Daily Express was
opposed to entry. However, if the 1975 evidence holds for
1970-2, the significance of the press may have been limited
by the fact that it was trusted by only 18% of the public,
against 66% who trusted television. In fact, the main
criticism that media studies made of television was that an
excessive desire for balance, rather than debate,
contributed to the presentation of all questions in " small,
I
ready-to-hand, stereotyped categories"; it was necessary to
present all issues as "small bites", in order to move on
quickly to make a statement of the contrary point of view.
There is some evidence that both the Government and the
media under-estimated the boredom threshold of the public.
There are also suggestions that many suspected they were
being patronised with a trivialised presentation that kept
them from an understanding of the full import of what was
being proposed. Indeed, there seems to have been a genuine
thirst for information with 6,000,000 copies of a shortened
version of the I97I White Paper being collected from Post
TT Jowell and Hoinville, op cit, PP 77-91. Also 
Kitzinger, op cit, 1973, PP 331-52.
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Offices within a week of publication. It is possible that, 
once the standard of living issues had been aired, sections 
of the public may have been ready to move on to a more 
profound discussion of the meaning of EC entry. There may 
have been scope to widen public assessments of EC membership 
from standard living criteria which went unexplored as 
Government and the media continued with assumptions of the 
era of elite bipartisanship that the public was uninterested 
in foreign policy.
Reluctance to debate criteria for how the new relationship 
1
should develop may have been compounded by the way in which
the under-articulation of conflicting values and principles
had long performed important functions in British society.
It has been seen how the political game often encouraged the
lumping together of conflicting positions and obfuscating
formulae. Wallace's comments about " the conventions of
informed debate not encouraging novelty or inspiration" and
the identification of soundness and solidness as central
political virtues reflect the premium that Britain's elite
2
placed on consensus, rather than coherence. Consensus was
thought essential to managing substantial, but
unarticulated, divisions within British society. As Marquand
3
has put it, "ambiguity and stability went hand in hand". The 
EC issue was difficult to manage within such a political
1. Allott, op cit, P 204-6
2. Wallace, op cit, 1976, P 107.
3. Marquand, op cit, 1988,P 185.
318
culture because it stood at the confluence of so many issues
that were beginning to demand clear decisions of principle:
how should Britain relate to its external environment ? What
principles should structure production and distribution if
Britain was to retain a competitive economy ? Should Britain
modernise or conserve its society ? The problem may have
been exacerbated by cognitive resistance to an excess of
simultaneous challenges to core assumptions . Julian
Critchley, noted how the Conservative faithful had been
required to adjust in a very few years from the notion that
Britain looked after other countries to the idea that it
1
could no longer look after itself on its own.
To conclude the last two chapters, the British political
game and culture were causes rather than correctives to a
lack of value integration. Any entity needs to be adaptive
to the structures within which it exists; it is better still
if it can influence them. Given that British Government had
to respond to international as well as domestic systems - to
the political demands of preserving economic competitiveness
and diplomatic influence in a world of larger states and
multilateral politics - there was a danger that what would
be "rational at the international level would be impolitic
2
at the domestic level", so long as the latter was
cognitively ill-adapted to transnational politics.
J~, Critchley, "Strains and Stresses in the Conservative 
Party", Political Quarterly, Vol 44, No 4, October 1973.
2. Putnam, op cit, P 434.
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PART 3: BRITAIN'S FIRST STEPS IN COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP.
An examination of Britain's eventful initiation into the EC 
will provide a useful test case for hypotheses that were 
developed earlier in the thesis. The aim will be to continue 
the story up to the fall of the Heath Government in March 
1974, while testing the following cognitive/critical 
propositions : i ) The claim in Part 1 that the assumptions of 
Britain's foreign policy-makers lacked value integration. 
There was a failure to specify how the goals of entry and 
traditional patterns of foreign policy-making would be 
traded off in the event of conflict between the two; ii) The 
suggestion at the end of Chapter 3 that the members of the 
new Community converged from separate conceptual reference 
points and without establishing intersubjective structures 
adequate to their several ambitions; iii) The conclusion of 
Chapter 6 that there was a failure to develop a comfortable 
relationship between British domestic politics and EC 
membership; the former were likely to entrench value 
disintergration in British elite thinking and to present 
problems of compatibility with such EC intersubjective 
structures as had formed by the early 1970's; iv) The claim 
that is made throughout that EC membership is a foreign 
policy response by middling states to the increasingly 
fractured and recursive structuring of the operational 
environment, but that its successful employment to meet this 
challenge is linked to the ability of individual 
governments, their domestic constituencies and Community
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processes to reach accurate perceptions of how trade-offs 
have to be made in immediate contexts, while grasping how 
future trade-offs might be restructured by collaborative 
action.
If British decision-makers had suffered from cognitive 
consistency - seeing the EC as a "solution" to Britain’s 
foreign policy problems, when it merely changed the context 
in which awkward choices would have to be confronted - case 
studies of participation in the EC should reveal pre-entry 
assumptions to have been designed to screen out 
"dissonances", or uncomfortable anticipations of trade-offs 
that might have to be made to make membership work . The 
following assumptions are worth examining: that an identity
of interest between members of the enlarged EC would result 
in an easy co-operation: that any adjustments in political
forms needed to deliver the goals of British entry could 
evolve through a process of "institutional pragmatism": that 
a system of inter-state norms and understandings would prove 
adequate in the meantime: that Britain would enjoy a
"leadership role" in the EC, reducing the compromises it 
would have to accept in the making of collective agreements. 
After an empirical introduction. Chapter 7 will be arranged 
around the testing of these assumptions against the first 
concrete experiences of EC membership. However, any failure 
in the pre-entry assumptions of Britain’s policy-makers will 
be shown to illustrate all the theses in the preceding 
paragraph and not just the first.
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CHAPTER 7: HOPES AND DISAPPOINTMENTS: THE PERILS OF INCHOATE
FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE.
1. Great Ambitions and Meagre Results : Britain and the
European Community: 1970-4.
British entry coincided with one of the periods of great
ambition in the history of the EC, as was perhaps inherent
in the decision at the Hague to couple enlargement with an
economic and monetary union (EMU) and an initiative for
foreign policy co-operation (EPC). Moreover, Britain's
involvement dated from the end of 1970 and not from the
beginning of 1973. From November 1970, meetings of EPC were
immediately followed by consultations with the foreign
ministers of candidate countries; German Foreign Minister,
Walter Scheel, claimed that the differences between these
consultations and EPC itself were in practice " very
1
subtle". In May and June 1972, Britain attempted to
participate in Stage 1 of EMU by fixing the pound with EC 
currencies in the so-called "snake". However, this lasted 
just seven weeks before the Government was forced to allow 
sterling to float. Although EMU was supposed to progress to 
a more ambitious and permanent second phase on 31 December 
1973, the Heath Government was unable to return the pound to 
the snake throughout 1972-4.
The Paris summit between Heads of Government in October 1972 
was intended as the main point of introduction of new
1. The Daily Telegraph, 3 December 1970.
322
members to the programme established for the EC at the Hague
in December 1969. The summit was notable for the decision to
" transform the whole complex of relations into a European
Union" by 1980: the intended completion date for EMU.
However, it was apparent as early as Summer of 1973 that the
Community was not even going to make a convincing transition
1
to a second phase of EMU by the end of the year. This was a 
blow to British hopes to develop a European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) and the further liberalisation of 
continental markets within the EMU initiative. EPC developed 
more smoothly, in spite of Kissinger’s decision to declare 
1973 the " Year of Europe", thus raising contentious issues 
of how European integration, relations with the US and NATO 
should be related. The Foreign Ministers agreed the " 
Copenhagen Report" to intensify the EPC process in July 1973 
and a statement that attempted to define the EC’s identity 
in international affairs in December 1973.
However, 1973 ended disastrously. The Arab-Israeli war and 
the related oil crisis brought an end to what little 
remained of the EMU initiative, while the new habits of co­
operation that were supposed to characterise the enlarged EC 
were unable to restrain unilateral and competitive reactions 
to the Arab oil embargo. By early 1974, five of the nine 
members were part of a Deutschmark zone that now included 
various non-EC countries and eight of the nine were part of 
an OECD- based International Energy Agency, formed under US
1. Tsoukalis, op cit~ 1977, P 154.
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leadership. Immediate exigencies and the slow operation of
EC processes even before October 1973 meant that the
Copenhagen summit of December 1973 became what Heath has
described as " quite the worst summit of all modern 
1 ' 
meetings", where it had been intended as an informal review
of progress since Paris. However, with the exception of
intensified procedures for EPC, it did produce the only
decision to adjust EC institutions following enlargement.
It was decided that Heads of Government would henceforth
meet regularly, in what came to be known as the "European
Council", to define priorities and finalise agreements in
relation to the two branches of Community activity: the EEC
and EPC.
2. Underestimates of conflicts of intra-EC interest in 
initial British attitudes to the Community.
The 1971 White Paper had confidently claimed that the goals 
of entry could be achieved without " any erosion of national 
sovereignty" and with "unanimous" decision-making by member 
states, as the latter had " common interests" and the 
differences between them were " insignificant". However, the 
case of the Heath Government's attempts to develop important 
goals of British entry within the EMU initiative showed how 
unlikely it was that awkward choices would disappear into an 
identity of interests between member states.
1. Heath, op cit, 1988, P 200.
2. Cmnd 4715 of 1971, Paras 29 & 32.
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An analysis of the different interests of the members of the
enlarged EC can be divided into i) operational factors:
differences in domestic contexts and in the ways in which
countries were locked into the wider international
environment that were likely to produce disagreements
between member states, whatever the interpretative schemes
of individual governments. As Magnifico puts it, attempts to
form single policies for the whole EC area are not only
complicated by governments choosing different trade-offs
1
between options: they do face different trade-offs. ii)
cognitive factors: different preferences or priorities and
conflicting interpretations of how economies, societies and
international relations work. Keohane has pointed out that
decisions cannot be inferred from contexts alone as all
choice theory is empirically empty without knowledge of how
governments structure their priorities between different
2
options in the contexts they face. Richard Cooper has
argued that international co-operation to formulate
policies across states and not merely within them " has
often been impossible without analytic agreement on means-
3
ends relationships and consensual knowledge".
1. G. Magnifico, European Monetary Union, Macmillan, London, 
1973, P 13.
2. Quoted in Richard Herrmann, " The Empirical Challenge of 
the Cognitive Revolution", International Studies Quarterly, 
Vol 32, No 2, June 1988, P 178
3. Quoted in R.D. Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, Hanging 
Together: The Seven Power Summits, Sage/RIIA, London, 1977, 
P9
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Britain's abortive participation in EMU was plagued from the
start by a conflict of priorities between Britain, France
and Germany. For Pompidou, a cohesive EC currency bloc
presented the first opportunity for thirty years for Europe
to insist on the reform of an international monetary system,
which the French Government perceived to be loaded in favour
of the power and wealth of the US. For Heath, EC entry
represented the first opportunity for fifteen years to
reverse Britain’s relative decline and EMU could not be
allowed to get in the way of this objective. As the
Economist Intelligence Unit put it, the Britain Government
felt that it needed flexible exchange rates to " achieve a
stable and expanding economy that will withstand competition
from the Community as Britain becomes more interlocked in 
1
the EC system".
The March 1972 budget accordingly pumped 2% of GNP into the 
economy, although Britain was due to enter the snake from 
the end of April. As a result, Britain's membership of the 
snake lasted just seven weeks before the Government was 
forced by a simple lack of reserves to allow the pound to 
float. Moreover, there seems to have been a conscious 
decision to give priority to the interests of Britain's 
domestic economy over steady progress towards a second stage 
of EMU by 31 December 1973. Barber had told the Commons in 
his 1972 budget speech that " it is neither necessary nor
European Trends, The Economist Intelligence Unit, No 35, 
May 1973, P 4.
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desirable to distort domestic economies..in order to retain
1
unrealistic exchange rates".
Attempts to return Britain to the snake only led to a
conflict of priorities with the German Government. To square
a fixed pound with continued domestic expansion, the Heath
Government came to demand i) a generous regional policy,
2
sufficient to counter the law of uneven development, and ii)
access to the currency reserves of other member states "
without limits of amount, without conditions and without
3
obligations to repay or guarantee". In practice, this would
mean unlimited Deutschmark supports for sterling and
increased German subventions to the EC. However, German
priorities for EMU initiative were not to extend German
liquidity to allow other members to run more expansionary
policies, but to construct new mechanisms and rules that
would establish German disciplines as the common standard of
economic management, in order to prevent the integration of
markets and currencies transmitting the effects of un-
4
neighbourly national policies throughout the EC.
Moreover, these differences of priority and perception were
stubbornly rooted. They could not be readily abandoned, as
Ï1 Frank Blackaby, ed, British Economic Policy: 1960-74,
CUP/NIESR, London, 1978, P 62.
2. Above P 79.
3. European Trends, The Economist Intelligence Unit, No 35, 
May 1973, P 4.
4. Kruse, op cit, PP 48-9.
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they reflected conflicting core beliefs about the ways in
which the state/society/economy relationship ought to be
organised and these were deeply grounded in the differential
experiences by which national elites had assumed
1
responsibility for economic and welfare questions. Entire
complexes of economic belief, spanning the distance from
varying perceptions of international political economy to
microeconomic issues of how best to treat individual
producers, were also engaged in disagreements about the
shape of an economic and monetary union for the EC. The oft-
cited example of this was Anglo/French preference for
economic management geared to full employment, in contrast
to a German preference for the control of inflation. But two
further conflicts are instructive. Lord Armstrong recalls
that it was under the influence of economist Jacques Rueff
that the French Government pressed the EC to accept a
perspective of global economic relationships as an
2
ingredient of inter-state competion for international power.
By contrast, the Keynesian tradition led British Governments
to emphasise the importance of a co-operative relationship
3
with actors outside the EC. On the other hand, Britain’s
disagreement with Germany on regional policy partly
reflected conflicting microeconomic paradigms. Long
experience of dealing with an economy with regional
Ï1 P.J. Katzenstein et al. Between Power and Plenty: Foreign 
Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States, Wisconsin 
University Press, 1979.
2. Interview with Lord Armstrong, January 1989.
3. See above P 74.
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disparaties, had made the law of
uneven development axiomatic to British decision-makers. By
contrast, a more homogeneous economy and a successful
market-led recovery from the war, led German actors to view
regional policies as counter-productive to the extent that
they retarded the reallocation of resources by obscuring
market signals. B.C. Kruse's study of EMU thus rightly
stresses the limits to co-operation that arose from "
different conceptualisation of the relationships between the
1
variables.... and of policy instruments".
But why were insufficient intersubjective structures
shared meanings and norms - to manage economic and welfare 
questions at the EC level a problem for the British
Government ? Surely it was the French who wanted to fix
currencies and the Germans who sought to co-ordinate 
economic management, while the British just wanted to 
integrate markets ? The exact economic goals of British 
entry might be re-stated from Chapter 1 as follows: i) the
operation of EC states as a bloc actor in international
economic negotiation ii) sufficient transnational management 
of interdependence to promote technological collusion, to 
ensure the openness of the continental market in the age of 
the non-tariff barrier and to correct the " law of uneven 
development" between regions iii) a rise in the long-term 
growth potential of the British economy as a result of an 
immediate stimulus on entry. The technical inter-relatedness 
Ï1 Kruse, op cit~ P 197.
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of economic variables would combine with the political 
demands of EC coalition-building to require that progress 
could only be made towards the British package in the 
context of agreed priorities and analyses across a far wider 
front of decision-making than British Governments seem at 
first to have appreciated.
The snake was intended to provide the EC with the desired
bloc negotiating leverage in pending talks on international
monetary reform. EC parities would have to be renegotiated
en bloc, while outsiders would be encouraged to convert out
of other currencies if EC parities became a better "store of
1
value" by fluctuating by only half the international norm. 
However, the British experience showed that the snake could 
only thus become a source of bloc bargaining leverage if 
fixed currencies were given priority over domestic economic 
management; even if members' domestic policies were not 
integrated by explicit transnational co-ordination, they 
would have to be integrated by a process of mutual 
adjustment to the priority of preserving a matrix of fixed 
exchange rates. The British Government soon realised that 
this would also have distributive implications, requiring EC 
action to compensate the disadvantaged, as some countries 
and regions needed discretionary economic management more 
than others. The assumption that the EC could become an 
effective international actor without implications for the 
ll Tsoukalis, op cit, 1977, P 122.
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integration of intra EC policies had been shown to be false.
On the other hand, the Heath Government was unable to make
much progress towards the further opening of European
markets - which it had admitted to be a key to its ambition
to doubling the underlying growth rate of the British
1
economy after entry - without progress on currencies and co­
ordination of economic policies. Strange has argued that the 
integration of markets will be technically neutralised and
politically unstable, unless it rests on a substratum of
2
agreement about monetary economics. Unless currencies 
continuously settle at a rate uninfluenced by governments or 
speculative flows, they fragment markets in just the same 
way as tariffs: perhaps more so, as their fluctuations add
an uncertainty premium, breaking any equivalence between 
transactions within and across political boundaries. The 
political side of Strange's observation is borne out by the 
fact that Heath managed to launch a raft of measures for 
market liberalisation at the Paris summit in October 1972, 
only to find that these failed to make progress as the 
Germans lost confidence that there would be sufficient co­
ordination of economic management to allow further market 
integration without inflationary impulses being transmitted 
through the EC area and the French lost interest in an 
EMU initiative that seemed increasingly unlikely to respond
1. See P 93.
2. Susan Strange, " Interpretations of a Decade", in Loukas 
Tsoukalis, ed. The Political Economy of International Money, 
Sage/RIIA, London, 1985, P 39.
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to their priority for fixed currencies.
Analysis of European co-operation often employs the economic
1
notion of an " optimal policy-making area". The 
attraction of the EC as a policy-making area for Britain 
would be positively related to its greater coextensivity 
with causal influences over the variables which governments 
wanted to control, but it would be negatively related to any 
dilution of British preferences that would be technically 
necessary to manage the interdependent, yet diverse, 
economic conditions of EC countries as a single complex and 
politically necessary to form a coalition of states for 
common action. By ignoring the negative side of the 
equation, British policy-makers had been simplistic in 
claiming that the EC was already an optimum policy-making 
area . In economic and welfare matters, EC intersubjective 
structures were still inadequate to allow member states to 
form commensurable priorities or assessments of the effects 
of their actions; to the extent that British goals depended 
on collective action, EC processes would only be able to 
deliver this by compromising someone's prefered economic or 
social policies: in this sense, they would have to be more
coercive than anticipated. There was as yet no identity of 
interests on which an easy co-operation, free of awkward 
choices, could be grounded. But the notion of a policy 
making-area is static . Political processes can promote 
convergence in both the circumstances and interpretations of
1. Magnifico, op cit, PP 43-50.
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their component units. Thus the full charge that British 
foreign policy assumptions towards the EC were inchoate at 
the time of entry can only be proven if the events of 1972-3 
showed that they were unlikely to aid the evolution of the 
EC in the direction of greater value integration: 
of a progressive fulfilment of the prophecy that there would 
be no need to trade off values to attain the goals of entry. 
The related assumptions that EC institutions could evolve 
"pragmatically", while EC-based codes of inter-state co­
operation could progressively improve the relationship 
between political decentralisation and collective 
effectiveness, were intended to perform just such a role.
3) The Poverty of 2 Institutional Pragmatism".
Jobert recalls that the British approach of " institutional
pragmatism" governed Community thinking on political
1
structures in the early 1970's. When, in preparation for
the Paris summit, the Foreign Ministers of the Nine came to
respond to the Commission's plea that the Community's
institutions should be re-appraised on enlargement, Benelux
proposals to strengthen the Commission and European
Parliament and to reintroduce majority voting were rejected
for Home's argument that the Community should avoid grand
designs for institutions that would, in any case, take a
2
quite unpredictable form by 1980. Before returning to the 
T1 Interview with Jobert, The Times, 14 December 1973.
2. ^  Monde, 28 May 1972.
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discussion of EMU, it will be helpful to define 
institutional pragmatism more closely, to analyse its 
application to EC decision-making at the prompting of the 
Heath Government and to discuss it in relation to another 
primary goal of UK entry: foreign policy concertation.
1
It is worth referring to the above account of Heath’s views, 
while bearing in mind the following claims that were made 
for institutional pragmatism. First, by holding "theological 
arguments" in suspense, progress could be made via a whole 
series of packages on which members were agreed fact,
even though they disagreed on the principles that they 
represented or on the end-states to which they were tending. 
Second, that there was a great deal of unexploited potential 
in the institutional status quo and this could be tapped by 
more efficient methods before there was any need to propose 
changes that would provoke arguments of principle. Third, 
even then, such arguments would not be strictly necessary as
all kinds of flexible and experimental forms of
r\j
collaboration could be adopted and abgboned without anyone 
feeling that his preferred future had been foreclosed.
For reasons that are familiar, the successful launch of EPC
can be claimed as a vindication of institutional pragmatism
2
in the early 1970's. Although there was a period when some 
Ï1 See above PP 102-3.
2. Philippe de Schoutheete, ^  Cooperation Politique, 
Europeene, Labor, Brussells, 1980.
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considered it a threat to the Commission and supranational 
options for EC development, it generally managed through its 
loose, decentralised, non-obligatory nature to avoid offence 
to the defenders of state sovereignty, while convincing 
integrationalists that it could perform a useful role, 
pending the development of conditions more propitious to 
agreement on final structures for a united Europe. Indeed, 
it was only when members sought to relate concrete 
initiatives to broader principles of arrangement that EPC 
ran into trouble. Otherwise, even as early as 1970-4, EPC 
became progressively more sophisticated through a flexible 
attitude to experimentation; where experiments became
permanent it was not because they were derived from first
principles, but because they evoked memories of past 
successes.
On the other hand, the early 1970’s shows how the 
limitations of EPC were also those of institutional 
pragmatism. Foreign Services might not have been so flexible 
in pooling their information and assessments if they had not
been on the defensive about their roles and status within
c
national governments. By deflation, not all agencies can be
losing power within their own governments at the same time -
and thus be open to defensive transnational coalition
bulding. Moreover, EPC did not so much avoid questions of
institutional principle, as seem to do so. Without press
1
briefings on its operation, member governments found it
1. De Schoutheete, op cit, P 50.
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easier to combine multilateral concertation with the
appearance of national foreign policy-making, while, by 
contrast to reactions to EMU, few noticed that EPC had 
implications for parliamentary sovereignty. EPC only seems 
to leave the sovereignty of the state undisturbed because it 
does not involve integration through institutions. However, 
chapter 3 showed that EPC is either episodic, or
sufficiently integrative of national policies and processes 
to trace out coherent and sustained efforts to influence the 
international environment. A pragmatic failure to clarify 
this basic criterion led to the British Government being
much more at cross-purposes in its use of EPC during 1973 
than has hitherto been realised. In terms used by Panayotis 
Ifestos, there was a two-way pull between Heath’s 
interpretation of EPC as a process of common foreign policy­
making and Home's perception that it was a means for the
1
makers of separate foreign policies to consult.
Given Heath's view that the EC was in the process of turning 
itself into a new international actor, he was much more 
likely than others in the British Government to perceive 
Kissinger's "Year of Europe" as an attempt to exercise a " 
supervisory role" . Indeed, he accepted the Pompidou view 
that Kissinger had given the game away by i) proposing that 
Western Europe and the US should negotiate all diplomatic,
Panayotis Ifestos, European Political Co-operation: 
towards a Framework of Supranational Diplomacy, Gower, 
Aldershot, 1987, P 252.
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economic and military matters in tandem, and ii) suggesting
that the EC would only ever be a regional power in contrast
to US responsibility for global order. Here was an attempt
to embed the EC in a US system of priorities, to penetrate
its efforts to formulate policies of its own, to make US
defence of Europe a "fungible" source of power over all
other issue areas and to hijack the bargaining chips that
could be used to create a European diplomacy for Kissinger ’ s
own Grand Design, which depended crucially on tying the USSR
and China into an elaborate web of incentives and
1
restraints, capable of precision control by the US. Heath
considered the "Year of Europe" a massive impertinence,
similar to his " standing up in Trafalgar Square and
declaring a Year of America". His suspicions were sharpened
when a comparison of notes between Armstrong and Jobert
suggested that Kissinger was offering both Britain and
France some sort of leadership role in EC/US relations in
2
exchange for advancing the initiative. However, Home and the
Foreign Office considered that the priority was not to
sustain EC solidarity at all costs, but to maintain a
balance between the American and European circles of British 
3
diplomacy. There was at least a difference of tone and 
signalling between Heath and Home statements within a very 
few days of each other that " successive US Administrations
1. Heath note to Kissinger and Jobert conversation recounted 
in Henry Kissinger, The Years of Upheaval, Weidenfeld / 
Michael Joseph, London, 1982, PP 171-3.
2. Interview with Edward Heath, December 1988.
3. Interview with Lord Greenhill, January 1989.
337
have accepted that the price of foreign policy co-ordination
would be that European and American views would not be 
1
identical" (Heath) and " Europe does not intend to become a
third force between the superpowers, but a second force on
2
the side of the US". (Home) Moreover, the latter statement
was made just after the Nine had agreed their response to
the Year of Europe by issuing their declaration of European
identity. Although the latter contained a clause that
stressed the need to develop the EC in a fashion acceptable
to outside powers, it nevertheless was an attempt to
announce the EC ' s aspirations to a distinctive role in
international affairs. Home's statement thus raises an issue
that Ifestos rightly claims to have been muddied by
pragmatic reluctance to define operational principles for
EPC: should member states embody EPC declarations into their
own individual statements and assumptions, so that the
3
former become a kind of "acquis politique" ?
Indeed, wider processes of British Government failed to 
adopt the principle urged by Heath that EC members should 
only deal with outsiders after co-ordinating positions 
between themselves. Kissinger reacalls that " Home and the 
Foreign Office were still following more established habits 
of collaboration ( with the US) and did their level-best to 
hide their Prime Minister's foot-dragging" . Kissinger 
Interview with Heath, The Guardian, 5 December 1973.
2. The New York Times, 14 December 1973.
3. Ifestos, op cit, P 264.
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himself looked to bi-monthly meetings with Heath's own
Cabinet Secretary to keep US/UK relations on an unchanged 
1
basis.
Pragmatists often claim that EPC can avoid defining 
desirable patterns of arrangement for international politics 
or even questions of its own identity and role, as member 
states only need the mutual protection of a reactive 
mechanism; they can and should avoid attempts to reconstruct 
the international environment. The Heath experience 
illustrates the shortcomings of this view.
Heath had long been personally anxious about the possibility
of an oil crisis. In early 1971, he told Brandt that " if
the Arabs were agreed on anything, it was that the West
2
should be subjected to permanent blackmail". He then went on
to press for a common energy policy at the Paris summit of
October 1972. However, the Nine remained unprepared a year
later. The problem was that even effective "reactive"
politics required decisions on principles of arrangement. In
April 1973, the Commission had recommended that the Nine
should form a consumers group with other oil importing
3
countries in the AIC area, but the French, and initially 
Heath, were later to consider this a provocation to the
Arabs and a concession of a supervisory role in EC affairs
1. Kissinger, op cit^ 1982, P 143.
2. Brandt, op cit, PP 466-7.
3. Ifestos, op cit, P 423.
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to the US. Perhaps even more important was the absence of
clear definitions of Community obligations. This meant that
individual efforts to defend national interests were also
those most likely to compromise the collective interest of 
1
the EC . Moreover, reactive and proactive politics may not
be separable: one may require the other. The Arabs had an
interest in the success of the EC to the extent that it was
an alternative economic partner to the US and it succeeded
in establishing a prototype and role for mechanisms of
2
diplomatic concertation in international politics. But this
required decisions on the independence of EPC positions and
on the relationship between economic power and diplomacy.
Indeed, by contrast to the pragmatic hope that, given enough
time, forms and principles can evolve imperceptibly and thus
non-contentiously, both Kissinger and the Arabs showed that
the very act of forming a new transnational arrangement such
as EPC is likely to lead outsiders to test its meaning. Home
expressed the forlorn hope of the pragmatist as follows:
" We would have preferred a different time scale for the 
Community of the Nine to shake down and find its way to 
common positions". 3.
In EEC matters, the Heath Government made suggestions to 
support its claim that decisions of institutional structure 
and principle could be avoided by simply making existing
1. Below PP 358-9.
2. David Allen, " The Euro-Arab Dialogue", Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol XVI, No 4, June 1978.
3. Kissinger, op cit, 1982, P 734.
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arrangements more efficient . In the early 1972, Pompidou
may have believed that British entry created the right
moment for an assault on the Commission’s role. He told the
Belgian Government that EMU could be developed without a
1
Community framework; if all members fixed their currencies
irrevocably, they would be compelled to adjust their
separate economic policies one to another. In the event that
there might still be some need for communications to ease
adjustments, Pompidou suggested a kind of extreme
intergovernmentalism: each government would appoint a
cabinet minister to take part in a management committee that
2
would sit, if necessary, in permanent session.
However, Heath regarded the relationship between an 
initiating, mediating Commission of impartial experts and a 
Council of states with vetoes as ingenious pragmatism that 
reconciled collective effectiveness with state sovereignty. 
He thus wrote of the need for:
" a balance between three kinds of EC institution: those
through which national control can be exercised, independent 
Community institutions and those through which a popular 
voice can be expressed". 3.
Where Pompidou had argued that the EMU programme should be 
simplified to the fixing of currencies in order to keep it 
within EC institutional capacities. Heath took a very 
different approach at the Paris summit. It has been seen
1. The Times, 8 June 1972.
2. ^  Monde, 30 March 1972.
3. The Financial Times, 1 January 1973.
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that he was active in suggesting a wide range of initiatives
for the Community to research, develop and agree before 31
December 1973. He was thus determined to improve the
workings of the Commission and Council, rather than scale
down policy goals. He proposed that both bodies should be
given more rigorous and co-ordinated programmes of action
with a precise timetable of deadlines for the submission of
1
reports and the making of decisions. He argued that the 
Commission would become far more effective if everyone
followed his example of appointing senior politicians with 
authority and good access to national governments. In the
Council of Ministers, Home urged the strengthening of low
level decision-making so that Foreign Ministers could 
concentrate on defining priorities and directions. Heath 
also opposed Pompidou’s scheme for the creation of European 
Ministries in each member state on the grounds that all
departments of national governments should communicate
directly with counterparts.
However, little progress had been made by the eve of the
review summit scheduled for December 1973. The grand
ambition of Paris contrasted with the tendency of each 
initiative to disappear into very minor, even trivial
proposals, as everything that might have caused disagreement 
was stripped away. During 1972-3, the creation of a common 
regional fund became a primary goal in Heath's European 
policy. However, when the Commission came up with proposals
1. The Guardian, 23 October 1972.
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it was for a fund of only 400m. A proposal, which might
have helped Britain, that 20% of all member reserves should
be pooled was first cut back to 10% and then transmuted into
nothing more than a "book-keeping" mechanism for states to
1
settle currency debts through the EC. When, in March 1973,
the Commission put forward proposals for a second stage of
EMU, they were actually more permissive than the first
stage. Meanwhile, several of the working groups on new
policies that Heath had urged at Paris either failed to
report, mired down in disagreements or ceased to meet
altogether. The latter category included discussions on a
common company law, which the British Government had
considered essential to its plans for a more open
2
continental market.
Points of contention, however minor, tended to be pushed to
the highest layer of inter-state bargaining available. Even
with the pressing agenda of problems at the end of 1973, a
meeting of the Finance Ministers had to concern itself with
3
the issue of tobacco imports. However, high level meetings 
were both infrequent and vulnerable to interruption by 
current exigencies. Heath has shown how little of the time 
was spent at the Copenhagen summit of December 1973 
reviewing the progress of the Community since October 1972 
once the Arab foreign ministers " announced that they were
1. Kruse, op cit, PP 142 & 203.
2. The Sunday Times, 30 December 1973.
3. The Guardian, 6 December 1973.
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going to take part in the conference" :
" we spent the morning of December 14th deciding whether or 
not to meet them.. .we spent the afternoon discussing what 
our Foreign Ministers should say to them. . the next morning 
we met with nine very tired Foreign Ministers".
When it came to preparing a communique, all that the
officials could, therefore, do was to write " down the views
of their countries on every subject and pin them
together, .we were faced with this to approve as a 
1
communique"
As with EPC, it would prove far more difficult than the UK 
Government had expected to make progress without confronting 
issues of institutional principle. Heath's own approach at 
Paris had shown that any UK goals for EC membership would 
have to be rolled up into a package sufficient to keep all 
members interested. But this clearly required agreed 
processes of low-level decision-making, as package deals 
were likely to break down if all items had to pass through 
the narrow bottle-neck of high- level decision-making. 
Agreed low-level processes would have to be capable of over­
riding cross-cutting standard operating procedures and 
institutionalised assumptions in national governments: they
required decisions on principles and practices of 
integration. Heath had looked to an energising Commission to 
overcome problems. However, the effectiveness with which the 
Commission could play an initiatory role could not be 
separated from the issue of national vetoes. Helen Wallace's
1. Heath, op cit, 1988, P 200-1.
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research into how the Commission drew up a proposal to meet
Heath’s strivings for a regional policy supports the
hypothesis that, so long as the Commission needs to
anticipate a single recalcitrant on any issue, it would not
base its proposals on criteria for effective policy-making,
but on "soundings" to discover the lowest common denominator
1
of what was negotiable between states.
A particular disappointment to Heath was that institutional
pragmatism made it hard to make EPC diplomacy "operational",
as opposed to merely declaratory. As Heath failed in his
personal hopes of integrating EPC with the security
relationships between EC states, he increasingly looked to
the deployment of the EC ’s economic strength across the
EC/EPC divide to create a new international actor. In June
1973, Britain’s First Permanent Representative in Brussels,
Sir Michael Palliser, warned of the dangers of diluting the
EC by creating too many decision-making centres, when
diplomacy and economic policy required a mutually helpful 
2
relationship. Where Pompidou had fiercely opposed the 
creation an EPC Secretariat in Brussels on the grounds that 
its members might become socialised into the Commission’s 
way of thinking. Heath felt that would be just the kind of 
synergy needed to make the Community work. However, the
1. Helen Wallace, " The Establishment of the Regional 
Development Fund: Common Policy or Pork Barrel" in Helen 
Wallace, William Wallace & Carole Webb", Policy Making in 
the European Community, Wiley, London, 1977 Edition.
2. The Daily Telegraph, 8 June 1972.
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failure to resolve this point meant that a Secretariat was 
not created at all.
Institutional pragmatism often attempts to evade contentious 
principles of political arrangement by implementing 
alternative approaches in parallel. Caught between a highly 
defensive British parliament in the immediate aftermath of 
entry and German and Dutch reluctance to proceed further 
with policies from which Britain might benefit without a 
strengthened European Parliament, Heath supported the Vedel 
report of 1972. He believed that a strategy that satisfied 
the supporters of both national and EC parliaments could be 
run in parallel for the foreseeable future. By drawing the 
membership of the European Parliament from members of 
national parliaments who chose to specialise in EC affairs, 
the former could win an important constituency in what were 
by nature competitor institutions. By expanding the tasks of 
the European Parliament before direct elections, its 
relevance could be made clearer to the public. In many ways, 
these were sound political judgements, but it was clear from 
the Vedel report that they only postponed choices of 
principle. Vedel suggested that the Parliament’s functions 
should be gradually expanded from limited rights of delay to 
full powers of co-determination with the Council on 
completion of EMU. But at what point along this continuum 
would the Parliament have to become directly elected and 
might it then claim a superior legitimacy over both 
national and other Community bodies as the only elected
346
institution capable of representing the interest of the EC
as a whole ? Could the EC really expand its tasks while
solving clashes of institutional principle by adding further
veto holders ? If not, would other veto holders in the
Community constellation have to lose out to accommodate an
1
effective Parliament ?
It is now worth returning to the EMU initiative to ask if 
pragmatism was likely to provide an evolutionary solution to 
obstacles presented to EC co-operation by short-term 
diversity of interests and alternative preferences for 
political end-states. During 1972-3, Britain, its partners 
and the Commission attempted to launch several packages in 
order to develop their several economic goals through EMU . 
Reflecting the need to handle economic relationships as a 
complex in order to deal with the technical inter­
relatedness of the variables and the political demands of
2
coalition building, they kept returning to a package with 
much the same mimimum mass: "fixed but adjustable exchange
rates", attempts to devise growth and inflation goals for 
each EC state and to subject economic management to mutual 
criticism, study groups on market liberalisation, regional 
policy and reserve pooling. Such approaches acknowledged the 
need for co-operation to deal with extensive economic 
variables, but they were pragmatic in their minimal
1. David Marquand, Parliament for Europe, Jonathan Cape, 
London, 1979, PP 191-2.
2. See above P 333.
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specification of obligations or of end -states.
However, any package of non-obligatory deals pinned together
from disparate economic perspectives would need "systemic"
qualities to survive, no less than a strategy that put its
money on a single economic paradigm or institutional
structure in the first place: there had to be clear
agreements on corrective mechanisms to return the package
1
deal to equilibrium, in the event of any unexpected
disturbance from either the international environment or
domestic economy of any member. But this in turn took the 
member states right back to the specification of priorities 
and obligations- the very points of principle that the 
pragmatic approach had sought to avoid. The two most 
important attempts that were made to put the British economy 
on a sufficiently convergent path to allow it to participate 
in the EMU initiative can both be seen to have broken down 
within weeks as the members of the enlarged EC were forced 
either to allow their economies to diverge, or to let some 
of their number fall out of the initiative for fear that it 
could not meet their goals, or to push EMU on to an 
entirely new plane of obligation, permanence and 
institutional development.
When Britain entered the snake in May 1972, it had been
hoped that a mutually reinforcing relationship could be
1. R. Lieber, Theory and World Politics, St Anthony’s/Allen 
and Unwin, London, 1972, PP 120-4.
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established between the convergence of members’ economic
policies, the harmonisation of their subsisting economic
situations and the progressive narrowing of margins by which
their currencies would need to fluctuate against each other.
However, Britain’s inclusion was probably hopeless so long
as the following principles were unresolved and the markets
knew them to be unresolved: the Heath Government’s complete
discretion to pursue the domestic policy of its choice, the
status of snake currencies as "fixed but adjustable" and the
under-cutting of the idea of collectively defended
currencies by the need for members to settle their reserve
debts at the end of each month. On the other hand, none of
these issues could be conclusivesly settled until they all
were: the member states were in a kind of prisoner’s
dilemma, in that each found there was at least one area in
which it could not afford to enter a binding obligation,
unless it could be sure that partners were tied in to
obligations on other issues. The Heath Government felt that
it could not fix the pound irrevocably without transnational
transfer payments sufficient to overcome any operation of
1
the law of uneven development. The German Government felt 
that it could not allow other members to use its reserves to 
protect their currencies before clearer obligations had been 
defined to prevent German credit being used to loosen 
counter-inflationary restraints in the EC.
These same patterns recurred when a second attempt was made
1." European Trends", EIU, op cit. No 35,May 1973, P 4.
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in December 1972 to create the conditions that would allow
Britain and its partners to go ahead with the second stage
of EMU from 31 December 1973. The package was soon
challenged when a massive outflow from the dollar in
February-March 1973 drove the pound and the mark further
apart. EC Governments were once again forced to consider the
issues of principle needed to keep their package of policies
together. Heath responded by suggesting to Brandt that the
Nine should move straight to the creation of a central bank
which could deploy the collective reserves of member states
1
against speculative flows.
However, the extension of credit to other EC members once 
again formed the point at which Bonn's complex bureaucratic 
politics would demand binding obligations of transnational 
economic management. The obligations that Britain might have 
been asked to accept to obtain reserve pooling from Germany 
can be deduced from a combination of the German Government ' s 
own Schiller plan of 1970 and the Commission's opinion of 
1973, outlining the variables that the members would have to 
handle in concert if they were to fix their exchange rates 
and achieve a neighbourly management of their 
interdependence : i) a central bank that would operate on
the Bundesbank model as an independent technocratic body, 
free of either national or Community political interference, 
to go well beyond the Heath aim of pooling currency reserves 
to fix domestic interest rates and credit expansion
1. Heath, op cit, P 203.
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(Schiller Plan): ii) a rolling programme of targets for the
deflationary/ reflationary stances of member budgets
together with the progressive harmonisation of methods of
economic management so that these would have similar effects
on competitive conditions throughout the EC. (Commission
proposals ). These might also have had to be decided by
majority voting: i.e. if a member was sufficiently un-
neighbourly, an economic policy might be imposed on it by
1
majority vote. (Schiller)
Common policies might at least have needed sufficient 
initial obligatory force and clarity of definition to be 
injected into the idiosyncratic vortex that each member 
faced between its internal and external environment, in such 
a way as to stabilise the situation and prevent further 
divergence . Divergence will create a wider dispersion about 
the EC average and thus raise the costs of transitional 
measures to bring members back to the point at which they 
can act in tandem to secure any benefits of collective 
action. In the case of Britain and EMU 1972-3, the UK was in 
a vortex of domestic inflationary expectations, a currency 
with an overhang of liabilities and a depreciating exchange 
rate, while Germany enjoyed a virtuous circle between price 
stability, the increasing popularity of Deutschmark assets 
and a rising currency. However, EMU became a receding target 
as it failed to deal with these conflicting vortices. The 
average annual inflation differential between Britain and 
T1 Kruse, op cit  ^ 67-9 & 160
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Germany rose from 1% between 1959 and 1968 to 5%, when
Britain was supposedly moving towards a second stage for EMU
1
between 1972 and 1974. The example of the stabilisation
targets that were agreed between Finance Ministers in
December 1972 illustrates the heavy transitional costs that 
Britain would have had to bear to return to a position in
which it could have operated a common policy with its new 
partners. Targets for monetary expansion to get Britain back 
on course for the second stage of EMU were set at 8% for 
1973; even with rising interest rates, credit eventually 
expanded by 31%. Where early stages of EMU were intended to 
buy time while members socialised their priorities and 
analyses of how a common policy could be made to work, the 
prospect of mounting costs of adaptation to a common policy 
acted as an incentive to proliferate excuses for not 
participating in the policy and a source of argument as to 
how transitional pains should be distributed.i.e. it caused 
reverse socialisation.
Brandt's reaction to Heath's proposal of March 1973 to pool 
reserves had, in fact, been to counter-propose a common 
float, which would have been an even tougher discipline for 
the British Government than the snake, which it had been 
forced to leave a year earlier; the domestic economies of 
Britain and Germany would have had to be managed with 
sufficient similarity for the pound to follow the mark
Yao-Su Hu ] Europe under Stress z Convergence and 
Divergence in the European Community, Butterworths, London, 
1982, PP 11-3.
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upwards against the dollar. However, France and the smaller 
members did enter a common float with Germany, illustrating 
a further danger of pragmatic, ad hoc approaches. For a few 
months, France and Germany became relatively "satisfied 
powers" within a more inclusive grouping that may have 
removed some of the pressure on them to keep a package deal 
in play that would apply to the whole EC and deliver British 
goals. The Heath Government certainly ran into enormous 
difficulties in its attempts to discuss further market 
liberalisation and an effective regional policy with the 
German Government during the course of 1973.
In the event, the common float broke down with the oil
crisis, but it had briefly illustrated a further danger of
fragmentation posed by institutional pragmatism. As efforts
switch away from transforming the whole complex of
relationships to voluntaristic packages of flexible
membership, those who are better placed to go ahead with an
initiative at the time form a more inclusive grouping which
may later become hard to enlarge as i ) the increased
divergence in technical conditions between insiders and
outsiders means that someone has to accept short-term
transition costs ii) insiders become relatively satisfied
and develop a complex of bargains between themselves that is
1
costly and uncertain to multilateralise. As this was a 
salient fear in Heath’s own interpretation of the
Helen Wallace and Adam Ridley, Europe: the Challenge of 
Diversity, Chatham House Papers, No 29, RKP/RIIA, London, 
1985.
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relationship between Britain and the EC, the rather bizarre
inclusion of a commitment in the Queen's speech of 31
1
October 1973 to go ahead with a second stage of EMU, when 
Britain had scarcely participated in the first stage and 
most other members had given up on the initiative during the 
summer of 1973, perhaps indicates Heath's own restlessness 
with institutional pragmatism by the end of 1973.
The chances of collaboration were also under-cut by attempts
to suspend reflection on end-states: the final principles of
arrangement, to which discrete acts of European Co-operation
could be seen as tending. The failure of actors to form
compatible expectations in this regard will not be a problem
where compensations can easily be arranged for unwanted
outcomes, or where actors are confident that outcomes will
be free from indivisibilities or irreversibilities in the
2
allocation of core values. However, British attempts to 
develop goals through EMU shows how attempts to mediate 
economic and welfare policies through the EC are likely to 
be afflicted by just such problems . British hopes for a 
significant regional fund and further market liberalisation 
were ground between contradictory French and German 
expectations of where the whole EMU package was leading. On 
the one hand, Bonn feared that the initiative would become 
stuck at some point along its planned trajectory at which
1. Observer Foreign News Service, 31 October 1973.
2. J. De Van Graaf, Theoretical Welfare Economics, CUP, 
London, 1957, PP 116-22.
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German resources would be "plundered" for Community 
policies, interdependence would be increased without the 
introduction of new economic disciplines and no institutions 
would exist to satisfy those Germans with a preference for 
supranational integration or for methods of democratic 
accountability co-extensive with the whole politico/economic 
complex in the EC. But the German Government was unable to 
present proposals to assuage these fears without provoking 
French anxieties of cumulative integration towards 
supranational forms.
The lesson was that preferred institutional configurations 
and questions of who would be net financial contributors 
were perceived as containing considerable indivisibility and 
irreversibility. Pragmatic under-statement only led to 
expectations of outcomes for core values being conditioned 
by the worst-case imaginings of individual governments, 
where a more explicit debate might have initiated progress 
towards more consensual views of how the EC should develop, 
under pressure of the knowledge that the alternative would 
be collective ineffectuality . The irrespresible tendency of 
actors to judge all specific proposals as contributing to 
general evolutions for their core values created a reverse 
situation to that suggested by pragmatists; instead of the 
holders of conflicting values being able to make substantial 
progress in parallel, they found it hard to deal with even 
relatively small issues - such as British goals for an ERDF 
and further market integration- without stabilising their
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perceptions of exactly what precedents they were 
establishing: views of whether the package would unleash
wider dynamics than intended, or stall in some incomplete 
condition. Institutional pragmatism worked against an 
evolutionary solution to the problems of co-operation 
because it precluded sufficient initial definition of 
obligations, or stabilisation of expectations. This analysis 
will now be continued in relation to the hope that problems 
of collective action needed to secure the goals of UK entry 
could be eased by emergent collaborative codes.
4. The disappointment of British hopes that the European 
Community would function as an effective 2 regime".
It has been seen how members of the Heath Government hoped
that a system of inter-state understandings and standard
working practices would " balance integration with
1
continuing national consent" (Rippon). International
Relations Theory has developed the term " regime" for norms,
rules and procedures around which actor expectations
2
converge. Robert Axelrod has shown how actors can build up
whole ecologies of co-operative norms and expectations
3
through precedents established in individual game plays.
Keohane has argued that as such codes emerge, inter-state
co-operation need no longer be confined to a chance 
Y] See above PP 100-4.
2. S.D. Krasner, ed. International Regimes, Cornell 
University Press, London, 1983.
3. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Co-operation, Basic 
Books, New York, 1984, PP 169-92.
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coincidence of short-term interests; it can begin to ground
1
long-term, coherent initiatives. In predicting that 
European co-operation would develop, like the British 
constitution, through a series of conventions, UK policy­
makers saw such a process as an extension of institutional 
pragmatism. Apart from allowing collective effectiveness to 
be reconciled with the continuing political decentralisation 
of the EC into a system of nation states, co-operation would 
become progressively easier through an evolutionary system 
of precedents that would avoid arguments about first 
principles. Some of the problems identified above 
conflicting perceptions of cause: effect
relationships, insufficient definition of Community
obligations to support continuous and complex EC
2
initiatives, non-commensurable expectations of end-states -
would disappear with the strengthening of intersubjective
structures in the EC. In this vein, Haas has argued that
3
regimes may provide an "evolutionary epistemology" between 
co-operating states.
However, it will be argued here that an evolutionary 
development of shared meanings and norms could not overcome 
the deficiencies of institutional pragmatism, as it was the 
TT See above P 107.
2. J. Galtung, " Expectations and Interaction Processes", 
Inquiry, Vol 2, No 4, Winter 1959, P 229.
3. E. Haas, " Words can hurt you : or who sai^ to whom about 
Regimes" International Organisation, Vol 36, No 2, Sprinq 
1982, P 208.
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very outcome that was inhibited by pragmatism. Moreover, the 
failure of British policy-makers to realise this contributed 
to the disappointment of hopes that the EC would respond to 
enlargement by making a new start in the direction of 
strengthened regime characteristics. First, it is useful to 
develop two cases of regime failure during the Heath period.
When the Arab states embargoed oil at the end of 1973, they
split oil consumers into three categories. This presented a
particular challenge to the EC states, as some of their
1
number were placed in each group. Britain and France were
considered sufficiently sympathetic not to be embargoed at
all, the Netherlands was totally embargoed and the rest were
su bject to monthly reductions of 5% in their supplies. In
spite of the privileged status of Britain and France, a
general shortage of oil would clearly affect their own
supplies, their import costs and the overall competitiveness
of their economies. Britain and France thus led rather than
restrained a competitive, nationalistic scramble to secure
supplies on favourable terms. As well as making private
deals with oil producers. Heath at one stage, attempted to
order all British Petroleum tankers, laden with oil
2
supplies, to divert to British ports. Meanwhile, the Germans 
tried to secure their supplies by buying anything they could
1. Robert Lieber, " Europe and America in the World Energy 
Crisis", International Affairs, Vol 55, No 4, October 1976.
2. Interview with Lord Greenhill, January 1989.
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obtain in the oil futures market. Where effective regimes
are supposed to enable states to co-ordinate moves to
minimise damage from "shock" events, the EC states
contributed to what Keohane has described as an outcome in
which the Advanced Industrial Countries chose the "defect
1
strategy" in a game of prisoner's dilemma. As Lord Greenhill 
admits, the EC countries had helped to bid up the price of 
oil against themselves. Oil prices quadrupled between 
December 1973 and January 1974.
Where the Copenhagen report of just a few months earlier had 
attempted to strengthen the EC "regime processes" by 
introducing the idea that members would develop a " co­
ordination reflex" - a habit of mutual consultation before 
taking unilateral actions- the oil crisis showed how 
vulnerable the steady accumulation of EC regime 
characteristics was to sudden disintegration. Britain and 
France threatened to prohibit the re-export of oil, in
contravention of the free movement of goods under the Treaty 
2
of Rome. Breach of even a fundamental and enforceable 
principle, was bound to be corrosive of confidence that 
elaborate EC initiatives could be constructed in the future 
on little more than expectations of mutual observance. The 
crisis also set off a cycle of retaliation in the Community; 
the putative norm that members would attempt to keep 
initiatives in play by discussing matters until a solution 
T1 Keohane, op cit, 1984, P 223
2. Ifestos, op cit , P 428.
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was reached that all could accept now slipped into its 
opposite; what was left of the attempt to develop a new 
package of policies for the enlarged EC was threatened with 
fragmentation as everyone sought to veto everyone else’s 
preferred programme.
The second example concerns the difficulties Heath 
confronted in attempting to develop a regional policy 
through the EMU initiative. Heath chose this means to 
consolidate EC entry in British domestic politics precisely 
because it avoided offence to pre-existing norms: if a
regional policy (ERDF) was a logical component of a monetary 
union, it would not offend the principle that it was non- 
communautaire to discuss net national contributions to the
budget. However, it should by now be clear that the ERDF
could only establish the former identity in the context of a 
more ambitious and irrevocable transition towards EMU than 
was then economically or politically possible. As the 
British Government slipped out of the snake and joined 
France in rejecting even a stronger regime of economic 
policy co-ordination, the ERDF could no longer be plausibly 
presented as part of a wider initiative: it re-emerged as
little more than a pay-off to Britain.
If the ERDF was not to be developed as a component of EMU,
the French Government was determined to include some of its 
1
own regions. This seems to have been the point at which the 
T1 Basse et al, op cit, PP 13-9.
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economic ministries in Bonn insisted that the ERDF, however 
modest, was beginning to form a precedent for the plundering 
of German resources by Community partners. The German 
Government dropped hints throughout 1973 that a regional 
policy should not form an attempt to negotiate a new pattern 
of inter-state transfers; instead it should be conditioned 
by the principle that the Community would help uncompetitive 
regions to redeploy their manpower in response to the 
widening of the market and it should draw its funding from a 
scaling down of subventions to the CAP as the latter 
attained its purpose. From the British point of view, it 
looked as if Germany was pitching it into conflict with the 
French over the norm that the acquis was unalterable, France 
was driving it deeper into an argument with the Germans over 
the principle that the budget could not be set with regard 
to national shares, while no-one was taking any notice of 
the norm that Britain itself had attempted to establish 
during the 1970-1 negotiations to the effect that all would 
co-operate to prevent situations arising in which one 
national member could be locked into EC arrangements that 
happened to develop in a way prejudicial to its interests. 
The partners were not being helped towards a fruitful co­
operation by a clearly defined normative order. On the 
contrary, they were finding it hard to agree even modest 
policies for fear that these would become precedents for 
competing concepts of the normative basis that their co­
operation should assume.
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The key to an effective regime-based co-operation is that 
the code of understandings should be sufficiently well- 
defined and politically robust for partner states to
hold to its precepts without interruption. It is the 
prospect that individual governments will need EC regimes in 
the future and that they can place trust in their long-term 
operation, that holds them into agreements, in spite of 
short-term disadvantages . Thus to launch a collaborative 
experiment and then to fail does not return actors to the 
status quo ante: it erodes the confidence that EC deals can
be seen to fruition through no more than self-enforced
reciprocation and without supranational institutions.
1
Analytic learning suggests that, where a regime based co­
operation fails, no harm need be done; next time round, all 
governments are wiser. However, i) the environment may 
become less tractable during, and even as a result of, 
failed experiments and ii) policy-makers may be frustrated 
and not educated by failure; cybernetic learning shows how 
actors may become peremptorily dismissive of a process, 
pigeon holing it as having been shown to be unworkable by 
the "facts", rather than analysing the causes of breakdown 
and inferring conditions under/it might be made to work.
The latter was the dominant reaction in UK politics to the 
disappointments of the first year in the EC. It has been 
seen how many in Britain adopted a simple feedback model to 
assess the new relationship. As the failure of EMU dragged 
XT See above P 12 '
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down more specifically British goals of further market
liberalisation and constructing a substantial regional
policy, the proportion of the public that believed Britain
should remain a member of the EC on existing terms fell from
1
31% in January 1973 to just 23% in July. Palliser recalls a
growing frustration in the Government that Heath was
investing all his energies in EC processes that -  ^ were
yielding no results; there was a strong move to reverse
Heath's directive to all departments to develop options for
European collaboration and to return to old forms of
2
independent, national decision-making. Britain could have
reacted to the oil crisis by offering its EC partners
preferential access to North Sea Oil in exchange for a
radical transformation of Community policies to serve UK
goals. Lord Armstrong recalls that there was simply not
enough confidence in Community processes for this to have
3
been thinkable in terms of British domestic politics. The 
Times reflected a perception that the EC was incapable of 
equitable treatment of British interests.
" Britain cannot take it for granted that the North Sea will 
be a national boon; much of it may have to be diverted to 
the rest of the world" 4
By 1974, The Social and Community Planning Research group 
found that 63% of the public thought that Six benefited 
The Times 6 July 1973.
2. Interview with Sir Michael Palliser, February 1989.
3. Interview with Lord Armstrong, January 1989.
4. The Times, 15 December 1973.
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most from the EC, while only 2% felt that Britain did.
British confidence that codes of co-operation could provide 
evolutionary solutions to the problems of inter-state 
collaboration were incompatible with pragmatic obfuscation, 
as regimes need a sufficient initial endowment of agreed 
meanings and principles to ensure the smooth and continuous 
growth which is the key to their operation and survival. The 
Heath experience is instructive because it gives an idea of 
what the interruptions to codes of EC co-operation are
likely to be and thus of the extent and nature of principles
that need to be defined from the outset.
Regime characteristics have to be equal to the fact that 
decentralised enforcement makes each government the 
interpreter of obligations in its own case, although each 
will have its own evoked set of immediate concerns, 
distinctive positioning on the electoral cycle and so on.
There is a clear conflict between pragmatic deals that allow 
each member to read a different interpretation of its 
obligations into the package and the need for norms to be 
robust and unambiguous in proportion to the operation of the 
system by decentralised self-enforcement.
By January 1974, Anglo/German acrimony over the ERDF had 
reached a pitch at which their delegations apparently
R Jowell and G Hoinville, Britain into Europe: Public 
Opinion and the EEC: 1961-75, Groom Helm, London, 1976, P 57
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exchanged comments about the war during one meeting on the 
1
fund, yet each Government considered itself to be operating
within the deal established at Paris in October 1972: a deal
which Le Monde had described as attempting to disguise
2
disagreements by opening up wider perspectives. Indeed, many
in the British Government considered the ERDF to have been
part of an understanding at the time of the negotiations
3
that new policies would develop to Britain's advantage.
Institutional pragmatism undoubtedly responded to a great 
dilemma faced by the enlarged EC at its inception. In many 
ways the collaborative needs and expectations of members 
were well-advanced, yet attempts to thrash out codes of co­
operation were likely to produce an immediate phase of 
contention, as there was still considerable diversity of 
opinion on what EC norms should be and any attempt to
arbitrate between these would systematically structure the
4
distribution of values in the EC area. However, the 
pragmatic alternative of pressing ahead with initiatives, 
while allowing each member to believe that its own 
interpretations of norms were generally accepted, only 
discredited the possibility of regime based co-operation by 
leading to failure and feelings of betrayal.
T1 Interview with Sir Michael Palliser.
2. ^  Monde, 23 October 1972.
3. Michael Butler, Europe: More than a Continent, Heinemann, 
London, 1988, PP 92-3.
4. See above P 26.
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Such was the ambiguity of the EC normative order that when
Heath followed the French into making bilateral oil deals
with the Arabs, "Community obligations" scarcely featured in
British decision-making, in comparison with domestic crises
which were steadily reducing the Government to a hand-to-
mouth existence. On hearing of the outbreak of the war in
the Middle East, Heath immediately realised that he was
1
likely to face a miners strike. If Britain was to go without
coal, the survival of the Government demanded that it should
act immediately to secure oil supplies. As Palliser and
Armstrong recall, Britain contributed to the demise of hopes
that the EC would make a new start as a collaborative
2
grouping, before realising that it had offended any norms. 
The way in which confidence can be damaged by launching co­
operative codes with insufficient initial definition is well 
illustrated by the conflict between statements by Heath and
Pompidou that no norms had been broken as energy policy was,
3
as yet, outside the Community system, and a comment by
German Finance Minister, Helmut Schmidt, which in turn fed
back into British disillusionment with the EC:
" West Germans are not in a mood to go to the help of 
countries ( referring to the ERDF), which are not themselves 
in a mood for co-operation ". (referring to oil sharing) 4.
Interview with Madron Seligman, " The Seventies".
2. Interviews with Palliser and Armstrong, Jan/Feb 1989.
3. Interview with Edward Heath, December 1988.
4." European Trends", Economist Intelligence Unit, Vol 38, 
February 1974, P 11.
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Indeed, some of the earlier points about launching
initiatives without understanding the extensity of variables
that will have to be controlled or the intensity and
permanence of obligations that will be needed can also sap
confidence in the steady growth of EC regimes. When the
Heath Government had not re-fixed the pound by July 1973,
Heath received a message from Pompidou that he considered
Britain in breach of the understandings reached at Paris in
May 1971 and that he would not consider the UK a full member
1
of the EC until the pound returned to the snake.
Regimes would also appear to be vulnerable to interruption 
if they fail to produce quick action to develop packages 
that give all participants a basic interest in their 
operation. The norms of EC collaboration can rarely be 
expected to be fully discounted into domestic consciousness. 
This makes it important that there should be some 
unequivocal "national interest" in the Community status quo 
to which appeal can be made whenever domestic politics put 
pressures on governments to interrupt the smooth 
accumulation of Community norms. In this regard, Paul Taylor 
has commented that the failure of the Nine to move quickly 
to a new "central bargain" to ground the enlarged EC in 
arrangements that gave each member state a clear interest in 
the portfolio of Community policies put British governments 
in a far more difficult position than any the French or 
German Governments had ever faced in persuading domestic 
T1 Interview with Edward Heath, December 1988.
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1
constituencies of the need to hold to Community norms.
It has been seen that a low level of socio-psychological
identification with the EC made it all the more important
for Britain to have material incentives to hold to codes of 
2
EC co-operation. However, the problem of creating a well- 
defined British interest in the EC returns us to the earlier 
analysis which suggested that institutional pragmatism was 
unequal to the technical or political challenges of forming 
a package deal for the "Second Europe", let alone to the 
decision-making capacity that was required for the EC to act 
before British domestic perceptions became disullisioned 
with European co-operation.
But perhaps the most important point of all was that the 
uninterrupted evolution of EC-based regimes was continuously 
threatened by the diffraction of policy-makers' efforts 
towards action through wider multilateral fora, more 
exclusive groupings of EC states , or the nation state 
itself. The EC was effectively in competition with 
alternative groupings to provide member states with "regime 
chararcteristics". If the international monetary crises of 
1968-71 had initiated a period particularly propitious for 
West European states to form regimes around the EC, the oil 
crisis shifted the balance back in favour of Atlanticist 
regimes under US leadership. Where the Nine failed to show 
Taylor, op cit, P 2991
2. See above PP 297-302.
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solidarity with an especially vulnerable member - the
Netherlands - or to conclude arrangements to keep the oil
flowing, the oil companies worked out an elaborate system of
1
rationing at US prompting. By February 1974, Britain was
taking the lead in pressing for energy co-operation to be
based on Kissinger’s International Energy Agency. The nearly
2
audible relief with which Home turned to an OECD-based
solution illustrated three perceived advantages of
Atlanticist over European regimes. First, it was easier for
some member states to secure particular interests at the
former level . Britain would not be the only energy producer
in a grouping that included the US. Second, the US often had
the leverage to compel convergent analyses and speedy
decisions to co-operate; in the case of oil, it could do
this through its position as the "swing consumer" in the
international market. Third, in a typical piece of
analogical reasoning, the Nine had extrapolated the
successes of the EC in the 1950's and 1960's, to assume that
the EC could operate as an optimal policy-making area with
the same ease in the 1970's; this had ignored the extent to
which earlier achievements had rested on the wider zone of
stability provided by the Bretton Woods system and the fact
that transatlantic interdependencies were often greater than
3
intra EC interactions in the new agenda of monetary, as
opposed to trading, economics. In these circumstances, the 
Ifestos, op cit, P 429.
2. Kissinger, op cit, 1982, PP 911& 920
3. Strange in Tsoukalis, op cit, 1985, P 39.
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EC could only act as a bloc with sufficient internal 
integration to neutralise the effects of exogenous stimuli 
and to overcome differences of opinion about extra EC 
relationships. The political trade-offs that this would have 
involved made it easier for Britain in particular to return 
to what had initially been its preferred model in any case: 
OECD based regimes.
The 1972-4 experience suggests that EC regimes will find it
hard to develop without interruption, until their
intersubjective structures are able to rival those
established within nation states. There was a perpetual
tendency to relapse into independent, national action, so
long as this was able to draw on well-defined routines and
reflexes to produce speedy decisions with clearer procedural
legitimacy, if not more consensual assessments, than was
likely at the EC level. It has been seen how EMU was
repeatedly fractured by standard national reflexes to short-
1
term economic developments. Both Barber and Allen recall
that the reflationary budget which made it so hard for
Britain to stay in the snake in 1972 was preceded by the
first rise in unemployment above a million since 1947 and by
police reports that the line could not be held against
bitter industrial disputes if the economic outlook
2
deteriorated further. In such circumstances, reflation was
1. See above PP 325-31 & 348-53.
2. Interviews with Anthony Barber and Sir Douglas Allen, 
"The Seventies"
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simply axiomatic to a postwar British Government.
The domestic pressures on Heath to return to settled
1
patterns of national policy-making reflected the
difficulties of establishing the legitimacy of Community
processes or of significant transnational payments, which
would be needed to make many common policies work.
Expectations of national parliamentary accountability,
established by the all-party report of October 1973, were 
2
noted above. The Treasury opposed a ^  4.5m payment into an
EC Social Fund in July 1973, while attempting to impose the
principle that Britain should not agree to any new policy
under which it could not be expected to receive as much as 
3
it contributed. Palliser recalls that it was also eager that
any payments from the ERDF should go straight into Treasury
coffers to offset the costs of existing national policies,
4
rather than to fund EC policies in Britain. Even Heath had
limited the transnational socialisation of UK Government by
aiming to develop a Whitehall system of co-ordinating policy
towards the EC that would be quite as disciplined as the
5
French to the pursuit of national priorities.
Carole Webb argues that the " politics of resource 
Ï1 See above P 363.
2. See above P 309.
3. The Sunday Times, 29 July 1973.
4. Interview with Sir Michael Palliser, February 1989.
5. Sasse et al, op cit, P 39.
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allocation, bargaining and interest mediation have deep
1
roots in domestic politics". Buchan has remarked that the EC
2
consists of " already highly governed states". Hoffmann has
pointed out that even crises will not necessarily lead to
catalytic conversions of states into wider entities better
able to deal with the international environment. Each
society may react by clinging all the more determinedly to
its "own political culture" and by lowering expectations of 
3
its own state. Governments may have to worry that there are 
thresholds in public perceptions at which inter-state co­
operation is sufficient to disrupt and make a mockery of 
established national authority and normative orders without 
substituting viable alternatives. The mediation of 
collective action through the state may also be a source of 
psychic value, yielding a clear delineation of a social 
identity through continuous self-management and assertion.
The more policies are poured through co-operative processes,
4
the greater the confusion in self-environment conceptions, 
as to whether the insitutional personality of society has 
become a fiction, superseded by opaque and elusive processes 
between states. A functional case may be made for trans­
national solutions, but decision-makers may be satisficers
Carole Webb, " Theoretical Perspectives and Problems" in 
Wallace, Wallace, Webb, op cit, 2nd Edition, P 37.
2. A. Buchan, The End of the Postwar Era, Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, 1974, P 209.
3. S. Hoffmann, " Reflections on the Nation State in Western 
Europe Today", in L. Tsoukalis, ed. The European Community: 
Past, Present and Future, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983.
4. See above PP 23-4.
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rather than optimisers; where optimising involves giving up
some values to obtain the best overall outcome, satisficers
snatch at the first solution that promises to be broadly
1
satisfactory in terms of all values. It has been suggested 
here that British actors epitomised a preference not to 
confront the value trade-offs involved in developing new 
transnational behaviours and forms, but to continue to work 
through the state so long as results were merely mediocre, 
rather than disastrous. Moreover, as the " normal course" 
this will always be the first option in the search field of 
a peremptory, satisficing decision-maker.
5. The Limits of Leadership Solutions.
The final claim made by British Governments before entry was
that the UK would be part of the "EC leadership", allowing
it to achieve the benefits of collective action without the
2
need to compromise national preferences. By the time of the
Heath Government, this notion was normally expressed in
terms of a UK/French/German triangle at the centre of the
EC. For example. Heath’s first reaction to Kissinger’s Year
of Europe initiative was, in fact, to propose a series of
3
British/French/German/US steering groups.
1. H.A. Simon, " From Substantive to Procedural Rationality" 
in Anthony McGrew and M.J. Wilson, eds, Decision-Making : 
Approaches and Analysis, OUP, London, 1982, PP 87-97.
2. See above PP 118-23.
3. Kissinger, op cit, 1982, P 162.
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The theory of the inner triangle was that it could provide
what William Wallace has called a "parallel network of
intensive bilateral links as a necessary adjunct to
1
multilateral processes". The triangle could be a subtle 
system of pressures and incentives to co-operate with a 
permanent tendency to implosion. Each of the big three would 
compete to ensure that its two bilateral relationships were 
closer than those of the others. The other members would be 
brought into the process as they lobbied the big three and 
the latter sought their support to tip the balance in 
the bargaining within the triangle.
However , Table 14 reveals that the triangle was unlikely to 
act as a force motrice, as almost every disagreement that 
existed in the EC as a whole could also be found in the 
inner grouping. In fact, this chapter has deliberately 
concentrated on the British/French/German relationship to 
illustrate EC disagreements, in order to show that the 
triangle was a source of stalemate rather than initiative in 
the early 1970’s.
A conventional crticism of the Heath Government is that it
failed to move from a bilateral focus on France to use a
triangular relationship with Germany to its advantage. From
this point of view. Heath’s diplomacy was an inertial
continuation of assumptions employed during the entry
1. William Wallace, Britain’s Bilateral Relations within 
Western Europe, Chatham House Paper No 23,RKP/RIIA, London, 
1984, P 9.
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negotiations: that Britain could only establish its place
within the EC by seeking to please the French Government. 
However, Table 14 shows that Heath was quite as likely to 
agree with the Germans against the French as vice versa. The 
real problem that he met was that the triangle was no basis
TABLE 14 : BRITISH/FRENCH/GERMAN 
X singifies agreement to position.
ALIGNMENTS 1972-3
Topic Br Fr Ger
1972
EEC/EPC contacts. X X
No strengthened institutions for EMU. X X
No weakening of Commission. X X
Market integration before fixed 
currencies. X X
Joint position for GATT round. X X X
Postpone directly elected 
parliament.
X X
Reserve pooling. X X
Joint position for CSCE. X X X
1973
No institutionalised contacts with US. X X
Membership of common float from March. X X
A limited regional fund. X X
No energy sharing. X X
An EC/Arab dialogue. X X X
European Council. X X X
1974
Participation in lEA. X X
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for a leadership solution, as the complexities of 
negotiating packages within the inner grouping were little 
less staggering than those involved in a full multilateral 
negotiation amongst the Nine.
Because the British Government's contacts were with Brandt
and the German Foreign Ministry, it may have believed that
the agreement on the ERDF was secure, little realising the
opposition that would come from the Finance and Economics
Ministries, forcing Britain to accept conflict with France
over the acquis if it wanted to attain substantial funds for
1
regional development. Greenhill recalls the difficulties of
2
dealing with a Government that " did not talk to itself".
Heath claims that, in spite of the position of the German
Finance and Economics Ministries, he had made an agreement
with Brandt in October 1973 that generous funding would
eventually be found for an ERDF in exchange for agreement to
3
an EC directive on workers’ participation.
The Heath experience shows how leadership ambitions may 
become a source of conflict in the EC. In line with Heath’s 
perception that the extra-regional contacts and roles of 
individual member states would be additive contributions to 
the bloc power of the EC, the French and, at first, the 
British Governments had been irritated by what they saw as a 
Sasse et al, op cit~ PP 13-9.
2. Interview with Lord Greenhill, January 1989.
3. Interview with Edward Heath, December 1988.
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failure by the rest to avoid provoking the Arabs while 
Anglo/French diplomacy worked out a solution to everyone’s 
benefit. However, there was no reason why the rest of the EC 
should accept this interpretation, as opposed to one that 
saw Britain and France as attempting to secure a competitive 
advantage through cheaper energy supplies, or diplomatic 
leadership by acting as the EC’s commodity broker.
Leadership notions may have satisfied British cravings for 
status and a wish to avoid the conclusion that national 
values would have to be sacrificed for membership to work. 
However, it was by no means clear that Britain would be well 
served by a system of leadership by individual states. 
Whilst triangular leadership proved problematic, the Heath 
period revealed that there were two alternatives, which 
would have excluded Britain. The common float in 1973 raised 
the possibility of a reversion to a Franco-German axis at 
the centre of the EC, while Germany’s defence of the 
Netherlands during the oil crisis and the eventual 
transmutation of the snake into a Deutschmark zone , 
suggested the possibility of a leading German role based on 
its domination of smaller, surrounding economies. Far from 
being able to function as one of the leaders, a combination 
of economic weakness and of the low socialisation of British 
domestic and bureaucratic politics into such norms of EC co­
operation as had developed by the early 1970’s, meant that 
Britain tended to fall out of agreements. Given Bruno Frey’s 
application of public choice theory to show that countries
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will react to the steeply rising marginal costs of expanding
collaborative groupings by building the latter in the order
in which nations rank as " good co-operators" up to a point
at which the coalition has the critical mass needed to
1
attain collusive goals, it was clear from the outset that
membership of the EC was insufficient to protect it from
2
exclusion from an inner core of European co-operation. One 
way out was a radical improvement in Britain’s circumstances 
and its stake in membership. However, it has been seen that 
matters then turned full circle to the extent of policy 
development and institutional growth that would be needed 
for functional and political reasons. Contrary to notions of 
leadership, the Heath Government found that all attempts to 
use the EC for British goals drew it into discussions of 
several options that had little support in its own domestic 
or bureaucratic politics. It found itself in the weak 
diplomatic position of having to make extensive demands on 
other members, while being able to offer little that would 
have made progress with Britain more attractive than more 
exclusive acts of collaboration.
To conclude the chapter as a whole it would seem that the
primary assumptions made at the time of British entry
concerning identity of member interests, pragmatic
1. Bruno Frey, " A Public Choice Theory of International 
Political Economy", International Organisation, Vol 38, No
1, Winter 1984.
2. Above P 353.
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development, the existence of a code of understandings and 
potential for British leadership - were simplifications, 
less important for their realism than for their ability to 
screen out " dissonances" that suggested the difficulty of 
attaining the goals of membership without some sacrifice of 
values held by national policy-makers. It is unsurprising, 
therefore, that the collapse of each assumption was related 
to the need, which British actors had attempted to avoid, to 
make choices between traditionalist and transformationalist 
approaches to EC membership. Were British Governments 
prepared to accept the need to make progress across a whole 
complex of issue areas, in order to attain co-operative 
goals ? Had they yet realised that even if institutions were 
not integrated, common policies would need to be adequately 
integrated to attain continuity and coherence ? Had they 
accepted that EC regimes could only present evolutionary 
solutions to the problems of European collaboration if they 
were sufficiently defined and dominant over national 
normative codes to develop without interruption ? As a late 
entrant in difficult circumstances, were Britain's interests 
really best served by a limited relationship that stressed 
leadership by states, of which it was not the strongest in 
its ability to form collaborative coalitions, rather than 
more ambitious collective action, initiated by Community 
bodies with a clearer interest in evening up the conditions 
of the disadvantaged ?
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CONCLUSION.
The aim of this work has been to use the case study of
British entry to the EC to demonstrate the theoretical
benefits of explaining foreign policy change by means of a
critical account of structure and a cognitive hypothesis of
decision-making. For this to have been successful it should
have expanded understanding of British entry to the EC in
line with Popper's injunction that a theoretical perspective
adds to knowledge if it a) generates a wealthier output of
secondary hypotheses that b) fits more of the facts than c)
1
previous theoretical accounts.
It has been claimed here that a cognitive/critical approach
to foreign policy analysis meets Popper's criteria by
providing an analysis of British entry to the EC that is
both richer and more plausible than previous accounts
that have presented it as an inevitable adjustment by a
2
country that had " nowhere else to go" . Not only are there 
good reasons for believing that the fact of entry was less 
than predetermined, but there are better reasons still for 
holding that the manner of entry was open-ended in terms of 
the following: the forms that an enlarged Community would
take, the intersubjective structures and patterns of 
alignment that would characterise a new EC , the cognitive 
environment that would shape both the preferences of British
1. Above PP 28-9.
2. Above P 5.
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foreign policy-makers for different approaches to EC co­
operation and their interpretations of the experiences and 
results of membership and the ways in which the British 
domestic setting would incline UK Governments to support 
some trajectories of EC development rather than others.
The ability of the cognitive/critical combination to advance
hypotheses about foreign policy change from a plausible
point of intersection between theories of structure and
choice enables whole new dimensions of theoretical
explanation to be opened that were previously blocked by
the failure of equilibrium theories of change to say
anything about intermediate perceptions, decisions,
processes, events and interactions and of decision-making
theories to say much about contexts. Indeed, of particular
value here has been the use of the cognitive/critical
combination to attempt a measure of the variable character
of foreign policy change in the following way: to form a set
of hypotheses about the fractured, recursive and emergent
operational structures in which a government was making its
foreign policy, to analyse the nature of its foreign policy
assumptions or cognitive structures, and then to yield
conclusions about the gap between the operational and the
cognitive that could serve as a measure of the completeness
1
by which a foreign policy is adjusted to its context. Of
2
course, this is no more than Brecher has suggested, except 
See Introduction for definition of terms.
2. See above P 11.
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that critical theory is introduced here as a means to model 
the operational environment, where Brecher only went as far 
as to employ cognitive theory to capture the nature of 
foreign policy assumptions. The value of such a method can 
be demonstrated by briefly drawing together the conclusions 
that it has yielded over previous chapters.
All sections - on initial contexts, the negotiations,
domestic politics and first steps in European co-operation -
have shown that the operational environment of British
European policy was, indeed, fractured and recursive: of the
structuring dimensions of foreign policy - the power of the
British state in a field of inter-state diplomacy, the
competitiveness of the British economy, the electoral
survival of British Governments and the intersubjective
understandings of European co-operation- it was hard to meet
the demands of each simultaneously; on the other hand, none
could be neglected or allowed to absorb disproportionate
resources and attention. Indeed, it was to improve Britain's
ability to deal with such an operational environment that
1
policy-makers sought EC membership in the first place.
However, it has been seen that the more fractured and
recursive the operational environment the more integrated
2
the cognitive environment of foreign policy needs to be: 
such settings place a premium on the ability to recognise 
opportunities and to form transnational coalitions to trade
1. Chapter 1.
2. See above P 130 and Chapter 7.
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off values on the best possible terms.
As governments react to fast moving events, they will often
have to depend on implicit beliefs or operating procedures,
but this makes it all the more important that they should
examine the plausibility and consistency of their
assumptions at those critical junctures when they change the
basic frameworks from which they intend to operate their
foreign policy. At any one moment, their models of the
environment will have to be simplifications to enable
decisions to be made in conditions of uncertainty, but this
does not preclude their explicit articulation or debate , or
even periodic efforts to test, elaborate and amend them in
the direction of greater value integration. Nor does the
excuse of insufficient time for reflection necessarily cover
long-term decisions of foreign policy orientation. In
Britain's case, adaptation to EC membership spanned the
years 1960-72. Thus it has been claimed here that British
1
foreign policy-makers committed a category error in claiming 
that EC membership was best approached "pragmatically" : 
they confused a method that is suited to dealing with events 
from well-established assumptions with a "framework 
decision" that was concerned with setting up the assumptions 
from which British foreign policy should operate in the 
first place.
The result of this was a discernible lack of integration in 
See above PP 137-8.
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British foreign policy assumptions and values at the point 
of entry to the EC. Some recognition of the need for a state 
in Britain's position to adopt a transformationalist 
approach to foreign policy in the new context of EC 
membership was combined with a reluctance to abandon 
traditionalist assumptions, although holding to the one 
would narrow the attainability of goals that were beginning 
to be developed under the other. Hence the conclusion that 
entry would remain an inchoate act of foreign policy 
adjustment until British policy-makers either gave clear 
backing to a traditionalist approach by abandoning many of 
the goals for which they had sought membership in the first 
place, or accepted that the aims of EC entry would draw them 
deeper into a transformationalist foreign policy than had 
been initially appreciated.
The conclusion that EC entry was an inchoate change 
contrasts with the contemporary assumption that EC 
membership was a "solution" to Britain's postwar foreign 
policy problems: the final act of adjustment by a once-great 
power to changed international realities. The argument here 
is that EC entry merely rolled up into a new context all the 
predicaments identified by critics such as Frankel, 
particularly the tensions between the conventional 
assumptions of foreign policy-making and the changing 
operational contexts of British society, economy and state. 
Indeed, in many ways, attitudes that were designed to ease 
the psychological adjustment to change meant that EC
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membership became the focus for perpetuating old delusions
by new means. British leadership of the EC and its political
skills, the identity of British interests with those of
other members and the potential for institutions and
policies to develop "pragmatically" were all presented as
allowing Britain to attain as much as it wanted from an
effective European collaboration without any need to
question the foreign policy methods, roles and assumptions
of the traditional nation state, or Britain’s own preferred
1
diplomacy with the rest of the world.
There were good reasons of cognitive theory to predict that 
this lack of value integration would become a stubbornly 
structural feature of British membership of the EC. A
pragmatic tradition meant that the assumptions that guided
policy were insufficiently articulated, criticised or cross­
correlated for them to be quickly identified as at fault in
2
the light of experience. The
traditionalist/transformationalist schizophrenia was also 
politically comfortable and convenient; by giving the
impression that change could be placed in a context of
continuity it responded to the high value that Britain’s 
elite placed on its own consensus; it gave the impression 
that foreign policy could adjust without upheavals in a 
domestic political game and political culture that were in 
ÎT See above Chapter 2.
2. Above PP 130-8.
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many ways poorly suited to the enmeshment of a substantial
1
slice of British policy-making in a Community of states.
Finally, the inter subjective structures of the Community
itself were still too confused and contested to constitute
clearly-defined conceptual challenges to any deficiencies in
2
British foreign policy assumptions towards the EC, while the
negotiations had ended with actors agreeing to enlargement
from a wide variety of very different viewpoints as to how
3
the Community should develop. It is for other studies to 
push the analysis beyond 1974, but it is hoped that this 
account of British entry to the EC has revealed some of the 
problems that were present at the creation of the new 
relationship.
1. Chapter 6.
2. Above PP 325-32 & 356-73.
3. Above P 231.
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